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  <updated>2026-11-18T15:38:00+00:00</updated>
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  <title type="html">Bitcoin Optech</title>
  <subtitle>Helping Bitcoin-based businesses integrate scaling technology.</subtitle>
  <author>
    <name>Bitcoin Optech</name>
  </author>
  <entry xml:lang="en">
    <title type="html">Bitcoin Optech Newsletter #429 Recap Podcast</title>
    <link href="https://bitcoinops.org/en/podcast/2026/11/03/" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="Bitcoin Optech Newsletter #429 Recap Podcast"/>
    <published>2026-11-03T00:00:00+00:00</published>
    <updated>2026-11-03T00:00:00+00:00</updated>
    <id>https://bitcoinops.org/en/podcast/2026/11/2026-11-03-recap</id>
    <content type="html" xml:base="https://bitcoinops.org/en/podcast/2026/11/03/">&lt;p&gt;Mark “Murch” Erhardt, Gustavo Flores Echaiz, and Mike Schmidt are joined by
Elias Rohrer, Greg Sanders, Antoine Poinsot, Oleksandr Kurbatov, and Nishant
Bansal to discuss &lt;a href="/en/newsletters/2026/10/30/"&gt;Newsletter #429&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;

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&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;The Bitcoin Optech Podcast and transcription content is licensed Creative Commons &lt;a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0/legalcode" target="_blank"&gt;CC BY-SA 2.0&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

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  &lt;h2 id="news"&gt; News
    
  &lt;/h2&gt;
  
    &lt;ul&gt;
      
      
      &lt;li id="silent-payments-for-multiparty-wallets" class="anchor-list"&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
          &lt;a href="#silent-payments-for-multiparty-wallets" class="anchor-list-link"&gt;●&lt;/a&gt;
          Silent payments for multiparty wallets
          (&lt;a href="javascript:void(0)" title="Play this segment of the podcast" onclick="seek('41:18')" class="seek"&gt;41:18&lt;/a&gt;&lt;noscript&gt;41:18&lt;/noscript&gt;)
&lt;a href="/en/newsletters/2026/10/30/#silent-payments-for-multiparty-wallets"&gt;
    &lt;i class="fa fa-link" title="Link to related content"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
&lt;/a&gt;

    &lt;a href="#silent-payments-for-multiparty-wallets-transcript"&gt;
        &lt;i class="fa fa-file-text-o" title="Read this segment of the transcription"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
    &lt;/a&gt;


        &lt;/p&gt;
      &lt;/li&gt;
      
      
      &lt;li id="cln-self-referential-channel-announcement-dos-disclosure" class="anchor-list"&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
          &lt;a href="#cln-self-referential-channel-announcement-dos-disclosure" class="anchor-list-link"&gt;●&lt;/a&gt;
          CLN self-referential channel announcement DoS disclosure
          (&lt;a href="javascript:void(0)" title="Play this segment of the podcast" onclick="seek('52:57')" class="seek"&gt;52:57&lt;/a&gt;&lt;noscript&gt;52:57&lt;/noscript&gt;)
&lt;a href="/en/newsletters/2026/10/30/#cln-self-referential-channel-announcement-dos-disclosure"&gt;
    &lt;i class="fa fa-link" title="Link to related content"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
&lt;/a&gt;

    &lt;a href="#cln-self-referential-channel-announcement-dos-disclosure-transcript"&gt;
        &lt;i class="fa fa-file-text-o" title="Read this segment of the transcription"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
    &lt;/a&gt;


        &lt;/p&gt;
      &lt;/li&gt;
      
      
      &lt;li id="bitcoin-core-security-policy-update" class="anchor-list"&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
          &lt;a href="#bitcoin-core-security-policy-update" class="anchor-list-link"&gt;●&lt;/a&gt;
          Bitcoin Core security policy update
          (&lt;a href="javascript:void(0)" title="Play this segment of the podcast" onclick="seek('24:53')" class="seek"&gt;24:53&lt;/a&gt;&lt;noscript&gt;24:53&lt;/noscript&gt;)
&lt;a href="/en/newsletters/2026/10/30/#bitcoin-core-security-policy-update"&gt;
    &lt;i class="fa fa-link" title="Link to related content"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
&lt;/a&gt;

    &lt;a href="#bitcoin-core-security-policy-update-transcript"&gt;
        &lt;i class="fa fa-file-text-o" title="Read this segment of the transcription"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
    &lt;/a&gt;


        &lt;/p&gt;
      &lt;/li&gt;
      
    &lt;/ul&gt;
  

  &lt;h2 id="selected-q-a-from-bitcoin-stack-exchange"&gt; Selected Q&amp;amp;A from Bitcoin Stack Exchange
    
  &lt;/h2&gt;
  
    &lt;ul&gt;
      
      
      &lt;li id="why-does-bitcoin-use-both-a-transaction-id-and-a-witness-transaction-id" class="anchor-list"&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
          &lt;a href="#why-does-bitcoin-use-both-a-transaction-id-and-a-witness-transaction-id" class="anchor-list-link"&gt;●&lt;/a&gt;
          Why does Bitcoin use both a transaction ID and a witness transaction ID?
          (&lt;a href="javascript:void(0)" title="Play this segment of the podcast" onclick="seek('1:02:58')" class="seek"&gt;1:02:58&lt;/a&gt;&lt;noscript&gt;1:02:58&lt;/noscript&gt;)
&lt;a href="/en/newsletters/2026/10/30/#why-does-bitcoin-use-both-a-transaction-id-and-a-witness-transaction-id"&gt;
    &lt;i class="fa fa-link" title="Link to related content"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
&lt;/a&gt;

    &lt;a href="#why-does-bitcoin-use-both-a-transaction-id-and-a-witness-transaction-id-transcript"&gt;
        &lt;i class="fa fa-file-text-o" title="Read this segment of the transcription"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
    &lt;/a&gt;


        &lt;/p&gt;
      &lt;/li&gt;
      
      
      &lt;li id="how-to-sign-a-musig-with-bitcoin-core" class="anchor-list"&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
          &lt;a href="#how-to-sign-a-musig-with-bitcoin-core" class="anchor-list-link"&gt;●&lt;/a&gt;
          How to sign a MuSig with Bitcoin Core
          (&lt;a href="javascript:void(0)" title="Play this segment of the podcast" onclick="seek('1:07:54')" class="seek"&gt;1:07:54&lt;/a&gt;&lt;noscript&gt;1:07:54&lt;/noscript&gt;)
&lt;a href="/en/newsletters/2026/10/30/#how-to-sign-a-musig-with-bitcoin-core"&gt;
    &lt;i class="fa fa-link" title="Link to related content"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
&lt;/a&gt;

    &lt;a href="#how-to-sign-a-musig-with-bitcoin-core-transcript"&gt;
        &lt;i class="fa fa-file-text-o" title="Read this segment of the transcription"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
    &lt;/a&gt;


        &lt;/p&gt;
      &lt;/li&gt;
      
      
      &lt;li id="what-changed-in-bitcoin-p2p-protocol-version-70017-compared-to-70016" class="anchor-list"&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
          &lt;a href="#what-changed-in-bitcoin-p2p-protocol-version-70017-compared-to-70016" class="anchor-list-link"&gt;●&lt;/a&gt;
          What changed in Bitcoin P2P protocol version 70017 compared to 70016?
          (&lt;a href="javascript:void(0)" title="Play this segment of the podcast" onclick="seek('1:09:11')" class="seek"&gt;1:09:11&lt;/a&gt;&lt;noscript&gt;1:09:11&lt;/noscript&gt;)
&lt;a href="/en/newsletters/2026/10/30/#what-changed-in-bitcoin-p2p-protocol-version-70017-compared-to-70016"&gt;
    &lt;i class="fa fa-link" title="Link to related content"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
&lt;/a&gt;

    &lt;a href="#what-changed-in-bitcoin-p2p-protocol-version-70017-compared-to-70016-transcript"&gt;
        &lt;i class="fa fa-file-text-o" title="Read this segment of the transcription"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
    &lt;/a&gt;


        &lt;/p&gt;
      &lt;/li&gt;
      
    &lt;/ul&gt;
  

  &lt;h2 id="releases-and-release-candidates"&gt; Releases and release candidates
    
  &lt;/h2&gt;
  
    &lt;ul&gt;
      
      
      &lt;li id="bitcoin-core-32-1" class="anchor-list"&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
          &lt;a href="#bitcoin-core-32-1" class="anchor-list-link"&gt;●&lt;/a&gt;
          Bitcoin Core 32.1
          (&lt;a href="javascript:void(0)" title="Play this segment of the podcast" onclick="seek('35:56')" class="seek"&gt;35:56&lt;/a&gt;&lt;noscript&gt;35:56&lt;/noscript&gt;)
&lt;a href="/en/newsletters/2026/10/30/#bitcoin-core-32-1"&gt;
    &lt;i class="fa fa-link" title="Link to related content"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
&lt;/a&gt;

    &lt;a href="#bitcoin-core-32-1-transcript"&gt;
        &lt;i class="fa fa-file-text-o" title="Read this segment of the transcription"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
    &lt;/a&gt;


        &lt;/p&gt;
      &lt;/li&gt;
      
      
      &lt;li id="bitcoin-core-31-2" class="anchor-list"&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
          &lt;a href="#bitcoin-core-31-2" class="anchor-list-link"&gt;●&lt;/a&gt;
          Bitcoin Core 31.2
          (&lt;a href="javascript:void(0)" title="Play this segment of the podcast" onclick="seek('39:18')" class="seek"&gt;39:18&lt;/a&gt;&lt;noscript&gt;39:18&lt;/noscript&gt;)
&lt;a href="/en/newsletters/2026/10/30/#bitcoin-core-31-2"&gt;
    &lt;i class="fa fa-link" title="Link to related content"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
&lt;/a&gt;


        &lt;/p&gt;
      &lt;/li&gt;
      
      
      &lt;li id="bitcoin-core-30-4" class="anchor-list"&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
          &lt;a href="#bitcoin-core-30-4" class="anchor-list-link"&gt;●&lt;/a&gt;
          Bitcoin Core 30.4
          (&lt;a href="javascript:void(0)" title="Play this segment of the podcast" onclick="seek('40:42')" class="seek"&gt;40:42&lt;/a&gt;&lt;noscript&gt;40:42&lt;/noscript&gt;)
&lt;a href="/en/newsletters/2026/10/30/#bitcoin-core-30-4"&gt;
    &lt;i class="fa fa-link" title="Link to related content"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
&lt;/a&gt;


        &lt;/p&gt;
      &lt;/li&gt;
      
      
      &lt;li id="bitcoin-core-29-5" class="anchor-list"&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
          &lt;a href="#bitcoin-core-29-5" class="anchor-list-link"&gt;●&lt;/a&gt;
          Bitcoin Core 29.5
          (&lt;a href="javascript:void(0)" title="Play this segment of the podcast" onclick="seek('40:53')" class="seek"&gt;40:53&lt;/a&gt;&lt;noscript&gt;40:53&lt;/noscript&gt;)
&lt;a href="/en/newsletters/2026/10/30/#bitcoin-core-29-5"&gt;
    &lt;i class="fa fa-link" title="Link to related content"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
&lt;/a&gt;


        &lt;/p&gt;
      &lt;/li&gt;
      
      
      &lt;li id="eclair-0-14-6" class="anchor-list"&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
          &lt;a href="#eclair-0-14-6" class="anchor-list-link"&gt;●&lt;/a&gt;
          Eclair 0.14.6
          (&lt;a href="javascript:void(0)" title="Play this segment of the podcast" onclick="seek('1:12:37')" class="seek"&gt;1:12:37&lt;/a&gt;&lt;noscript&gt;1:12:37&lt;/noscript&gt;)
&lt;a href="/en/newsletters/2026/10/30/#eclair-0-14-6"&gt;
    &lt;i class="fa fa-link" title="Link to related content"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
&lt;/a&gt;

    &lt;a href="#eclair-0-14-6-transcript"&gt;
        &lt;i class="fa fa-file-text-o" title="Read this segment of the transcription"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
    &lt;/a&gt;


        &lt;/p&gt;
      &lt;/li&gt;
      
      
      &lt;li id="lnd-v0-21-5-beta" class="anchor-list"&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
          &lt;a href="#lnd-v0-21-5-beta" class="anchor-list-link"&gt;●&lt;/a&gt;
          LND v0.21.5-beta
          (&lt;a href="javascript:void(0)" title="Play this segment of the podcast" onclick="seek('1:13:36')" class="seek"&gt;1:13:36&lt;/a&gt;&lt;noscript&gt;1:13:36&lt;/noscript&gt;)
&lt;a href="/en/newsletters/2026/10/30/#lnd-v0-21-5-beta"&gt;
    &lt;i class="fa fa-link" title="Link to related content"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
&lt;/a&gt;

    &lt;a href="#lnd-v0-21-5-beta-transcript"&gt;
        &lt;i class="fa fa-file-text-o" title="Read this segment of the transcription"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
    &lt;/a&gt;


        &lt;/p&gt;
      &lt;/li&gt;
      
    &lt;/ul&gt;
  

  &lt;h2 id="notable-code-and-documentation-changes"&gt; Notable code and documentation changes
    
  &lt;/h2&gt;
  
    &lt;ul&gt;
      
      
      &lt;li id="bitcoin-core-36665" class="anchor-list"&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
          &lt;a href="#bitcoin-core-36665" class="anchor-list-link"&gt;●&lt;/a&gt;
          Bitcoin Core #36665
          (&lt;a href="javascript:void(0)" title="Play this segment of the podcast" onclick="seek('3:43')" class="seek"&gt;3:43&lt;/a&gt;&lt;noscript&gt;3:43&lt;/noscript&gt;)
&lt;a href="/en/newsletters/2026/10/30/#bitcoin-core-36665"&gt;
    &lt;i class="fa fa-link" title="Link to related content"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
&lt;/a&gt;

    &lt;a href="#bitcoin-core-36665-transcript"&gt;
        &lt;i class="fa fa-file-text-o" title="Read this segment of the transcription"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
    &lt;/a&gt;


        &lt;/p&gt;
      &lt;/li&gt;
      
      
      &lt;li id="bitcoin-core-36667" class="anchor-list"&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
          &lt;a href="#bitcoin-core-36667" class="anchor-list-link"&gt;●&lt;/a&gt;
          Bitcoin Core #36667
          (&lt;a href="javascript:void(0)" title="Play this segment of the podcast" onclick="seek('14:37')" class="seek"&gt;14:37&lt;/a&gt;&lt;noscript&gt;14:37&lt;/noscript&gt;)
&lt;a href="/en/newsletters/2026/10/30/#bitcoin-core-36667"&gt;
    &lt;i class="fa fa-link" title="Link to related content"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
&lt;/a&gt;

    &lt;a href="#bitcoin-core-36667-transcript"&gt;
        &lt;i class="fa fa-file-text-o" title="Read this segment of the transcription"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
    &lt;/a&gt;


        &lt;/p&gt;
      &lt;/li&gt;
      
      
      &lt;li id="bitcoin-core-36669" class="anchor-list"&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
          &lt;a href="#bitcoin-core-36669" class="anchor-list-link"&gt;●&lt;/a&gt;
          Bitcoin Core #36669
          (&lt;a href="javascript:void(0)" title="Play this segment of the podcast" onclick="seek('19:02')" class="seek"&gt;19:02&lt;/a&gt;&lt;noscript&gt;19:02&lt;/noscript&gt;)
&lt;a href="/en/newsletters/2026/10/30/#bitcoin-core-36669"&gt;
    &lt;i class="fa fa-link" title="Link to related content"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
&lt;/a&gt;

    &lt;a href="#bitcoin-core-36669-transcript"&gt;
        &lt;i class="fa fa-file-text-o" title="Read this segment of the transcription"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
    &lt;/a&gt;


        &lt;/p&gt;
      &lt;/li&gt;
      
      
      &lt;li id="bips-2130" class="anchor-list"&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
          &lt;a href="#bips-2130" class="anchor-list-link"&gt;●&lt;/a&gt;
          BIPs #2130
          (&lt;a href="javascript:void(0)" title="Play this segment of the podcast" onclick="seek('1:15:55')" class="seek"&gt;1:15:55&lt;/a&gt;&lt;noscript&gt;1:15:55&lt;/noscript&gt;)
&lt;a href="/en/newsletters/2026/10/30/#bips-2130"&gt;
    &lt;i class="fa fa-link" title="Link to related content"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
&lt;/a&gt;

    &lt;a href="#bips-2130-transcript"&gt;
        &lt;i class="fa fa-file-text-o" title="Read this segment of the transcription"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
    &lt;/a&gt;


        &lt;/p&gt;
      &lt;/li&gt;
      
      
      &lt;li id="core-lightning-9627" class="anchor-list"&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
          &lt;a href="#core-lightning-9627" class="anchor-list-link"&gt;●&lt;/a&gt;
          Core Lightning #9627
          (&lt;a href="javascript:void(0)" title="Play this segment of the podcast" onclick="seek('1:17:33')" class="seek"&gt;1:17:33&lt;/a&gt;&lt;noscript&gt;1:17:33&lt;/noscript&gt;)
&lt;a href="/en/newsletters/2026/10/30/#core-lightning-9627"&gt;
    &lt;i class="fa fa-link" title="Link to related content"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
&lt;/a&gt;

    &lt;a href="#core-lightning-9627-transcript"&gt;
        &lt;i class="fa fa-file-text-o" title="Read this segment of the transcription"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
    &lt;/a&gt;


        &lt;/p&gt;
      &lt;/li&gt;
      
      
      &lt;li id="eclair-3417" class="anchor-list"&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
          &lt;a href="#eclair-3417" class="anchor-list-link"&gt;●&lt;/a&gt;
          Eclair #3417
          (&lt;a href="javascript:void(0)" title="Play this segment of the podcast" onclick="seek('1:19:13')" class="seek"&gt;1:19:13&lt;/a&gt;&lt;noscript&gt;1:19:13&lt;/noscript&gt;)
&lt;a href="/en/newsletters/2026/10/30/#eclair-3417"&gt;
    &lt;i class="fa fa-link" title="Link to related content"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
&lt;/a&gt;

    &lt;a href="#eclair-3417-transcript"&gt;
        &lt;i class="fa fa-file-text-o" title="Read this segment of the transcription"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
    &lt;/a&gt;


        &lt;/p&gt;
      &lt;/li&gt;
      
      
      &lt;li id="eclair-3416" class="anchor-list"&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
          &lt;a href="#eclair-3416" class="anchor-list-link"&gt;●&lt;/a&gt;
          Eclair #3416
          (&lt;a href="javascript:void(0)" title="Play this segment of the podcast" onclick="seek('1:26:02')" class="seek"&gt;1:26:02&lt;/a&gt;&lt;noscript&gt;1:26:02&lt;/noscript&gt;)
&lt;a href="/en/newsletters/2026/10/30/#eclair-3416"&gt;
    &lt;i class="fa fa-link" title="Link to related content"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
&lt;/a&gt;

    &lt;a href="#eclair-3416-transcript"&gt;
        &lt;i class="fa fa-file-text-o" title="Read this segment of the transcription"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
    &lt;/a&gt;


        &lt;/p&gt;
      &lt;/li&gt;
      
      
      &lt;li id="ldk-5314" class="anchor-list"&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
          &lt;a href="#ldk-5314" class="anchor-list-link"&gt;●&lt;/a&gt;
          LDK #5314
          (&lt;a href="javascript:void(0)" title="Play this segment of the podcast" onclick="seek('1:28:48')" class="seek"&gt;1:28:48&lt;/a&gt;&lt;noscript&gt;1:28:48&lt;/noscript&gt;)
&lt;a href="/en/newsletters/2026/10/30/#ldk-5314"&gt;
    &lt;i class="fa fa-link" title="Link to related content"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
&lt;/a&gt;

    &lt;a href="#ldk-5314-transcript"&gt;
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&lt;h2 id="transcription"&gt;Transcription&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Welcome everyone to Bitcoin Optech Newsletter #429 Recap.
Today, we’re going to talk about three Bitcoin Core security advisories; we have
Bitcoin Core’s security policy update as well, which came in handy or
potentially came in handy; Bitcoin Core 32.1 release, plus three point releases
that shipped alongside it; there’s a protocol for making silent payments for
multiparty wallets; we have discussion of a responsible disclosure in Core
Lightning (CLN) from a channel announcement that triggered a crash; we have our
monthly segment on the Stack Exchange, and we have our weekly Notable code and
Release segments as well.  We have a full house today.  This week, Murch,
Gustavo, and I are joined by a few folks.  We’ll have them introduce themselves
briefly.  Elias?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Elias Rohrer&lt;/strong&gt;: Hi, I’m Elias, I’m with Spiral working on LDK, but also on
Project Loupe.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Greg?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Greg Sanders&lt;/strong&gt;: Hi, I’m Greg, I’m also at Spiral.  I work on a mixture of
things, including Bitcoin Core and other layer 2 stuff.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Oleks?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Oleksandr Kurbatov&lt;/strong&gt;: Hey, Oleks, Blockstream Research.  The majority of my
time, I’m working on PQ stuff, but today it’s a different one.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Nishant?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Nishant Bansal&lt;/strong&gt;: Hey, I am Nishant and I work on fuzzing Lightning
implementations.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Thank you all for taking the time to join us and talk about
your respective items.  I think it’s great that we have firsthand accounts on a
lot of these things, so we appreciate it.  I’m sure the audience appreciates it.
For those listening at home, we’re going to go a little bit out of order in
deference to some of our guests.  We’re going to start with Project Loupe and
three Bitcoin Core advisories.  Elias, I know you were on with Gustavo a few
weeks ago for #426, and Greg, you’ve been on a bunch of times before, but today
we’re going to talk about three Bitcoin Core security advisories that were
published, I believe it was last Wednesday.  All three were found by Project
Loupe.  There were some additional researchers as well that also found similar
or the same issues, but after you guys had found them.  Maybe a quick
explanation or reminder of what Project Loupe is, Elias?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Elias Rohrer&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah, Project Loupe is essentially an initiative we started at
Spiral in roughly March, experimenting with automated LLM-based security
scanning for open-source projects.  We really started basically continuous
scanning for the first batch of projects that we onboarded in May.  Bitcoin Core
was part of that initial batch.  Since then, we opened up the program a bit for
further registrations for projects that are interested to be scanned.  Yeah,
please do if you’re interested.  Yeah, but it is an LLM-based security scanning
for Bitcoin open-source projects that we have been running for the last few
months and yeah, we produce a considerable amount of reports.  And according to
the change logs and public attributions, quite a few projects are actually
patching the vulnerabilities we found since then.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p id="bitcoin-core-36665-transcript"&gt;&lt;em&gt;Bitcoin Core #36665&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Excellent.  Well maybe we can get into the three that are from
our Notable code segment this week.  We can start with Bitcoin Core #36665,
which is the TCP urgent data bug.  I don’t know, Elias, if you want to go
through it and then Greg piggybacks, or Greg goes through it.  I don’t know what
you guys have in mind.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Elias Rohrer&lt;/strong&gt;: I think Greg will take us.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Greg Sanders&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah, so Elias’ role is making sure the system is up in place,
making the reports, but when it comes down to triage, that’s where this half
comes in.  So, the urgent packets report was one of the three where it came in,
I think, this is the one that came in last minute.  So, Antoine can speak more
to this, but there was a Bitcoin Core 32.0 release tag and releases being built
about to happen.  But shortly before that, Project Loupe spat out this last one.
I triaged it and basically, it lets an attacker easily out-of-memory (OOM) a
node if you are running on a non-Linux-based distribution.  So, that kind of
triggered this batch of issues needing to be solved kind of quickly.  And
Antoine can go more into that if he likes.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah, Antoine, what happened with 32.0 and 32.1 because of
this particular item?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Antoine Poinsot&lt;/strong&gt;: So, we were planning to do the first round of applying the
new security policy of Bitcoin Core for issues that are easily discoverable.
And so, now that they are public, we essentially had the other OOM issue, which
was also found by Loupe.  And we had the undo file overflow.  We picked these
issues because the other OOM issue is reasonably severe, but it’s not as bad as
the other one, because it’s slower to exploit.  And the undo file overflow is
merely theoretical.  So, we were planning on doing a 32.1, a 31.2, a 30.4, and a
29.5, so a set of minor releases for all maintained versions of Bitcoin Core
with patches for these issues.  And that’s when the new Loupe report came in.
Greg jumped on it immediately and said, “That’s probably bad”, forwarded it to
the security team.  We confirmed it was probably bad.  And over the weekend and
at the beginning of the following week, we worked on issuing minor releases,
including a patch for this bug, in addition to the two other bugs that we were
initially planning to release accelerated fixes for.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So, we had started planning to have accelerated releases already.  We just
decided to include the patch for this one, and also to not release the next
major version of 32.0 without the mitigation for this fix, because it would be
awkward to just send a major version to all users saying, “Hey, that’s the best
version of our software, update to this new version”, and then two days later,
“Actually there is critical OOM bug.  If you don’t run on Linux, upgrade to this
version.  And by the way, we knew about this bug before we released the last
major version”.  So, that would have been confusing signals.  If there was a
month between the two, that would probably be fine.  But given that we were
planning to do the accelerated releases within the next couple days anyways, the
maintainers, Ava and Michael, decided to just not follow through with 32.0 and
just jumped ahead to 32.1 instead.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Greg, any more color on this last-minute one that you all
found for 32?  Like, you mentioned that it’s operating-system specific.  Maybe
we can get into the details of the nuance between the operating systems?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Greg Sanders&lt;/strong&gt;: Right.  So, the way that the system is polling for packets
being sent by the peer is different based on architecture.  So, in 2018, Patrick
Strateman changed how Linux does it, but didn’t change how Windows, FreeBSD, and
so forth do it, I think from what I understand, mostly because of how those
operating systems would handle that particular method.  And so, it wasn’t a full
conversion.  And then, that was unchanged until now, pretty much, where the ones
that weren’t switched over back in 2018 were vulnerable to this issue.  So, I
think Antoine has some follow-up work to synchronize now that things have
changed in the interim, change that to synchronize so we have one system, one
path to think about.  That’s a follow-up issue past just making sure that nodes
aren’t easily crashable.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Antoine, I don’t remember if you mentioned it in your
discussion a minute ago, but you implemented the fixes for each of these three
that we’re going over, right?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Antoine Poinsot&lt;/strong&gt;: Yes.  So, we had the fixes for the slow-to-exploit memory
issue and the undo file overflow, because we had worked on it during the past
week.  And we immediately started implementing a fix as soon as Greg reported
the easy-to-exploit OOM bug on the Friday.  And we synchronized opening these
fixes in public.  Generally, for security patches, we poll, pun intended, a few
other contributors in private about the patch.  Back in the days, we would
sometimes ask somebody if they could find the issue that it fixes without
knowing about the bug in the first place.  For easily discoverable issues, we
obviously don’t do that anymore.  But we try to get some assurance that it
actually patches the bug completely, because it would be a massive mistake to
just go ahead, publish a fix in an accelerated release, publish all the details,
and it doesn’t patch it entirely; or worse, work on the fix, publish the fix,
make accelerated releases, but it introduces a regression in some other aspect
of the software that users depend on, and they can’t upgrade to the fix.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So, now you have the details published, but the fix is not available to the
users.  So, we try to make sure that we don’t introduce a regression, but still
completely patch the bug.  So, that was done during the previous week and over
the weekend.  And then, on Monday, we opened the fixes publicly because it’s an
easily discoverable issue.  We didn’t put too much effort in trying to cover the
patch, in trying to go around the fix to try to fix it.  Instead, we fixed it
directly to make sure that we actually fully fix it and not introduce a
regression.  But we also don’t try to unnecessarily call attention to, “Hey,
this is a security fix”, because at the time we opened the PR, there was still
no fixed version available to users.  And as soon as we open the PR, the race
begins of getting those PRs merged in time and then getting a release published
as soon as possible to users, which takes a long time.  There is a bunch of
processes, and then obviously, the Bitcoin Core releases are not just one person
building and signing and sending to users, which would make such process a lot
faster.  But we rely on a community of people building the software, the Guix
builds, and signing the software that is necessary to go through before the fix
is available to everybody.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;For this first experiment with these three issues, we were able to release the
binaries within 48 hours for all maintained versions from the point where the
PRs were open in public.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Murch, anything else?  Should we geek out a little bit more on
this one or move to the next one?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mark Erhardt&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah, maybe just, so this is the first time this new security
policy for easily-discoverable bugs has been used.  Have you gotten any feedback
so far?  It sounds like it went pretty well.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Antoine Poinsot&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah, an interesting aspect.  So, we have this security
team inside the group of Bitcoin Core contributors, and generally we work on the
security fixes within the security team, because for embargoed vulnerability
there is something like 40 contributors on Bitcoin Core.  So, if you share a
secret to 40 persons, it’s not a secret anymore.  But for these vulnerabilities,
they are easily discoverable, we are going to publicize them very soon, so we
could afford to share it with all contributors.  And I think that significantly
helped us move fast and get some more assurance that the fix is correct, because
we’ve got a lot more eyeballs than we generally do on security patches that are
fixed covertly.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p id="bitcoin-core-36667-transcript"&gt;&lt;em&gt;Bitcoin Core #36667&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Maybe we can move to the next one in the interest of time.
This is Bitcoin Core #36667, the slow leak on paused peers one.  What’s leaking,
Greg?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Greg Sanders&lt;/strong&gt;: So, this one is how a Bitcoin Core node deals with an
essentially unresponsive peer, or a peer that’s not draining what you’re trying
to send in.  So, you have this queue of things you’re trying to send the peer.
If they stop processing, taking that off the wire, this starts building up.  And
then, we have this logic in the node that says, “Hey, pause additional sending,
so don’t send certain amounts of certain types of messages to this peer anymore
to stop backlogging”.  But unfortunately, there’s a few message types that were
kind of whitelisted from this.  And one of those, the most important one by far,
ends up being the inventory message, so the message that says, “Hey, I have a
new transaction in my mempool for you”.  And so, these messages kept piling up
indefinitely.  And so, the average is something like eight to nine transactions
per second being queued up in this queue, which ends up having more and more
memory being used up and is never backstopped anywhere.  So, you can imagine a
case where you’d have a number of incoming peers to your node.  They
intentionally stop listening, kind of in a semi-malicious way, stop listening,
stop taking bits off the wire, and then grow this memory until your node
crashes.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So, obviously this is dependent on things that the attacker can’t control, like
how many inventory messages you’re sending.  And so, that kind of rate-limits it
and makes it slower, but there is a universality to it in that it doesn’t depend
on which operating system you’re using, unlike the other one.  So, it’s on the
order of, I can’t remember the number of connections, but days to weeks, kind of
thing, or your node will run out of memory.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Okay, yeah, I was going to say how long does it take, but it
takes a while?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Greg Sanders&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah, it’s fairly slow.  So, it’d be very unlikely to have a
network-wide effect, where every user gets hit at the same time.  Everyone has
different amounts of memory, a different amount of peers, and it’s slow.  So,
that’s why it wasn’t rated higher than it was.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: There would be no notification, obviously; this would be
something you just have to notice the memory usage climbing yourself?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Greg Sanders&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah.  And any deployments that are on Kubernetes, or
whatever, it would be a crash and then, it would be back up in a second.  So,
this more affects nodes that have less provision in terms of RAM and other
infrastructure.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: And this one was medium severity, right?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Greg Sanders&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah, medium because of the universality; not higher,
critical, because it can’t be a systemic issue, like an immediate systemic
issue.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Antoine Poinsot&lt;/strong&gt;: The cost to exploit is also not from the attacker’s pocket.
The attacker is leveraging normal network traffic and is able to attack all the
network at the same time.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Greg Sanders&lt;/strong&gt;: And they don’t even have to expend much bandwidth to do so,
right?  There’s no sort of proportionality at all.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Now, Antoine, the previous one, was also a medium, right?  I
think one of you used the word, ‘critical’, but is that because it doesn’t
affect all operating systems or was that just flowery language?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Antoine Poinsot&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah, the first one was also medium severity, because it
would only affect Windows users and macOS users and BSD users.  So, out of
those, it would probably be BSD users that are actually reachable on the network
and form some very tiny part of the backbone of the network.  But the vast, vast
majority of the backbone of the network is Linux.  So, if Patrick Strateman
didn’t fix that in 2019 for Linux, that would have been high for sure and
possibly critical, because it would allow anyone to just take down the entire
network immediately.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p id="bitcoin-core-36669-transcript"&gt;&lt;em&gt;Bitcoin Core #36669&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Last one of these three, Bitcoin Core #36669.  This is the
undo-file overflow.  Maybe Greg, as you explain, you just remind everybody what
these undo files are?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Greg Sanders&lt;/strong&gt;: So, these undo files allow a node to replay history backwards.
If there’s a reorg, you need your node to be able to step backwards in time, in
the UTXO-set sense, to play forward again.  And the way these files are built,
there’s this assumption that these files can’t get too large.  They’re bounded
by various factors and they can’t get too large.  But it turns out that under
certain extreme conditions, that these files can get larger than what the
addressing format was using.  Yeah, the variable internally was using 32-bit
variables and it would overflow.  And so, that means you’re reading and writing
into the wrong spots, and this could cause a crash, consistency issues, and in a
very theoretical sense, if everything goes right for the attacker and ten
months’ worth of blocks and very good luck, there could be some inflation, but
that’s very outside there.  It’s primarily a crash concern and primarily
theoretical.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Antoine, any color on this one?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Antoine Poinsot&lt;/strong&gt;: Not really.  I guess you could sensationalize it by saying,
“Because then, you could overwrite the UTXO set”, but it’s only in conditions
where the Bitcoin system is useless anyways, right, or you can have a 100-block
reorg, or an attacker can time a bunch of reorgs at a specific time and then a
follow-up reorg at a very specific other time.  So, it’s really theoretical.  We
had discussions about whether it should be a vulnerability at all, and also with
the previous policies.  So, should it require secrecy to fix this?  It was
discussed back in the day when the UTXO set model was implemented, actually when
Pieter Wuille introduced the chainstate database with the undo data.  It was
known that it was a limitation but it was not a priority at this time.  But
there’s also the case that it wouldn’t be very serious to just discuss all of
this publicly because of the potential impact.  So, that’s why we settled on low
severity, but it’s definitely the least interesting of the three that we just
released.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Greg or Elias, anything else to say on Loupe’s work into these
three?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Greg Sanders&lt;/strong&gt;: Well, I can speak to the reports.  So, Loupe gives a lot of
reports, I sift through hundreds of reports.  And primarily, my job as a triager
is I ignore the severity rating it gives and just pull on threads, and try to
have a focus on security model.  In that sense, a number of these leads have
been very helpful, obviously.  So, I’ve been very happy with the output so far.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: So, Loupe alone, for example, has hundreds of Bitcoin Core, I
guess, items for you, Greg, to triage as the subject matter expert at a deeper
level.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Greg Sanders&lt;/strong&gt;: Right, yeah.  So, some will be like, “Oh, these helper scripts
have an issue, like contrib tools”.  I just ignore those.  And then there’s some
that are API footguns that potentially could be problematic.  And there’s real
bugs that aren’t vulnerabilities, or, “What if the user does something very,
very stupid in their RPC?  It can take quadratic time to process”, whatever.
Okay, there’s those.  And then there’s also, on the far end, these serious
issues, and that’s what I tend to focus on, because there’s already a lot of
people working on the regular bug fixes in the open.  You can just look at the
GitHub tracker for issues and PRs.  There’s lots of tests, lots of bug fixes.
That is less of a good use of my time, I think, versus focusing on these tail
risk, what’s out there, and fixing those appropriately with reporting to the
security team.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Excellent.  Oh, sorry, go ahead.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Elias Rohrer&lt;/strong&gt;: Maybe one last comment on the volume there.  So, yes, Loupe
can create a high volume of reports, and that is the feedback we got from
several projects.  And that is perceived in part to be noisy, and we’re actually
working towards improving the quality of our reports and reducing essentially
the false positive rate.  But so far, we also basically intentionally erred on
the side of being conservative, and report more and leave it to the projects to
actually do triage how they would seem fit, basically, because we saw
misclassifications in both directions.  We would rather report a few more things
that the projects can filter out, maybe also with the help of LLMs, rather than
not report something that it turns out to be actually a high or critical
vulnerability in the end.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Well, thank you both for joining us.  I have a couple
follow-up questions for Antoine on the policy and security stuff, but you guys
are welcome to hang on, or if you have other things to do, we understand.  We
appreciate your time.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Greg Sanders&lt;/strong&gt;: Thank you.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Cheers.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Elias Rohrer&lt;/strong&gt;: Thanks.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p id="bitcoin-core-security-policy-update-transcript"&gt;&lt;em&gt;Bitcoin Core security policy update&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Antoine, in some of this discussion about vulnerabilities and
bugs, where should listeners sort of think that the line is?  I think that I did
a quick look at the PRs using some heuristics that went into 32, and there’s
something like 80 bug fixes that maybe went into 32 or 32.1.  And now, people
hear, ‘bugs’, and all this stuff going on online.  It’s like everything’s a bug
and a vulnerability, it gets blended.  So, how should listeners think between
those, whatever it is, 80 or whatever, I don’t know if that’s the right number
of bugs that are fixed in the open, versus the lowest low severity that you
might assign for a security vulnerability?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Antoine Poinsot&lt;/strong&gt;: I think it’s pretty simple.  When we say bug on its own,
it’s that it’s not something that is critical.  If it was, we would mention it.
For instance, we had a pretty critical bug with v30, with the wallet deletion,
that was not a vulnerability.  And it was taken very seriously and we took the
steps to advertise it to users.  The rest of the bug fixes are some small
malfunctions that should be fixed, but are not known to have very severe
consequences.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Are you saying that wallet deletion is a bug and not a
vulnerability, and maybe that’s a good one to distinguish for people?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Antoine Poinsot&lt;/strong&gt;: It’s not triggered by an attacker.  It’s a footgun.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Got it.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mark Erhardt&lt;/strong&gt;: Right.  So, bugs generally indicate any sort of way the
program can behave differently than intended; whereas vulnerabilities are often
based on a bug, but they are exploitable in a sense that someone else can do
something to you.  So, for example, with the wallet deletion bug, this was based
on the name of the file and the type of file.  And in certain combinations, it
would just behave incorrectly and fail to do the migration, I think, and then
delete the directory that was supposed to have been created, but in the case of
specific names, was actually the main wallet directory, right?  So, nobody else
can go on your computer and make a wallet on your Bitcoin Core in order to
trigger this bug because, well, if someone’s on your computer, you have other
issues already, obviously.  But yeah, the difference being bugs anywhere where
the software has a flaw that causes misbehavior; and vulnerabilities are things
that attackers can exploit to either crash or penetrate foreign devices.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Makes sense.  Antoine, we sort of started on your item already
and covered a good chunk of it, but I think there’s this sort of tension that
you outlined in the announcement of the policy change.  And maybe you can just
comment on that.  I don’t know if you commented on that earlier.  Maybe
listeners can understand how you’re thinking about this tension.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Antoine Poinsot&lt;/strong&gt;: I think the tension is on information asymmetry.  Let’s say
the starting point is already bad.  So, you discover a vulnerability in your
software, but in the software that you publicly develop and release.  So, that’s
already a bad situation.  How do you mitigate and not make it worse?  One way of
mitigating it is to make users as aware as soon as possible of the bug and
provide them a release that fixed the bug which happens to also be a
vulnerability.  That maximizes transparency and that minimizes information
asymmetry between an unsuspecting user that is not scanning the codebase daily,
and an attacker that may be scanning, with either his eyeballs or whatever
tooling he has, the codebase.  On the other end of the spectrum, you have
betting that an attacker cannot easily rediscover the vulnerability.  Patch it
in the open covertly under the guise of a mere refactoring or a new feature, and
you sneak in a patch for the vulnerability.  That’s how we historically
approached fixing vulnerabilities.  And you let the patch sit for a full
development cycle, and then make it available in a release.  Then, users
progressively upgrade to the new release.  And some amount of time later, you
publish the details of the vulnerability to make users aware that there was an
issue.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I think, due to the culture around Bitcoin Core users and just the nature of
Bitcoin Core, which represents the consensus rules of your money, you don’t want
to be upgrading your money every so often.  And this is reinforced by a culture
of very slow upgrades around users of Bitcoin Core.  For this reason, we
historically have been on the second end of the spectrum, the one which
maximizes the time, the embargo time, where we covertly patch everything, slowly
have users progressively upgrade because the fix is not made available in minor
releases, because it would make it obvious that it was a security fix, so it’s
only available through the new major releases.  And eventually, so something
like 18 months after it was discovered, we make it public.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;However, for things that are easily discoverable through LLMs or otherwise, it’s
just not the right trade-off, because it means that the fix sits there, that an
attacker or any script kiddie with the right tool can rediscover it.  And a fix
is not available to users.  So, for these bugs, we opt for the other end of the
spectrum, and we now try to make a fix available as soon as possible to users
instead, even if we compromise on making a fix more conspicuous than it could
otherwise be, for instance, because it’s already conspicuous, is the point.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: So, for things that are not easily discoverable, aka I guess
it would be like me pointing an LLM and saying, “Hey, find something here”, that
would be easy.  So, for the ones that don’t fall into the easily discoverable,
you still retain the existing policy; is that right?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Antoine Poinsot&lt;/strong&gt;: Yes, so we retain the existing policy by default, and the
easily-discoverable flag is a carve-out of the policy.  As an example, we also
confusingly pre-announced that we are going to release three security advisories
as part of the 32.1 release announcement, and the three pre-announced advisories
are not the same as the three advisories that we directly published at the same
time in 32.1.  So, we had three vulnerabilities, one low severity and two medium
severity, that were easily discoverable.  And we have three either medium- or
high-severity security issues that were not easily discoverable, for which we’re
going to publish the details about exactly a week from now.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: And so, those were fixed in previous versions covertly, and
they were in what then, 30, the ones that were fixed in 30?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Antoine Poinsot&lt;/strong&gt;: Yes, so for the regular policy, it’s to publish the details
of a vulnerability as soon as the last major version which was vulnerable to
this issue goes end of life, which means as soon as three releases with the fix
come up on top of the last vulnerability.  So, it means that the first release
that contains the fix for the first major version that contains the fix for
these bugs is v30.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Makes sense.  And maybe just to spell out for the audience, if
your eyes have glazed over from this discussion, or your ears, I guess, if that
vulnerability that came in late in the 32 development cycle hadn’t come in, and
instead came in today after a major release already, there would be a new point
release within days, right, something like this; is that right?  So, there could
be another one coming in, and that would be a quick version release coming in a
few days, just so folks can understand?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Antoine Poinsot&lt;/strong&gt;: Yes, exactly.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Because I think it was weird that it happened around 32.
Maybe people haven’t fully wrapped their minds around how this could go.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Antoine Poinsot&lt;/strong&gt;: Yes, exactly.  That’s what we would shoot for.  Obviously,
it’s not only up to me, but in all likelihood, if we have the same type of issue
that shows up today, we would do something very similar.  And it just so happens
that it happened exactly at the same time when we’re releasing a major new
version.  But it’s not going to happen the same every time.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Anyone else have questions for Antoine on this one?  Antoine,
we can do Bitcoin Core 32.1 with you and comment on the point releases as well,
or we can do them without you.  I don’t know what your schedule is like?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Antoine Poinsot&lt;/strong&gt;: I can stay for five more minutes.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p id="bitcoin-core-32-1-transcript"&gt;&lt;em&gt;Bitcoin Core 32.1, Bitcoin Core 31.2, Bitcoin Core 30.4 and Bitcoin Core 29.5&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Okay.  Well, we talked about why there’s no 32.0.  And so, I
guess we’re on 32.1, which we’ve covered most of the changes in there
previously, over the last month or so, during the RCs.  I think we had a
discussion on the testing guide which went into some of the features.  I can
just go off of a few here that I have in my notes.  Mempool-based fee
estimation; PSBTv2, and that’s also by default; there’s watch-only wallet
exports; there’s some improvements that went into faster block validation,
including some of the parallel prevout-fetching that we talked about in previous
newsletters, I don’t have that handy; there’s a note on indexing, I think it
went from 66 to 26, was the metric that I saw; there’s the change in max
connections from 125 to 200, which sort of lays the groundwork for a potentially
more connected network in the future.  And then, we have BIP434, which is the
feature message, and I think that we actually cover that separately so we can
get into that.  Murch or Gustavo or Antoine, other headline features?  We
obviously talked about the security fixes in there as well.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mark Erhardt&lt;/strong&gt;: I think you covered it.  We had also talked quite a bit about
that in episode #427.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Gustavo, anything from you?  Go ahead, Antoine.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Antoine Poinsot&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah, maybe something to quickly highlight is the new HTTP
server, as we just discussed security.  Bitcoin Core 32.1 is the first version
of Bitcoin Core that is shipping with its own implementation of an HTTP server.
And you may ask, “Why in hell would Bitcoin Core take on the maintenance of an
HTTP server?”  But the alternative, well, the status quo was using libevent,
which although it’s being used by large projects, was a massive unmaintained C
codebase.  In the age of automated vulnerability scanning, it was just an issue
waiting to happen.  So, we often talk about vulnerabilities after they happen,
but there’s a lot of work that goes into avoiding them in the first place, and I
think that’s one such case here.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah, sorry, I was just trying to find.  We had Zipkin on, who
did a lot of work around that.  So, if you look in the podcast for Zipkin, you
can see the show we did with him where we talked a bit about that.  So, yeah,
that’s a good one to articulate.  Okay.  Murch, what do you think?  Should we do
the rest of the point releases?  Should we let Antoine drop and then do those
later or?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mark Erhardt&lt;/strong&gt;: I think we more or less covered them already, right?  The main
point of them, well, every time we make a new major release, we usually also
backport bug fixes to the previous major releases that are still being
maintained.  So, for 32.1, the major release v29 is going to go out of
maintenance.  And so, for 29, 29.5 is probably the last release in the major
release series.  And yeah, I think other than that, it’s just things we’ve
talked about a lot already.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: I think that’s fair.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mark Erhardt&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah, plus the security fixes that we just discussed in
detail.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: 32.1 has those security fixes.  It trims the version bits.
That’s in BIP323 that we talked about before.  And it caps the private broadcast
queue to 10,000 transactions.  And then, there’s this compacting of the
chainstate database regularly.  30.4 also has those same security fixes, also
has the BIP323 warning change, and then there’s a DNS seed removal.  And then,
29.5 has the security fixes plus the DNS seed removal.  And then, as you
mentioned, Murch, 29 is end of life as of now-ish.  Anything else, Antoine,
before we let you go?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Antoine Poinsot&lt;/strong&gt;: No.  Thank you for having me.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p id="silent-payments-for-multiparty-wallets-transcript"&gt;&lt;em&gt;Silent payments for multiparty wallets&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Thanks for your time, Antoine, we appreciate it.  Cheers.
Okay, back up to the News section, “Silent payments for multiparty wallets”.
Oleks, you were on with us back in #392 to talk about BLISK, I believe, and
before that we had you on talking about OP_RAND emulation.  But we’re going to
talk about silent payments this go around.  You mentioned that you’ve been doing
a lot of post-quantum work.  So, how did you find yourself working on silent
payments?  Maybe talk about the use case for multiparty wallets and its relation
to silent payments.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Oleksandr Kurbatov&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah, actually it was a pretty funny story.  I was at a
conference in Neuchâtel last summer and there was some guy, unfortunately I
don’t remember the name, who talked about silent payments.  And I have seen that
the first time and I said, “All right, so there should be some algebraic
properties behind, so do they support FROST or MuSig2 solutions?”  Actually, he
didn’t know the answer, so I did my own research.  And yeah, it happens that in
the form of BIP352, it proposes that it doesn’t work in this way.  So, we need a
bit to reconstruct what they propose and it will work, without any modifications
to existing interfaces, to existing DLEQ proofs, etc.  So, everything is going
to be byte-to-byte compatible, so we don’t need to introduce some additional
stuff. Yeah, and I constructed that.  That’s it.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mark Erhardt&lt;/strong&gt;: So, just to be clear, we’re talking about FROST and MuSig on
the input side.  So, whether people that hold funds in shared ….&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Oleksandr Kurbatov&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah, because usually, if you have the single scan key,
that’s totally fine.  So, you are letting every party to detect all incoming
payments.  That’s fine because it doesn’t compromise your wallet trust model.
But actually, when you are spending from a multisignature wallet, it might be a
problem because to reconstruct an ECDH secret, in naïve form, you need to have
the scalar value on the single device, and we should avoid that.  And this
protocol allows you to calculate this ECDH point collaboratively between several
parties without reconstructing the main secret on the single device.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mark Erhardt&lt;/strong&gt;: Okay, so it’s actually exactly the other way than I
understood.  I thought it was about being able to send to silent payment
addresses, or from a multisig, because also the construction gets a little
complicated because you have to derive the shared secret.  But you’re talking
about receiving funds to a MuSig2-based silent payments address, and then
spending them afterwards; is that right?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Oleksandr Kurbatov&lt;/strong&gt;: Yes, I mean you can receive just a payment to
multisignature wallet, to a MuSig2, for example, wallet.  But when you want to
make a silent payment from this wallet, you can apply this technique.  So, this
is only relevant for the sender.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Sending from a silent-payment-received MuSig2 or FROST wallet;
is that right?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Oleksandr Kurbatov&lt;/strong&gt;: Right.  Any nested construction is also supported, so
nested MuSig or BLISK or, I don’t know, whatever you want.  So, all the
signatures share the single interface.  Just probably the difference is how
exactly they share the main scalar value between wallets is different from FROST
and MuSig2.  But basically, yeah, you can have a common approach, for example.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Now, you mentioned that BIP352 said explicitly not to do this?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Oleksandr Kurbatov&lt;/strong&gt;: It says we shouldn’t do that in the form they propose.
What they propose, you can just, I don’t know, take your share, multiply it by
base G, and then sum everything together.  And it doesn’t work, because first of
all you need to have coefficients.  In the case of FROST, you have Lagrange
coefficients; in the case of MuSig2, you have the aggregation coefficients,
which are a bit different.  So, the sum will not result in the needed value.
And secondly, yeah, we need to have another two-nonce technique, pretty similar
to MuSig2, to make this approach secure.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Now, you have a security paper, right, and that’s under
review?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Oleksandr Kurbatov&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah, I have a security paper.  Also, I have proven all
theorems with SSProve.  So, everything should be fine.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: I have in my notes here that there still is the hardness
assumption, that that’s still open.  What would it take to settle that if that
is open?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Oleksandr Kurbatov&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah, I mean there is no clear way how we can make a
reduction to AOMDL, for example.  That’s the main assumption behind the MuSig2
solution.  Because additionally to what MuSig2 shares, we share three additional
ECDH points inside.  That’s a scalar value multiplied to the G base and plus to
the scan key base.  That should be safe.  There is no known attack which allows
us to apply those values and recover the scalar value or make a proof for an
invalid, I don’t know, discrete logarithm, etcetera.  But still, there is no
known reduction of one problem to another problem.  And probably, that’s the
biggest gap.  We know there is a famous attack proposed by Cheon.  This is the
worst case we have, but still it allows you to produce up to 256 signatures
safely, which is a lot.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: I saw in the thread there was a user, MacGyver, who’s working
on Jade and COLDCARD support for this on signet.  Did you get a chance to look
at that?  And then maybe the broader question is, what has the response been
from essentially, I guess, signing devices or wallet providers on wanting to
support something like this?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Oleksandr Kurbatov&lt;/strong&gt;: I believe so, because recent incidents have shown that,
yeah, people should use multiparty wallets, because I mean your software and
hardware wallet might be compromised because of supply chain attacks or, I don’t
know, any problems with randomness.  Probably, we will implement it in Jade in
some future.  But again, for example, Blockstream app doesn’t support silent
payments right now.  That’s also the problem.  So, if you want to solve only the
problem with multiparty security model, that’s all right, there is a set of
wallets which resolve it.  But at the same time, they usually don’t implement
silent payments.  Actually, yeah, we want to raise this question between, I
don’t know, maybe Cake Wallet plus Electrum plus Jade, Blockstream App, etc.  I
think there is a demand.  Another question is how much time it might take to
make it implemented, because again, quantum computer is coming, etc.  That’s
actually my hobby, because the majority of the time I’m working on SHRINCS, etc.
But still, I think yeah, that might be a pretty interesting feature if you want
to support both elegant technologies and just fill the gap between them.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: As we wrap up here, it sounds like next steps would be to get
feedback on that security paper and is there then a BIP in the works?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Oleksandr Kurbatov&lt;/strong&gt;: I mean, I would like to hear your opinion on this point.
If this makes sense, I would be happy to work on that, but only if there is a
demand for the technology.  Because the security paper is ready, I just need to
publish it.  A BIP is, again, there is a common narrative that people should
stop working on pre-quantum cryptography.  I don’t agree with that.  But still,
I’m only the smallest part of the Bitcoin community.  So, yeah, if there is a
demand, a BIP is the following step.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Well in terms of demand, I guess that’s the community of
signing devices, users and wallets.  In terms of the BIP process, we have a BIP
editor here, maybe you’ll opine on that, Murch?  Do you think, if there’s
seemingly demand, that this makes sense as a BIP?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mark Erhardt&lt;/strong&gt;: Well, if there is, yes, certainly.  But I think Oleks does
touch on an interesting point here, which is probably the next focus of the
broader ecosystem is to work on post-quantum things.  Silent payments still has
relatively small adoption anyway, and so adding more bells and whistles to
silent payments is probably going to be only after silent payments itself gets
more adopted.  And I don’t know how many wallet implementers will focus on that
when they’re probably going to work on post-quantum signatures next.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Oleks, any final comments before we wrap up this item?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Oleksandr Kurbatov&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah, I just checked the statistics before our call.
Right now, daily statistics shows only 80% of addresses are single-key addresses
still.  So, we don’t even have an adoption of multisignatures.  With silent
payments, we cannot track, because they are silent, but my prediction is that’s
around 2% or 3%.  But still, I’m pretty open to any wallets who want to have
this functionality.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mark Erhardt&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah, maybe an interesting thing is that silent payments
outputs are always Pay-to-Taproot (P2TR).  So, we can look a little bit at the
P2TR outputs.  And while there’s a huge count of P2TR outputs, the overall
amount of money in P2TR outputs is still very low.  So, I don’t know how much
silent payments use we’re seeing; we’re still seeing P2TR being used very
little, unfortunately.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Oleks, thanks for your work on this.  Thanks for coming on and
talking about it with us.  We appreciate your time.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Oleksandr Kurbatov&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah, thanks for having me.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Cheers.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Oleksandr Kurbatov&lt;/strong&gt;: Bye-bye.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p id="cln-self-referential-channel-announcement-dos-disclosure-transcript"&gt;&lt;em&gt;CLN self-referential channel announcement DoS disclosure&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Our final news item, “CLN self-referential channel
announcement DoS disclosure”.  Nishant, you’ve been on before and you’re back,
to many Lightning users’ chagrin, to talk about another disclosure.  Maybe to
kick things off, what is a channel announcement; what is a self-referential
channel announcement; and how can it be used to DoS a CLN node?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Nishant Bansal&lt;/strong&gt;: Okay, so a channel announcement is one of the gossip
messages in the LN.  So, channel announcement identifies a new channel based on
the short channel ID (SCID) onchain, and also it contains both the node
endpoints which has the channel.  And the channel announcement is actually used
to prove that these are the Bitcoin keys which correspond to an onchain 2-of-2
Lightning funding output, and they are node keys which are used to prove that
both node endpoints actually own these channels.  So, what Lightning node
typically does is verify the onchain output and then checks the signatures, and
then stores this channel data on disk which, for CLN, it was gossip_store, and
then tries to build the network graph from this channel in memory, and for CLN
it is gossmap.  And now, the vulnerability in CLN was CLN verifies that this is
actually a Lightning funding output onchain and the signatures are actually
valid, but CLN wasn’t verifying that the two nodes which are used in the channel
announcement are, or should be, different.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So, what an attacker could do is they can create a 2-of-2 output onchain, and
then they can sign their channel with the same fresh node endpoints.  So, the
channel announcement is actually self-referential; both node endpoints are the
same, so the channel is referring to itself, so that is why it’s
self-referential.  And what CLN does is CLN verifies this channel announcement,
it doesn’t reject this channel announcement because of the same node IDs.  It
stores this channel data on disk and then tries to build the network graph with
it.  Added in the releases from 25.02 to 26.04, CLN added a no-duplicate
hash-table-based channel graph construction.  So, these same node endpoints are
actually added to that graph, gossipd will crash.  And since the lightningd,
which is the master daemon for CLN, considers that as fatal, lightningd will
also crash.  So, after this, if the operator tries to restart, what happens is
since this channel data exists on disk, CLN will again pull that data and try to
build the network channel graph again.  And again, the same no-duplicate
assertion will trip and again CLN will crash.  So, the attacker only needs to
actually fund the 2-of-2 output, and then just create a channel announcement and
send it.  And if the operator removes that issue from that gossip_store by hand,
then also the attacker can send the same announcement again and again crash the
node.  So, as long as that 2-of-2 output is unspent, this attack can be
triggered any number of times.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The fix was fairly straightforward.  So, BOLT7 has already a requirement on the
sender side, where they asked that node_id_1 should be less than the node_id_2
in the channel announcement.  But they didn’t have the same requirement on the
receiver side.  So, first, CLN added that requirement on their node itself, and
then they created a PR on the BOLTs itself so that every other implementation
should have that, which every other implementation was already rejecting it at
that time.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: I was going to ask how the other node implementations were
handling it.  It sounds like they saw that it was the same and they had some
check already in there and rejected it?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Nishant Bansal&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah, so every other Lightning implementation already has
the check to reject the cases where the both node IDs in the channel
announcement are same.  But since this BOLT PR was raised, now every Lightning
implementation rejects a channel announcement where node_id_1 is not less than
node_id_2.  So, it should be less than.  So, the equal-to case is also covered
in that.  And one more extension to this issue is that since CLN wasn’t
rejecting this on the receiver side, and before the 25.02 release, CLN accepted
that channel announcement and built the network graph with that, and then also
rebroadcast this message again.  So, an attacker doesn’t have to actually
connect to the vulnerable node itself.  The old CLN releases could also
rebroadcast this bad message to the vulnerable nodes.  So, all the operators
should actually update, because an attacker doesn’t have to be directly
connected.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Yikes.  Maybe pardon my ignorance, but if it’s
self-referential, you don’t want the two node IDs to be the same, why not just
say, “Make sure that they’re not the same”?  What is this less-than value
comparing the node IDs?  I don’t understand that part.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Nishant Bansal&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah, so I think based on my understanding, the reason is
that since this channel announcement, the whole signature verification happens,
so if there is not a set of defined rules for which should be node_id_1 and
node_id_2, there could be the cases where actual valid channel announcements
could be rejected because some implementation has used node_id_2 as the one
which is less than node_id_1, which is the creator.  So, I think just to set the
rules.  But the main issue which should be fixed is the case where those two
node IDs are equal.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Makes sense.  I don’t remember if you said how you discovered
it.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Nishant Bansal&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah, so I discovered this when I was adding the gossip
state machine fuzz test to CLN.  So, I started adding this gossip state machine
fuzz test to all Lightning implementations.  And I started with LND, I found
some bugs, I reported it, disclosed the one which I did in June itself.  Then I
went to CLN.  CLN already had this gossip state machine fuzz test PR which was
being worked on.  But that time, the states which it had were only the normal
signature verification or the node verification cases, but it didn’t have the
onchain lookup case, which only happens for channel announcement.  And after
that, only the channel announcement is considered fully validated and actually a
network graph or a node or channel graph is constructed.  So, once I added that,
the fuzzer found the self-referential case where the fuzzer panics, and this was
the bug.  And when I tried to restart the node, it keeps on crashing
continuously.  So, that is how I found the bug.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: I’m curious if any folks who are monitoring the LN have seen
an attempt to exploit this in the wild?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Nishant Bansal&lt;/strong&gt;: So, this issue wasn’t exploited at all and that is why Rusty
didn’t add it.  So, the thing is, in the fix, only the case where a new channel
announcement where both node IDs equal is rejected.  But the case where some
already affected node which already has the same node ID’s channel graph in
their disk, if it tries to upgrade then also it will fail, because that
rejection phase happens before that and this entry still exists on your disk.
But since this wasn’t exploited, so Rusty didn’t add that case, and so the
simple fix is just to reject whenever we get such an announcement.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Makes sense.  Murch or Gustavo, any other questions on this
item?  All right, Murch is good.  Gustavo, you good?  Nishant, anything else
before we wrap up?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Nishant Bansal&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah, I would say keep your node software upgraded.  In the
past, or maybe the last week, there have been instances, for example in BTCPay
Server, where some operators haven’t updated their node, and some security fixes
which were fixed maybe one or two months back have been exploited again.  So, I
would say keep your software upgraded, maybe reach out to your known ones and
tell them to be sure to be upgraded.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Thanks for your time, Nishant.  We appreciate it.  Thanks for
joining us.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Nishant Bansal&lt;/strong&gt;: Thanks everyone.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p id="why-does-bitcoin-use-both-a-transaction-id-and-a-witness-transaction-id-transcript"&gt;&lt;em&gt;Why does Bitcoin use both a transaction ID and a witness transaction ID?&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: To the Stack Exchange segment, we had three this month.  First
one, “Why does Bitcoin use both a transaction ID and a witness transaction ID?”
And this was answered by Pieter Wuille.  I feel like, Murch, we’ve covered
something like this before, but when Pieter answers and he provides all that
detail and he starts his answer with, “Great question”, I figure that’s one we
should cover for the newsletter.  So, is there new information here or maybe we
can give the answer, and then is there new information in here?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mark Erhardt&lt;/strong&gt;: I don’t think so.  I think that’s basically around the crux of
what segwit was about.  So, segwit, or segregated witness, one of the main goals
was to fix transaction malleability; transaction malleability in the sense that
if you changed a signature the txid would change.  And that was happening
because, of course, the input script is part of the data that contributes to the
hash that is the txid.  So, what segwit does is it pulls the signature data and
other witness items into the witness structure.  And the witness structure is
not and cannot be covered by the txid, as it wouldn’t be backward compatible.
So, the txid needs to continue to be calculated from the things that every
Bitcoin node always knew about, so the input script, the output script, the
transaction header.  So, when we pulled out the signature data to the witness,
the txid became stable, regardless of whether signatures might be changed.  And
so, yeah, signatures can, for example, change because the sender just signs
again and gets a different signature, or maliciously by anyone that forwards a
legacy transaction, and they could just switch the sign of the s value to the
high s value, and then the txid would change.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So, anyway, we still have the txid because we need to be able to identify which
outputs we’re spending, and to identify transactions the way they’ve always been
identified, and so forth.  Until recently, that was the tool that was used to
ask for transactions on the P2P network, and it is still what the merkle root
commits to, and so forth.  But of course, we don’t want anyone to be able to
change the witness data of the transactions in the blocks either.  So, we
additionally have to, in some way, commit to the witness data in the
transaction.  So, there’s the wtxid that covers the entire data of the
transaction, including the witness data, and this also identifies the
transaction and actually identifies it more specifically because, well, the txid
could be the same for two transactions that are the same except different in
witness data.  So, for example, if a P2TR output had first a scriptpath input
and then got replaced with a keypath input, otherwise all the same transaction,
that would cause two transactions with the same txids but different wtxids.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So, to distinguish between variants of transactions, we need the wtxid to commit
to the data in the blocks.  So, we have that extra witness commitment in the
coinbase transaction output, but also we recently changed the P2P traffic to be
based on wtxids so that if multiple variants of the same transaction were
floating around on a network, we would be able to distinguish between them
properly.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Excellent.  Thanks, Murch.  If you’re curious, I think I guess
you could sum up the answer from Pieter Wuille here as maybe not saying the what
so much as the design considerations around txid, wtxid, and segwit.  So, if
you’re curious as to his insight in designing that, take a look at the full
answer.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mark Erhardt&lt;/strong&gt;: Right.  Sorry, I didn’t actually read his answer.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p id="how-to-sign-a-musig-with-bitcoin-core-transcript"&gt;&lt;em&gt;How to sign a MuSig with Bitcoin Core&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: You gave a great alternate answer.  You should put it on Stack
Exchange.  “How to sign a MuSig with Bitcoin Core”.  This person is trying to
spend from a MuSig2 output just using Bitcoin Core.  They have the taproot
descriptor with MuSig keys from two different Bitcoin Core wallets, they
imported it into watch-only, they funded it with a faucet, they made a PSBT, and
then they ran it through all three of those wallets, and everything seemed to do
something and work.  But when running analyzepsbt, it kept saying that an
updater was needed and that the transaction never finalized.  Ava Chow, wallet
master, answers this question, going through MuSig2, that it’s a two-round
signing protocol, so you actually have to process that PSBT twice.  The first
one, the wallets are adding the public nonce, and then the second one, combining
that PSBT once every nonce is present.  And so, the missing step here was
walletprocesspsbt.  If you’re curious about the flow and want to run an example
yourself, maybe jump into the answer by Ava and give it a go yourself to
understand that process.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p id="what-changed-in-bitcoin-p2p-protocol-version-70017-compared-to-70016-transcript"&gt;&lt;em&gt;What changed in Bitcoin P2P protocol version 70017 compared to 70016?&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Last question from the Stack Exchange, “What changed in Bitcoin P2P protocol
version 70017 compared to 70016?”  Murch, first of all, what is a Bitcoin P2P
protocol version?  I don’t know if that’s something that’s on a lot of people’s
radar.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mark Erhardt&lt;/strong&gt;: Right.  So, when two nodes connect, they perform something
that we call the version handshake, and they tell each other about what features
they support and which version of the protocol they speak.  And this protocol
version indicates which features they understand.  So, the latest added feature,
which the protocol version was bumped to 70017 for, is BIP434, which is Peer
Feature Negotiation.  This is a new mechanism by which you can negotiate
optional features.  You tell your peer that you want to use an optional feature
and which variant of an optional feature, and then there’s a schema by which
both peers that talk to each other align their expectations and pick a variant
that works for both of them.  So, if one peer says, “I want to use feature A in
the third variant, and after that, second variant would also be acceptable to
me”, and the other one wants to use the second variant, they might end up using
second variant together.  Yeah, anyway, the hope is now that we can negotiate
features through BIP434, we don’t need to bump the protocol version as often
because we can just use the Peer Feature Negotiation BIP instead.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: So, is this more like permissionless feature adding to the P2P
network, that instead of having to get it to 70018 to add your thing, you can
just add it, and as long as everybody who you’re talking with is speaking 70017,
you can put in, I guess, little identifiers within the feature message, and I
guess an easier way to innovate at the P2P level; is that the idea?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mark Erhardt&lt;/strong&gt;: That is in effect, yes.  Now, when people want to use optional
features, they can just do the Peer Feature Negotiation per BIP434, and peers
that don’t understand a specific feature will just ignore it.  So, yes, in that
sense.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Awesome.  That wraps up the Stack Exchange.  We can move to
the Releases and RCs, of which we covered several already, but a couple remain.
And we can summon Gustavo for this segment.  What’s up, Gustavo?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p id="eclair-0-14-6-transcript"&gt;&lt;em&gt;Eclair 0.14.6&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Gustavo Flores Echaiz&lt;/strong&gt;: Yes, perfect.  Thank you, guys.  So, in addition to
the major release of Bitcoin Core 32.1 and the three other maintenance releases
of Bitcoin Core, we also have Eclair 0.14.6.  So, this is a small security
release.  Once again, users are recommended to upgrade because malicious peers
could exploit some of the fixed issues.  And we’re going to go into detail of
what these fixes were, but basically there’s two categories.  One is about
multiple edge cases when handling splice force-closes, and the other one is
specifically in a feature called on-the-fly funding.  When a node requests
incoming liquidity from an LSP running Eclair, that node could trick the LSP
into opening a channel for him without paying him the channel liquidity fees.
So, we’re going to go more into detail in the Notable code section about those
fixes.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p id="lnd-v0-21-5-beta-transcript"&gt;&lt;em&gt;LND v0.21.5-beta and v0.20.6-beta&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The next item on the Release section is LND v0.21.5 and v0.20.6.  Both are
denominated beta versions and they’re both maintenance releases of LND.  Once
again, users are recommended to upgrade.  And we covered the RCs of these two
releases in the previous Newsletter #428.  But briefly, there’s multiple bug
fixes found here, besides the ones we covered in #428, which we have been
covering over the past few newsletters.  Such as, for example, in v0.21.5,
there’s a fix about specifically auxiliary Taproot Asset channels, where a node
didn’t include the auxiliary HTLC (Hash Time Locked Contract) signatures that
are required for recovering the Taproot Assets, an LND node would simply accept
a peer not including those signatures, which would then make an LND node unable
to recover those assets during a force-close if it had to recover the HTLCs
onchain.  So, now that new validation has been added.  But there’s also a major
fix we are going to cover in a bit in the release in the Notable code section
about commitment feerates.  And yeah, I also want to add there’s also multiple
other fixes related to the new SQL database implementation, such as excessive
memory allocation when parsing TLV records, SQL database deadlocks, and also a
fix for faster startup cleanup on SQL-backed nodes.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;We jump on to the Notable code and documentation changes.  And once again, we’re
going to skip through the first three items because we covered them earlier
during the episode.  Those were the three fixes of the new major release of
Bitcoin Core that were also backported into previous maintenance releases.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p id="bips-2130-transcript"&gt;&lt;em&gt;BIPs #2130&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So, we jump in with the first item after those three.  We’re in the BIPs
repository at PR #2130.  So, this merges a draft for BIP139, which specifies a
Wallet Metadata Export Format, that is a specific JSON format for exporting
wallet accounts and all other types of wallet metadata that haven’t been
standardized yet.  We’ve covered this previously in Newsletter #399, when the
author, Pythcoiner, posted on the mailing list his proposal for such a
specification.  Murch, anything you would like to add, since you’re the BIP
editor?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mark Erhardt&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah, just wanted to clarify.  So, this allows you to export
all of the data except the private key material.  So, it would allow you to
produce a watch-only wallet maybe, but it will not allow you to sign.  And the
hope would be if this gets adopted by other wallets, it might be easy to move
between wallets using this export format.  Yeah.  So, if this is something that
interests you, maybe give it a read.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p id="core-lightning-9627-transcript"&gt;&lt;em&gt;Core Lightning #9627&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Gustavo Flores Echaiz&lt;/strong&gt;: Great.  Thank you, Murch.  So, now we jump in into
the Lightning section, which once again, as we’ve seen throughout the last
multiple weeks, there’s multiple bug fixes.  First, Core Lightning #9627.  This
is a specific issue where when selecting a payment route to make a payment over
the LN and using specifically the xpay command for doing so, it could find
routes that were very long.  However, it wouldn’t account for the BOLT4 rule
around the routing information limit of 1,300 bytes, which meant that it could
select a very long route and then, when constructing the onion, the payment
would simply fail because the selected path exceeded the limit.  So, the fix is
very clear.  Xpay simply has to account for that limit before selecting a
payment route, because potentially it could have selected another route that
would have been shorter and would have fit in that size.  But because it wasn’t
accounting for that limit when finding the route, it was choosing a long route
that would later fail without thinking of this in advance.  So, now the fix
applies that accounting before, and it also passes the corresponding hop limit
to another function in CLN called askrene, which is also another pathfinding RPC
command.  And also, the pathfinding cost calculation adds a penalty for each hop
to favor shorter routes.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p id="eclair-3417-transcript"&gt;&lt;em&gt;Eclair #3417 and #3419&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The next item is one of the ones that I was mentioning in the Release section.
This combines two different PRs, #3417 and #3419.  #3419 was merged into #3417.
So, if you would have looked at the code changes from #3417, everything is
included there.  However, I’m going to cover first what was in #3417, and then
what came later with #3419.  So, here we’re going to first discuss what is the
setting.  The setting is usually force-close handling when splice transactions
are unconfirmed.  And we’ve covered similar cases in Newsletter #427.  So, maybe
if you’ve listened to that episode or read that newsletter, many of these fixes
will sound familiar.  So, there’s four different steps to the first PR.  The
first one is a new setting that comes in, called
require-confirmed-inputs-for-splicing.  This one is enabled by default.  And it
basically means that an Eclair node will not accept a peer adding inputs to a
splice-in transaction that have not yet confirmed on the Bitcoin blockchain.
Why?  Because I believe this is exactly the vulnerability covered in Newsletter
#427, which is that the peer could then double-spend the inputs he added into
the splice-in if those were unconfirmed.  And that would invalidate the splice
transaction and would also invalidate any commitment spending it and could lead
to issues that we saw in Newsletter #427.  So, now that setting is enabled by
default.  Also, part of that change is limiting how many inputs or outputs a
peer can add to a splice transaction.  The limit by default is ten inputs and
ten outputs.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The second change of this PR is that Eclair sometimes would fail to choose the
usable commitment when force-closing.  It could get confused in a situation
where there’s an unconfirmed splice, but also the required commitment for
force-closing could change.  So, now Eclair always makes sure to check its
Bitcoin Core backend to choose the newest commitment whose funding transaction
is confirmed.  For example, if I’m trying to force-close when the splicing
transaction is unconfirmed, I could have used the commitment of the funding
transaction before the splice.  But if then the splice became confirmed, I
should use the commitment of the splice, right?  So, now Eclair has the proper
code to choose the usable commitment when force-closing, and also reconsider
that choice as conditions change.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The third part of this PR is that Eclair, when force-closing, once again, during
an unconfirmed splice, specifically for zero-fee anchor channels, Eclair would
have previously failed to consider the splice weight when making a CPFP
transaction for the commitment, and also the anchor that spent that commitment.
So, now Eclair includes the unconfirmed funding ancestors when calculating CPFP
fees to include every unconfirmed transaction.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The fourth item and final of this PR, before we move on to the other PR that is
also part of this item, is the fact that Eclair should claim outputs promptly
when the peer closes using an earlier funding state, which means that, for
example, your peer publishes a commitment for an earlier funding state.  Eclair
previously waited for the configured confirmation depth before claiming the
outputs.  So, for example, if Eclair had a setting of waiting six confirmations,
it would wait for six confirmations.  However, what if some HTLCs were
approaching a deadline at the same time?  And what if Eclair had to claim those
HTLCs at the second confirmation?  And that’s the issue we used to run in.
Eclair was unnecessarily waiting for too many confirmations.  And now, the fix
is for Eclair to simply wait for one confirmation.  If it has to rush because
the HTLCs are approaching a deadline, it will claim those outputs before
reaching the full configured confirmation depth.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Then, the other item, which is also very related, the PR puts this example.
There’s an unconfirmed splice, and Eclair force closes by publishing the
commitment spending that splice, the outputs of that splice.  However, what if
the splice disappears from Eclair’s mempool?  Then, Eclair would have switched
to another commitment that would spend the original funding output.  Eclair now
assumes the splice has disappeared, will not confirm, so it now tries to
force-close the original funding output.  However, a miner could still confirm
the splice transaction even if it disappears from Eclair’s mempool.  Previously,
Eclair would have failed to publish the commitment.  Excuse me, no, the miner
confirms both the splice and the commitment force-closing the channel based on
that splice state.  So, now Eclair will simply recognize that the miner did that
and that the new state is that the first intended commitment transaction is the
one that got confirmed.  Previously, Eclair would fail to recognize the change
that happened in between.  And that’s for that Eclair item, which is the main
one in the release we covered previously.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p id="eclair-3416-transcript"&gt;&lt;em&gt;Eclair #3416&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;And the second Eclair item, #3416, this PR is completely different.  This is
about when I, as a node, request liquidity from an Eclair LSP.  Because I want
to receive a payment over a channel that has reached its maximum liquidity, so
Eclair simply adds additional liquidity by splicing that channel or in a
completely different new channel, right?  If I, as a node that requested that
liquidity and also committed that I was going to pay the fees for that new
liquidity from the payment, if I rejected the payment, Eclair could still
complete the channel opening.  So, I basically rejected a payment that would
have paid Eclair for opening a channel, but Eclair would still proceed with
opening the channel.  The problem before is that Eclair wouldn’t flag this as an
underpaid purchase.  So, I, as an attacker peer, I could have just done this
repeatedly.  I could have requested one channel after another from Eclair and
never paid for the fees required for opening that channel.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Now, the fix is for Eclair to flag that that purchase was underpaid, still allow
that channel to be open, however block the peer from making further purchases of
liquidity, specifically with the setting that they’re going to pay it from
future payments, also called from_future_HTLC.  Also important to specify that
if the payment was a multipath payment and I had simply refused a part, the fact
that the other parts succeed doesn’t clear the flag.  Also, there’s a specific
limit called the suspicious-peer limit that applies to all peers, and flagged
peers count towards that limit, which means that if too many peers are abusing
Eclair’s LSP and getting liquidity without paying the fees, Eclair can simply
disable the payment method globally for all peers.  And the flags are cleared on
restart, or an operator could intervene and also remove the flag for a specific
peer.  Or if the funding transaction that opens the channel is aborted before
publication, that also removes the flag.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p id="ldk-5314-transcript"&gt;&lt;em&gt;LDK #5314&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So, now we jump in into the other repository, LDK.  This one has two fixes as
well.  The first one is a privacy leak, similar or related to a change we
covered in Newsletter #426, where LDK made SCID aliases the default when opening
new unannounced channels.  Now, the privacy leak that we’re covering in this
newsletter is that an attacker that is watching funding outputs in the Bitcoin
blockchain could derive a candidate SCID from an output’s blockchain location;
and by deriving that SCID, and connecting to suspected channel endpoints, this
is a specific case where an attacker is suspecting that two nodes that share a
channel, he’s suspecting that that channel was funded via this output that it
has already identified on the Bitcoin blockchain.  So, this is not an attacker
guessing; this is an attacker that has a specific thesis of two nodes and a
specific funding output.  So, he connects to both channel endpoints to both
nodes and sends an onion message through them back to itself.  So, the onion
message routes through both peers and it comes back to itself.  And it uses the
SCID that it derived from the funding output on the blockchain to identify the
channel between them.  And if he’s able to receive the message back, it confirms
that the unannounced channel that these two peers share was funded with the
specific output from the blockchain.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So, the fix is for LDK to resolve real SCIDs for unannounced channels.  So, an
LDK node will simply refuse to route that onion message, unless SCID aliases are
used.  So, that’s the first item from LDK.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p id="ldk-5412-transcript"&gt;&lt;em&gt;LDK #5412&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The second one is a DoS bug in the LSPS2 server for just-in-time (JIT) channels.
So, what does this mean?  When a client connects to an LSP server to request a
JIT channel, which allows it to receive, similar to on-the-fly funding, it
receives a payment on the LN without having a channel there in advance.  So, an
LSP server is constantly monitoring for requests from different clients.  A
client could make a request for a JIT channel.  And then, the client could have
made a second request using the same request ID of his first request.  The
problem is that LDK has a request limit globally for all peers.  And if I, as an
attacker, am making different requests with the same request ID, LDK was
accepting that request, was replacing the stored entry with the new request, and
was counting that towards its request limit.  So, it means that an attacker
client could have made, let’s say, 1,000 requests with the same request ID, and
that would have exhausted LDK’s 1,000-request limit queue, and it would have
made the LSP reject requests from other clients.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So, now the fix is once again pretty clear.  LDK simply has to reject duplicate
IDs, because clearly an attacker is trying to just duplicate requests to exhaust
the limit, without increasing the counter, but also without replacing the
original request, because that was also a separate issue.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p id="lnd-11164-transcript"&gt;&lt;em&gt;LND #11164&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Now, we are into LND with two items, and finally the last item will be BTCPay
Server.  So, the first is a feature, not a bug, where LND, in PR #11164,
advances the implementation, also known as gossip-v2, which would allow nodes to
announce and verify taproot channels.  As we’ve covered previously in the BOLTs
specification of taproot channels, but also in the implementation of taproot
channels for multiple Lightning implementations, this is a known gap that nodes
can simply not yet announce and verify taproot channels via the gossip protocol,
because the existing gossip protocol doesn’t yet support taproot channels.  So,
LND is not fully done with this, of course, because the taproot gossip proposal
remains in draft mode.  Well, the PR simply hasn’t been merged yet to the BOLTs
repository, but multiple steps are taken by LND to match the latest proposal.
And those steps include, for example, the signature-exchange messages now
include the funding transaction ID to distinguish funding attempts and splice
attempts, right?  You really want to be able to track which funding transaction
this signature-exchange message corresponds to, whether it’s the initial funding
or for splicing.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;There are also fixes, such as the changes also correct the encoding of the fee
and capacity fields and preserve optional fields containing default values.  The
main point of that is to preserve the signed bytes when messages are decoded and
re-encoded.  That’s very important to avoid signature verification failures.
So, multiple fixes are made for that.  Once again, as I said, this is not yet
work that is done.  We should expect probably another round of improvements to
the taproot gossip proposal that will eventually get merged into the BOLTs
repository.  LND would eventually turn it on or complete this implementation
only after that is done.  Also, important to specify that LND is taking steps in
preparation for splicing, but LND hasn’t yet completed its splicing
implementation.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p id="lnd-11373-transcript"&gt;&lt;em&gt;LND #11373 and #11380&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;And finally, the next item on the LND repo combines two PRs, #11373 and #11380.
Both of these together enforce LND’s existing minimum commitment feerate of 253
sat/kw (satoshis per kiloweight) unit consistently during channel opening and
fee updates.  The problem here was that there’s another setting that was
clashing with this setting.  That other setting is called
max-commit-fee-rate-anchors.  When set at 1, it would cap the rate at 1 sat/vB
(satoshi per vbyte), which is equivalent to 250 sat/kw unit, which is just under
the minimum.  So, you could put a maximum that was under the minimum, and those
two settings would clash.  What would happen, for example, if you were opening a
channel, it would have been okay because the second setting that was set lower
was when opening a channel, it was following that setting.  But then, when
trying to sign commitment updates to carry HTLCs, it simply triggered an issue
because it couldn’t sign those commitment transactions, because it was trying to
apply a fee that was lower than the minimum commitment feerate.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So, now the fix for that is simply for LND to raise locally-proposed opening
rates to the minimum, right?  It will simply not, even if it sets a lower amount
on the other setting, it will simply not follow that when signing commitments.
Also, when checking incoming and outgoing fee updates against the minimum before
recording or sending them, it also now starts doing that instead of only
rejecting them when signing commitments.  These fixes are not necessarily
backported to all channels.  For example, if a channel initiator cannot afford
the increase in the feerate, the channel will remain unable to carry HTLCs, as
it would still hit an error when trying to sign a commitment transaction because
of this previous, even if it changed the setting.  If it’s unable to afford the
fee increase, it will simply remain unusable.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p id="btcpay-server-7744-transcript"&gt;&lt;em&gt;BTCPay Server #7744 and #7748&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;And finally, the last item is a combination of two PRs from the BTCPay Server
repo, #7744 and #7748.  These two are fixing errors when merchants authorize API
keys, very similar to what we covered in the last Newsletter #428.  And in #428
we had specifically covered a privilege escalation in the API key authorization.
This is once again very similar.  Here, the two errors are that first, if a
merchant unchecks specific optional permissions, BTCPay Server could have
ignored the fact that the merchant unchecked those permissions, and the API key
would still have been granted those permissions.  And the other bug is that an
application could have requested a permission scoped to another store, even if
the merchant had given that application only permission for a specific store.
So, now the fixes preserve the merchant’s permission choices, and yeah, that’s
the main story around it.  And like I said, Newsletter #428 is a precursor of
this, and both are related to API bugs around API key escalation.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: We continue to see a lot of fixes, unsurprisingly, some
features, but a lot of fixes.  Thanks for walking us through that, Gustavo.
Thanks also for co-hosting.  Thanks for co-hosting, Murch.  And we want to thank
our guests today, Elias, Greg, Antoine, Oleks, and Nishant for joining us
earlier, and for you all for listening.  We’ll hear you next week.  Cheers.&lt;/p&gt;</content>
    <author>
      <name>Bitcoin Optech</name>
    </author>
    <summary type="html">Mark “Murch” Erhardt, Gustavo Flores Echaiz, and Mike Schmidt are joined by Elias Rohrer, Greg Sanders, Antoine Poinsot, Oleksandr Kurbatov, and Nishant Bansal to discuss Newsletter #429.</summary>
    <media:thumbnail xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://bitcoinops.org/img/logos/optech-notext.png"/>
  </entry>
  <entry xml:lang="en">
    <title type="html">Bitcoin Optech Newsletter #428 Recap Podcast</title>
    <link href="https://bitcoinops.org/en/podcast/2026/10/27/" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="Bitcoin Optech Newsletter #428 Recap Podcast"/>
    <published>2026-10-27T00:00:00+00:00</published>
    <updated>2026-10-27T00:00:00+00:00</updated>
    <id>https://bitcoinops.org/en/podcast/2026/10/2026-10-27-recap</id>
    <content type="html" xml:base="https://bitcoinops.org/en/podcast/2026/10/27/">&lt;p&gt;Gustavo Flores Echaiz and Brandon Black are joined by Adam Gibson, Vincenzo
Palazzo, and João Dias to discuss &lt;a href="/en/newsletters/2026/10/23/"&gt;Newsletter #428&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div id="podcast-links"&gt;
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&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;The Bitcoin Optech Podcast and transcription content is licensed Creative Commons &lt;a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0/legalcode" target="_blank"&gt;CC BY-SA 2.0&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

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  &lt;h2 id="news"&gt; News
    
  &lt;/h2&gt;
  
    &lt;ul&gt;
      
      
      &lt;li id="trust-minimized-exits-from-a-single-issuer-layer-2" class="anchor-list"&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
          &lt;a href="#trust-minimized-exits-from-a-single-issuer-layer-2" class="anchor-list-link"&gt;●&lt;/a&gt;
          Trust-minimized exits from a single-issuer layer 2
          (&lt;a href="javascript:void(0)" title="Play this segment of the podcast" onclick="seek('1:32')" class="seek"&gt;1:32&lt;/a&gt;&lt;noscript&gt;1:32&lt;/noscript&gt;)
&lt;a href="/en/newsletters/2026/10/23/#trust-minimized-exits-from-a-single-issuer-layer-2"&gt;
    &lt;i class="fa fa-link" title="Link to related content"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
&lt;/a&gt;

    &lt;a href="#trust-minimized-exits-from-a-single-issuer-layer-2-transcript"&gt;
        &lt;i class="fa fa-file-text-o" title="Read this segment of the transcription"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
    &lt;/a&gt;


        &lt;/p&gt;
      &lt;/li&gt;
      
      
      &lt;li id="descriptor-syntax-for-hash-preimages" class="anchor-list"&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
          &lt;a href="#descriptor-syntax-for-hash-preimages" class="anchor-list-link"&gt;●&lt;/a&gt;
          Descriptor syntax for hash preimages
          (&lt;a href="javascript:void(0)" title="Play this segment of the podcast" onclick="seek('18:03')" class="seek"&gt;18:03&lt;/a&gt;&lt;noscript&gt;18:03&lt;/noscript&gt;)
&lt;a href="/en/newsletters/2026/10/23/#descriptor-syntax-for-hash-preimages"&gt;
    &lt;i class="fa fa-link" title="Link to related content"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
&lt;/a&gt;

    &lt;a href="#descriptor-syntax-for-hash-preimages-transcript"&gt;
        &lt;i class="fa fa-file-text-o" title="Read this segment of the transcription"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
    &lt;/a&gt;


        &lt;/p&gt;
      &lt;/li&gt;
      
    &lt;/ul&gt;
  

  &lt;h2 id="changes-to-services-and-client-software"&gt; Changes to services and client software
    
  &lt;/h2&gt;
  
    &lt;ul&gt;
      
      
      &lt;li id="ibis-wallet-v5-0-beta-released" class="anchor-list"&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
          &lt;a href="#ibis-wallet-v5-0-beta-released" class="anchor-list-link"&gt;●&lt;/a&gt;
          Ibis Wallet v5.0-beta released
          (&lt;a href="javascript:void(0)" title="Play this segment of the podcast" onclick="seek('26:31')" class="seek"&gt;26:31&lt;/a&gt;&lt;noscript&gt;26:31&lt;/noscript&gt;)
&lt;a href="/en/newsletters/2026/10/23/#ibis-wallet-v5-0-beta-released"&gt;
    &lt;i class="fa fa-link" title="Link to related content"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
&lt;/a&gt;

    &lt;a href="#ibis-wallet-v5-0-beta-released-transcript"&gt;
        &lt;i class="fa fa-file-text-o" title="Read this segment of the transcription"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
    &lt;/a&gt;


        &lt;/p&gt;
      &lt;/li&gt;
      
      
      &lt;li id="landfall-wallet-for-lightning-mining-payouts" class="anchor-list"&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
          &lt;a href="#landfall-wallet-for-lightning-mining-payouts" class="anchor-list-link"&gt;●&lt;/a&gt;
          Landfall wallet for Lightning mining payouts
          (&lt;a href="javascript:void(0)" title="Play this segment of the podcast" onclick="seek('28:57')" class="seek"&gt;28:57&lt;/a&gt;&lt;noscript&gt;28:57&lt;/noscript&gt;)
&lt;a href="/en/newsletters/2026/10/23/#landfall-wallet-for-lightning-mining-payouts"&gt;
    &lt;i class="fa fa-link" title="Link to related content"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
&lt;/a&gt;

    &lt;a href="#landfall-wallet-for-lightning-mining-payouts-transcript"&gt;
        &lt;i class="fa fa-file-text-o" title="Read this segment of the transcription"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
    &lt;/a&gt;


        &lt;/p&gt;
      &lt;/li&gt;
      
      
      &lt;li id="rbitcoin-0-8-0-released" class="anchor-list"&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
          &lt;a href="#rbitcoin-0-8-0-released" class="anchor-list-link"&gt;●&lt;/a&gt;
          rbitcoin 0.8.0 released
          (&lt;a href="javascript:void(0)" title="Play this segment of the podcast" onclick="seek('38:44')" class="seek"&gt;38:44&lt;/a&gt;&lt;noscript&gt;38:44&lt;/noscript&gt;)
&lt;a href="/en/newsletters/2026/10/23/#rbitcoin-0-8-0-released"&gt;
    &lt;i class="fa fa-link" title="Link to related content"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
&lt;/a&gt;

    &lt;a href="#rbitcoin-0-8-0-released-transcript"&gt;
        &lt;i class="fa fa-file-text-o" title="Read this segment of the transcription"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
    &lt;/a&gt;


        &lt;/p&gt;
      &lt;/li&gt;
      
    &lt;/ul&gt;
  

  &lt;h2 id="releases-and-release-candidates"&gt; Releases and release candidates
    
  &lt;/h2&gt;
  
    &lt;ul&gt;
      
      
      &lt;li id="eclair-0-14-4" class="anchor-list"&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
          &lt;a href="#eclair-0-14-4" class="anchor-list-link"&gt;●&lt;/a&gt;
          Eclair 0.14.4
          (&lt;a href="javascript:void(0)" title="Play this segment of the podcast" onclick="seek('43:18')" class="seek"&gt;43:18&lt;/a&gt;&lt;noscript&gt;43:18&lt;/noscript&gt;)
&lt;a href="/en/newsletters/2026/10/23/#eclair-0-14-4"&gt;
    &lt;i class="fa fa-link" title="Link to related content"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
&lt;/a&gt;

    &lt;a href="#eclair-0-14-4-transcript"&gt;
        &lt;i class="fa fa-file-text-o" title="Read this segment of the transcription"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
    &lt;/a&gt;


        &lt;/p&gt;
      &lt;/li&gt;
      
      
      &lt;li id="bdk-chain-0-23-4" class="anchor-list"&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
          &lt;a href="#bdk-chain-0-23-4" class="anchor-list-link"&gt;●&lt;/a&gt;
          BDK chain 0.23.4
          (&lt;a href="javascript:void(0)" title="Play this segment of the podcast" onclick="seek('45:37')" class="seek"&gt;45:37&lt;/a&gt;&lt;noscript&gt;45:37&lt;/noscript&gt;)
&lt;a href="/en/newsletters/2026/10/23/#bdk-chain-0-23-4"&gt;
    &lt;i class="fa fa-link" title="Link to related content"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
&lt;/a&gt;

    &lt;a href="#bdk-chain-0-23-4-transcript"&gt;
        &lt;i class="fa fa-file-text-o" title="Read this segment of the transcription"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
    &lt;/a&gt;


        &lt;/p&gt;
      &lt;/li&gt;
      
      
      &lt;li id="lnd-v0-21-5-beta-rc1" class="anchor-list"&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
          &lt;a href="#lnd-v0-21-5-beta-rc1" class="anchor-list-link"&gt;●&lt;/a&gt;
          LND v0.21.5-beta.rc1
          (&lt;a href="javascript:void(0)" title="Play this segment of the podcast" onclick="seek('47:09')" class="seek"&gt;47:09&lt;/a&gt;&lt;noscript&gt;47:09&lt;/noscript&gt;)
&lt;a href="/en/newsletters/2026/10/23/#lnd-v0-21-5-beta-rc1"&gt;
    &lt;i class="fa fa-link" title="Link to related content"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
&lt;/a&gt;

    &lt;a href="#lnd-v0-21-5-beta-rc1-transcript"&gt;
        &lt;i class="fa fa-file-text-o" title="Read this segment of the transcription"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
    &lt;/a&gt;


        &lt;/p&gt;
      &lt;/li&gt;
      
    &lt;/ul&gt;
  

  &lt;h2 id="notable-code-and-documentation-changes"&gt; Notable code and documentation changes
    
  &lt;/h2&gt;
  
    &lt;ul&gt;
      
      
      &lt;li id="eclair-3409" class="anchor-list"&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
          &lt;a href="#eclair-3409" class="anchor-list-link"&gt;●&lt;/a&gt;
          Eclair #3409
          (&lt;a href="javascript:void(0)" title="Play this segment of the podcast" onclick="seek('50:16')" class="seek"&gt;50:16&lt;/a&gt;&lt;noscript&gt;50:16&lt;/noscript&gt;)
&lt;a href="/en/newsletters/2026/10/23/#eclair-3409"&gt;
    &lt;i class="fa fa-link" title="Link to related content"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
&lt;/a&gt;

    &lt;a href="#eclair-3409-transcript"&gt;
        &lt;i class="fa fa-file-text-o" title="Read this segment of the transcription"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
    &lt;/a&gt;


        &lt;/p&gt;
      &lt;/li&gt;
      
      
      &lt;li id="eclair-3411" class="anchor-list"&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
          &lt;a href="#eclair-3411" class="anchor-list-link"&gt;●&lt;/a&gt;
          Eclair #3411
          (&lt;a href="javascript:void(0)" title="Play this segment of the podcast" onclick="seek('52:20')" class="seek"&gt;52:20&lt;/a&gt;&lt;noscript&gt;52:20&lt;/noscript&gt;)
&lt;a href="/en/newsletters/2026/10/23/#eclair-3411"&gt;
    &lt;i class="fa fa-link" title="Link to related content"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
&lt;/a&gt;

    &lt;a href="#eclair-3411-transcript"&gt;
        &lt;i class="fa fa-file-text-o" title="Read this segment of the transcription"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
    &lt;/a&gt;


        &lt;/p&gt;
      &lt;/li&gt;
      
      
      &lt;li id="ldk-5126" class="anchor-list"&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
          &lt;a href="#ldk-5126" class="anchor-list-link"&gt;●&lt;/a&gt;
          LDK #5126
          (&lt;a href="javascript:void(0)" title="Play this segment of the podcast" onclick="seek('55:03')" class="seek"&gt;55:03&lt;/a&gt;&lt;noscript&gt;55:03&lt;/noscript&gt;)
&lt;a href="/en/newsletters/2026/10/23/#ldk-5126"&gt;
    &lt;i class="fa fa-link" title="Link to related content"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
&lt;/a&gt;

    &lt;a href="#ldk-5126-transcript"&gt;
        &lt;i class="fa fa-file-text-o" title="Read this segment of the transcription"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
    &lt;/a&gt;


        &lt;/p&gt;
      &lt;/li&gt;
      
      
      &lt;li id="lnd-10919" class="anchor-list"&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
          &lt;a href="#lnd-10919" class="anchor-list-link"&gt;●&lt;/a&gt;
          LND #10919
          (&lt;a href="javascript:void(0)" title="Play this segment of the podcast" onclick="seek('56:19')" class="seek"&gt;56:19&lt;/a&gt;&lt;noscript&gt;56:19&lt;/noscript&gt;)
&lt;a href="/en/newsletters/2026/10/23/#lnd-10919"&gt;
    &lt;i class="fa fa-link" title="Link to related content"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
&lt;/a&gt;

    &lt;a href="#lnd-10919-transcript"&gt;
        &lt;i class="fa fa-file-text-o" title="Read this segment of the transcription"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
    &lt;/a&gt;


        &lt;/p&gt;
      &lt;/li&gt;
      
      
      &lt;li id="btcpay-server-7679" class="anchor-list"&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
          &lt;a href="#btcpay-server-7679" class="anchor-list-link"&gt;●&lt;/a&gt;
          BTCPay Server #7679
          (&lt;a href="javascript:void(0)" title="Play this segment of the podcast" onclick="seek('1:01:06')" class="seek"&gt;1:01:06&lt;/a&gt;&lt;noscript&gt;1:01:06&lt;/noscript&gt;)
&lt;a href="/en/newsletters/2026/10/23/#btcpay-server-7679"&gt;
    &lt;i class="fa fa-link" title="Link to related content"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
&lt;/a&gt;

    &lt;a href="#btcpay-server-7679-transcript"&gt;
        &lt;i class="fa fa-file-text-o" title="Read this segment of the transcription"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
    &lt;/a&gt;


        &lt;/p&gt;
      &lt;/li&gt;
      
      
      &lt;li id="btcpay-server-7684" class="anchor-list"&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
          &lt;a href="#btcpay-server-7684" class="anchor-list-link"&gt;●&lt;/a&gt;
          BTCPay Server #7684
          (&lt;a href="javascript:void(0)" title="Play this segment of the podcast" onclick="seek('1:02:39')" class="seek"&gt;1:02:39&lt;/a&gt;&lt;noscript&gt;1:02:39&lt;/noscript&gt;)
&lt;a href="/en/newsletters/2026/10/23/#btcpay-server-7684"&gt;
    &lt;i class="fa fa-link" title="Link to related content"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
&lt;/a&gt;

    &lt;a href="#btcpay-server-7684-transcript"&gt;
        &lt;i class="fa fa-file-text-o" title="Read this segment of the transcription"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
    &lt;/a&gt;


        &lt;/p&gt;
      &lt;/li&gt;
      
      
      &lt;li id="bdk-2325" class="anchor-list"&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
          &lt;a href="#bdk-2325" class="anchor-list-link"&gt;●&lt;/a&gt;
          BDK #2325
          (&lt;a href="javascript:void(0)" title="Play this segment of the podcast" onclick="seek('1:04:18')" class="seek"&gt;1:04:18&lt;/a&gt;&lt;noscript&gt;1:04:18&lt;/noscript&gt;)
&lt;a href="/en/newsletters/2026/10/23/#bdk-2325"&gt;
    &lt;i class="fa fa-link" title="Link to related content"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
&lt;/a&gt;

    &lt;a href="#bdk-2325-transcript"&gt;
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&lt;h2 id="transcription"&gt;Transcription&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Gustavo Flores Echaiz&lt;/strong&gt;: Hello, everyone, and welcome to another episode of
the Bitcoin Optech show.  Today I’m going to be the main host and I’m also
joined by Rearden Code as co-host, Vincenzo, waxwing and João Dias, who are
going to present all on different items.  So, Brandon, would you like to say a
few words, and then we can go one by one to introduce ourselves?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brandon Black&lt;/strong&gt;: Absolutely.  Yes, I’m Brandon Black, or Rearden Code,
currently working on the rbitcoin project, which we’ll also cover in this
newsletter, and I’ll help go through the other news and software items.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Gustavo Flores Echaiz&lt;/strong&gt;: Great, waxwing?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Adam Gibson&lt;/strong&gt;: Hi, yeah, I’m waxwing, I do sort of various privacy and
cryptography research projects in Bitcoin.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Gustavo Flores Echaiz&lt;/strong&gt;: Thank you, Vincenzo?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Vincenzo Palazzo&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah, I’m Vincent, I’m mostly working on the LN
protocol.  Currently, I’m focusing on BOLT12 and trying to improve the payment
UX of Lightning.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Gustavo Flores Echaiz&lt;/strong&gt;: That’s amazing.  And finally, João?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;João Dias&lt;/strong&gt;: Hey, so I am a software engineer at ZBD.  I also just joined
Blockstream to work with Core Lightning (CLN), and I’m also a developer
advocate at Vinteum, a project based in Brazil.  And I guess I’m also a vibe
coder, just like everyone else.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Gustavo Flores Echaiz&lt;/strong&gt;: Thank you so much, everyone.  Brandon, the floor is
yours.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p id="trust-minimized-exits-from-a-single-issuer-layer-2-transcript"&gt;&lt;em&gt;Trust-minimized exits from a single-issuer layer 2&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brandon Black&lt;/strong&gt;: All right.  Yeah, let’s get into the news.  So, waxwing has
been hard at work, as usual, on new privacy and scaling protocols for Bitcoin.
And we talked last week about his LN-GAP work and improving Lightning
directly.  This week, we have his new Lichen protocol, which is, if I
understand it correctly, and I’m sure he’ll give us more details here, is a
Lightning-like layer 2 protocol in terms of it has things locked in 2-of-2
outputs like Lightning.  There’s unilateral exit like Lightning, there’s
inbound liquidity needs like Lightning, all that is very similar to Lightning.
However, it’s a full second-layer protocol where the layer can implement any
rules it wants for how those tokens that are minted out of these 2-of-2
outputs are transferred within the second layer.  So, that gives it kind of a
different feel to it, although it could also potentially interoperate with
Lightning.  And then, I think the innovation about this is it’s a unilateral
exit as opposed to kind of a committee-based exit, using BitVM to validate
those unilateral exits.  Yeah, Adam, what else you want to add about that?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Adam Gibson&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah, so, I think this proposal, I’m personally very
enthusiastic about it, and I don’t say that very often about things, because I
often come up with weird ideas that I know are somewhat interesting, but maybe
don’t really matter that much.  But I think this one’s actually very
interesting.  I’ll try and justify that.  So, yeah, you described at a high
level, I think, pretty well the main idea.  But I think perhaps coming at it
from a different angle, if you look at the recent couple of years of research
into L2s that are trustless, so, you mentioned BitVM, and it goes all the way
through BitVM2, BitVM3, Glock, now we’ve got PIPEs v2, we’ve got BABE, and so
on; and there’s BitVMX, which I also actually used in this.  There’s a lot of
different ways of approaching it, where the idea is that sort of fully
leveraging the power of cryptography and specifically the power of
zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs), and even more specifically the succinctness of
proving systems that can take a very complicated set of conditions and boil it
down into verifying a very short string basically, sort of leveraging that in
the context of Bitcoin and all of these ideas, the various BitVMs and
satellite ideas, they do something very powerful.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;But I think, in many cases, when you look at the proposed use cases for them,
a good example of this is the paper, BABE, that was released earlier this
year, they describe how their sort of canonical use case is collateral for a
loan.  And many of them will talk about that.  They’ll say, “Oh, this is
really cool”, because you could basically bridge your Bitcoin onto, let’s say,
Aave or some other Ethereum-type thing, and then you can lend out your money,
and it can all be trustless, where you know you will get your Bitcoin back as
long as the rules are followed, and you don’t need to trust an operator, so to
speak, because the idea is that there is some UTXO that is yours.  And you
sort of deposit it, and it just sits there, and you will be able to
trustlessly exit it using this clever zero-knowledge proving tech, as long as
you followed the rules on the other system.  And that’s cool and everything,
but that’s not what really sort of excites my interest.  My interest is more
the general L2 concept, the idea going back to the sidechains paper, of we can
take our Bitcoin, move it onto another system which has other properties, do
payments with it, do all kinds of weird stuff on there, faster payments, more
private payments, smart contract payments, whatever.  And then, when we want
to get the money back, we just take it back.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The problem is those two kinds of models don’t fit together very well.  If you
want to deposit into a UTXO with these BitVM variants, what you’re going to
have to do is to have something called covenant emulation.  So, because we
don’t have covenants, and in particular we’d need very general covenants for
this, I think, you’d want to be able to say, “Well, I’ll put my money into the
deposit”, but there’ll be a certain set of rules under which it can come out.
But as we know, without covenants on Bitcoin, it’s just a binary lock; either
you can spend the money or you can’t.  So, we have to do this kind of setup
committee thing where we imagine, oh, there’s 1,000 people in a committee, and
as long as one of them is honest, then the effective covenant emulation will
work.  So, that’s one big restriction with those models.  Another big
restriction with them is that it just deals with a fixed-size UTXO.  So,
that’s why I think they liked that collateral example, because it doesn’t
really cause a problem there.  But in a typical L2 usage scenario, you’d
deposit, like, 10 million sats on the L2, and then after six months, you’d be
spending and receiving, and you’d end up with 7 million at the end.  And you
want to withdraw 7 million, not 10 million.  And so, that creates a very nasty
friction point with these ideas as well.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So, what my idea was here in Lichen, and I called it Lichen, silly piece of
background on it, it means L2s In CHannels ENforced on bitcoin.  But let’s
just call it Lichen and stick with that.  So, my idea here was that well, if
you think about it in a way, what is Lightning, if not a covenant emulation.
It’s just that calling it a covenant emulation is silly because there’s only
two parties in the contract, so there’s only one sort of counterparty you’re
dealing with.  But it’s just natural that you can enforce that certain things
happen in that sort of Lightning setup.  And so, what I’m doing here is
mapping the existing work.  Actually, I’ve sort of moved on.  I was originally
using BitVMX, I’m now using BABE, but that doesn’t matter.  The exact ZKP
technology is not really the point here.  The point here is that because it’s
that two party contract, it means that you don’t have that problem of covenant
emulation, and you can even resolve the problem of having a fixed withdrawal
output amount as well.  That is also resolved, because what you can do is you
can bit decompose the amount that you’re withdrawing, and you can include that
as part of the statement that you’re proving.  In other words, “I’m going to
prove in the ZKP system that I’m entitled to withdraw 7 million sats exactly.
And you will not be able to stop me doing that because if you try to, you will
fail because the ZKP is actually valid”.  And that comes out in the form of
actually multiple outputs of different denominations.  But effectively, within
reasonable tolerance, let’s say 1,000 sat is the minimum unit, you’ll be able
to withdraw any arbitrary amount using that approach.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Perhaps I should stop there.  Now I’ve started to talk about it, I realize
this is a very long and complicated explanation.  So, I’ll stop.  Just ask me
or whatever, and I’ll move on from whatever you say.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brandon Black&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah.  So, I think one thing that’s interesting to kind of
dive into a little bit more here is the benefit specifically compared to the
kind of BitVM, let’s say, pooled sidechain proposals where everyone’s funds go
in together, versus here, any given entity operating on this L2 has their own
output, and that’s why we can get this unique property of the unilateral
withdrawals without that committee being involved.  So, maybe focus in on
that.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Adam Gibson&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah, exactly.  And the thing is, it’s a weird mental model
at first, which is why when I wrote the paper, I wrote the introduction as
like an FAQ, because I thought there are obvious things that you’re going to
think this doesn’t make sense, but they’re really trade-offs that I think
really do make sense and it really works well together.  So, you have one hub
entity, and the way I would ask people to think about that is think of it a
bit like an LSP, like a Phoenix or something, right?  You’re imagining one
central coordinating entity, and obviously there’s negatives with that.  But
it has the benefit that it basically means that everyone is trading on the L2
redeemable tokens of that entity.  And redeemable in the strictest sense is
that even if they die, you can go on the blockchain and get back exactly the
amount of money you’re owed, even if they disappear.  Rather like, in fact,
today, I mean, the reason I like Phoenix and I often mention it to people,
“Use Phoenix for your LN”, is because I do actually have self-custody, I own
my coins on that.  I have a seed phrase, and so on, even though I get all of
the sort of luxurious benefits of not having to worry about my node and
whether I’ve got the uptime and stuff.  Well, I mean, theoretically, I kind of
do.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;But that’s another thing where this is better than Lightning, is that when
everyone takes their tokens onto this L2, it’s not only that you can get all
kinds of different functionality, but also, the receiver doesn’t have to be
live.  In fact, you can kind of forget about Bitcoin’s blockchain, because
what you can do is you can say, “Right, I’m going to set this contract with
the hub for six months”.  That’s a long time, but it could easily work like
that for six months.  And during that six months, at least until close to the
end of that six months, I don’t have to actually pay any attention to anything
at all, because I can just receive and pay without, like, as in Lightning, you
have to check if the contract state has been breached.  You don’t have to do
that, because the only obligation on the user side that you have is to come
back online before the end of the contract.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Now, on the hub side, it’s different.  The hub actually has to stay online all
the time.  And why?  Because anytime, the user could send out a fraudulent
request and say, “I deserve to be paid 10 million”, whereas actually they only
have 6 million.  So, there’s a lot of requirements on the hub, it’s very heavy
on the hub in that regard.  It would be quite an expensive thing to run.  I
also want to say this now before I forget, but the description in the
newsletter, it’s not that it’s wrong, it’s more that it’s out of date.  It
says that, “Oh, well, we completely trust the sequencer”.  Well, no, that’s
not actually true with what I’ve got right now because now, the updates to the
state of the L2 are all proved valid in the ZKP.  So, just like the standard
idea of rollups in Ethereum, you have a validity rollup, what they call, so
it’s constantly maintained in that sense.  And also, if the hub/sequencer goes
online, because actually, if you think about it, they’re kind of the same
entity, if they go offline there is now a mechanism whereby you can withdraw
anyway.  In other words, they can’t censor you.  But maybe, that’s too much
detail.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brandon Black&lt;/strong&gt;: On that note, the link to the paper is also out of date;
the paper link is to the old paper that’s not there anymore, that had that old
information in it.  So, yeah, we do need to update both of those.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Adam Gibson&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah.  No, it’s fine.  I mean, I’m going so fast, guess why
I’m going so fast?  Obviously, I’m coding it all myself, right?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brandon Black&lt;/strong&gt;: No one’s using the LLMs in this.  We don’t do that, right?
Another thing I think is interesting to talk about with this, and it’s been an
interesting kind of discovery over the course of recent years in Bitcoin L2
research, is there’s no free lunches in terms of liquidity.  So, in Ark, the
ASP has to put up liquidity for this to work.  In Lichen here, the hub has to
put up liquidity for this to work.  In Lightning, an LSP has to put up
liquidity.  We’re finding, as we build layer 2s in Bitcoin, there’s always
some kind of a liquidity requirement on some party in order for the thing to
work, beyond the raw balances of all the users.  How would Lichen compare to
something like Ark or Lightning, or some of the other L2s, in terms of the
liquidity requirements on the hub and the sequencer?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Adam Gibson&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah.  First of all, I’m going to withhold comment on Ark
because my knowledge of it is really weak; I hardly understand it at all.  But
on Lightning, I’m going to say this, that I think it’s a very heavy
requirement on the hub actually.  Because I have figures in my current version
of my paper where I claim, using BABE and not BitVMX, which is a bit too
heavy, but BABE works really well for this, I think I can get to like 10 to
50,000 users concurrently being supported by a single hub.  But that number is
based on me analyzing the problem of mass exit.  Because I think the biggest
weakness with this system is what happens if the hub does go offline and
everyone wants to get out at the same time.  So, they all have to broadcast
their sort of enforcement transactions on Bitcoin.  And that’s why I switched
from BitVMX to BABE, because it makes it so that the size of those
transactions is nowhere near as big.  And so, that’s that.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;But if I start to claim things like, “Oh, yeah, you can have a hub with 10 to
50,000 users”, well, hang on a minute, inbound liquidity for all of them?  I
mean, obviously, you’re always going to have the users that don’t really need
inbound liquidity, because they’re just spending, just like in Lightning.  You
could be just a consumer on Lightning, you don’t need inbound liquidity.  But
in general, obviously, some of the users need inbound liquidity, otherwise
how’s anybody going to receive any money, right?  So, it’s exactly the same as
running an LSP, I think.  And I think, I don’t know how many users typical
LSPs have now, and I don’t know how much liquidity they reserve, but it is a
market problem.  The way I see it is, it’s solvable because it’s a market
problem.  If the hub finds that it can support its operations with a certain
amount of payments from users, then that’s fine.  That’s the price they can
agree on, right?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brandon Black&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah, and I think that’s what we’re seeing in all the other
areas.  So, one thing that I think is maybe nice about Lichen versus some of
the other current protocols, Ark and BitVM, where there’s pooled liquidity, is
that it seems like with Lichen, the hub could negotiate with individual users
to kind of flex their liquidity up and down over time in a way that is
difficult in something like Ark, where they have to kind of roll users over in
large batches between rounds.  So, there is maybe a benefit here in the fact
that these are individual 2-of-2s, like Lightning, as opposed to a large pool
with everyone in one pool, like Ark.  Now, does that mean though that, well, I
guess you said that these things can last for a long time.  So, unlike in Ark,
where pools have to be kind of short-lived to facilitate liquidity management,
these 2-of-2s can be long-lived in Lichen, so that’s kind of a trade-off.
There’s still a time limit, unlike a Lightning channel, but the time limit is
much longer than an Ark pool.  Is that accurate?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Adam Gibson&lt;/strong&gt;: I don’t, as I said before, I don’t actually understand Ark
very well.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brandon Black&lt;/strong&gt;: Sorry.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Adam Gibson&lt;/strong&gt;: No, not at all, it’s necessary to make these comparisons.  I
can only speak from the point of view of what I’ve built so far, and it seems
very clear to me that you would use a long timeout.  So, concretely imagine
you’re a user, you want to deposit 10 million sats, and you want to, just for
argument’s sake, you want to also have 10 million sats inbound, just for
symmetry’s sake.  It depends, is that useful to you?  If that’s useful to you
for six months, you may as well just have a six-month contract.  There’s no
reason to have a shorter one, I think.  And as I said before, if the hub, or
let’s call it the operator, if the operator goes offline, well, you just have
the material necessary to get your money back onchain.  So, you just relax
until you hit like, after the fifth month, you realize that, “Okay, I can’t go
up to the last day”, because if something goes wrong on the last day, the
timeouts are naturally – oh, by the way, the period of withdrawal, I think,
with BABE is going to be typically like one day in a dispute.  Obviously, most
of the time, there would be no dispute, because there’s no point going
backwards and forwards when you already know that the ZKP is valid.  That’s
the general argument.  The only reason you have to worry about that is if
there’s an attack, if somebody’s trying to do a mass exit attack, etc.  But
basically, I don’t see any reason for it to be a short time, it should be a
long time.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brandon Black&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah, good.  So, yeah, so that manages the traffic onchain
for supporting many users in this.  All right, very cool.  Anything else you
want to add?  Any other questions from the other folks on the call before we
go on to the next item?  All right, moving along.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Adam Gibson&lt;/strong&gt;: Thank you.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p id="descriptor-syntax-for-hash-preimages-transcript"&gt;&lt;em&gt;Descriptor syntax for hash preimages&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brandon Black&lt;/strong&gt;: Jaonoctus, you proposed, “Descriptor syntax for hash
preimages”.  Just for everyone’s context, in miniscript descriptors today, we
have nice ways to express private keys when needed, so that they can be
imported from a private descriptor into a wallet, and that works fine for
private keys.  Their equivalent public descriptors can then be shared, people
can pay them, you can recover using the public one, all that kind of stuff.
But we don’t have an equivalent for secret hash preimages, and that’s
something that is a challenge for users who are trying to use certain kinds of
offchain protocols, or in your case, you mentioned using it in the puzzle for
TABConf.  There’s a need here that there is other secret data than just secret
keys.  There are the symmetric secrets of preimages, and you might need to
specify those in order to use a descriptor effectively.  And you have a
proposal here that’s kind of in draft phase, it looks like, for how we might
specify those in descriptors, and kind of get them into the language so that
wallets can share these and export them and they can be managed appropriately,
similarly to how we manage private keys in descriptors.  So, tell us more.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;João Dias&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah, exactly.  So, I ran into this while solving the TABConf
CTB puzzle two years ago, where I expected to have the same feature or
functionality of the pk descriptor, the public key, while creating the wallet
and using the bitcoin-cli, because I am familiar with the cli, and then I was
expecting to do the createwallet and then importdescriptors, and do the
SHA256, or whatever hash it is.  And then, there is no way to describe the
wallet, like the private information, or in this case, the preimage.  And that
makes sense, because when you are using the pk, you can either specify the
public key, or there is a specific format for the private information, which
would be the WIF (Wallet Import Format), or the xpriv, and they vary on sizes,
right, which is different from the digest because right now, the way that the
descriptors for any hash works is that they do enforce the size.  And then, it
wouldn’t look different if I tell the preimage or the digest because they have
the same size.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So, I got frustrated two years ago.  I remember even tweeting about it.  Ava
Chow, she saw it, and I know that they were discussing about it in IRC, and
they were like, “Oh, we never thought about it”.  So, yeah.  The thing that
I’m proposing is that it’s basically a marker to the descriptors that you can
say, “This is the preimage for this hash”, because as I just mentioned, there
is no specific format for differentiating preimages from digest, so that we
would have to use a specific descriptor for it.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brandon Black&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah.  So, just again, for the user’s context, when you’re
using hashes in verification scripts in Bitcoin or other crypto systems, the
preimage is kind of the secret key and the digest is the public key.  So, in
your locking script, you would specify the digest, and then anybody who can
bring the preimage, that’s the secret part, can hash it to the digest and
validate it in your locking script.  So, that’s why we need to have this
differentiation, is in the public side of the descriptor, you specify the
digest, and in the private side, you specify the preimage, and that’s how you
can spend.  And only the person who has the secret can spend, of course,
unlike with secret keys, once you do the spend, the secret becomes public.
So, in some ways, there’s like an extra level of secrecy you have to deal with
with preimages, because once they’re used, they become public.  Anyway, so
there’s all that kind of going into considerations of how to build these to
help users effectively retain their spend conditions’ secrecy as needed.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;João Dias&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah, because right now, again in the bitcoin-cli, you can do
the createwallet, and then by default, the argument disable_private_keys is
disabled.  So, you can import a private key, even if you specify like the
public key and then private key inside of it, your wallet is going to store
that into the file and use that while signing transactions, right?  The hash
is different because, again, it is going to have the same size of the preimage
and it’s going to be converted to the script OP_SIZE 32 OP_EQUALVERIFY so that
it verifies the size first, and then do the &amp;lt;HASHOP&amp;gt;, whatever it is, and
then the &amp;lt;digest&amp;gt; OP_EQUAL.  So, it verifies if the hash you’re using
matches what you previously committed to the address.  I was expecting to have
some similar feature for it.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brandon Black&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah, or Bitcoin Core won’t show preimage by default, would
be awfully nice.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;João Dias&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah, it would read as the digest always.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brandon Black&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah.  So, what’s the status of the proposal?  What
feedback have you gotten so far?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;João Dias&lt;/strong&gt;: Very few, actually.  Like, I wrote this article in Delving, and
I talked with Poelstra at TABConf this year, and also there are a few
questions still open.  My first idea is just to have this preimage marker, and
this would be the simplest way to build this feature.  But at the same time,
should I create a new BIP for it, or should I edit the existing descriptor
one, BIP379, I think?  And there is other stuff that we can also do in the
future, like add new RPC or complementary RPC calls into Bitcoin Core.  Should
we leave this for software wallets only or should hardware wallets implement
this?  And I know that for some other protocols, like Lightning
implementations, they do have preimages, but they handle this in a
deterministic way.  So, we could extend this, but the simplest way would be
just have this preimage marker.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brandon Black&lt;/strong&gt;: Or, you could have a syntax for derived preimages as well,
potentially, in the descriptor?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;João Dias&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brandon Black&lt;/strong&gt;: Interesting.  Well, I hope maybe this podcast will get some
more attention on it and move the proposal forward, because I do think it’s
something valuable for folks to have, especially when people are working
towards various kind of offchain-sequenced protocols and things like that.
These are important features to have in the Bitcoin Core wallet.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;João Dias&lt;/strong&gt;: I think the next steps would be just I write a draft, like a
BIP draft, and then see what people talk about it.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brandon Black&lt;/strong&gt;: Cool.  Well, look forward to seeing it.  Any other
questions, Gustavo or Vincent, before we move on?  All right.  Well, thanks a
lot, João.  Feel free to stay on or drop at your discretion.  We’re going to
move on to the Services and client software section, where we have three
vibe-coded or agentically-engineered projects to talk about that had releases
recently.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p id="ibis-wallet-v5-0-beta-released-transcript"&gt;&lt;em&gt;Ibis Wallet v5.0-beta released&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;First up, we have the Ibis Wallet v5.0-beta.  Note, there is already a
5.1-beta that fixes an important bug, so the newsletter item is slightly out
of date, although the features talked about here are still the relevant
features.  So, this new release adds Ark support built on Bark, unilateral
exits from the Spark statechain, and receiving to silent payment addresses.
We’ve talked about Ibis before in the newsletter and on the podcast, but just
kind of to briefly summarize, it’s a fully vibe-coded wallet by a friend of
the show, aeon, who was one of the early people to start saying, “No, we can
build vibe-coded Bitcoin software and it’ll actually be more secure done this
way”.  I didn’t believe him when he started.  Of course, now I do, but that
changed later.  So, I think this project has been going for quite a while now,
I think over a year-and-a-half or more, and he’s really made huge progress in
building a wallet that is vibe-coded, that is to all kind of outside auditing
appearances very secure, and has a lot of feature functionality built in
because of the capabilities of LLMs.  So, kind of an early example that’s
continuing to make great progress towards getting less reckless over time,
let’s say, using vibe-coded, agentically-engineered software.  Questions or
comments about Ibis?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Gustavo Flores Echaiz&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah, I just want to say that it’s only available
on Android.  So, I wanted to test it out, but I wasn’t able to because I don’t
have an Android.  But yeah, if listeners would like to try it out, it’s only
available on Android for now.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brandon Black&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah, and I’ve talked to him about that actually.  And he
said that because it’s agentically-engineered, he proposes that someone
basically just point their agent at it and copy it to iPhone, and that’s the
best way to do it.  In the modern world, it doesn’t make sense to try and
support both in a single codebase, because you’re going to end up having this
kind of unnecessary branching for the two platforms.  And it’s better to have
just a copy that’s focused on being the best iPhone version and the agents can
effectively translate.  It’s one of the things they’re really good at.  So,
that’s why it’s only one platform; it’s intentional.  Cool.  Anything else
about that, otherwise, we’ll move on to Landfall.  Cool.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p id="landfall-wallet-for-lightning-mining-payouts-transcript"&gt;&lt;em&gt;Landfall wallet for Lightning mining payouts&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;All right.  So, Landfall is Vincent’s project here, also
agentically-engineered.  And this is in the proof-of-concept state, it is not
as far along, at this moment, as Ibis is.  But it’s a proposal for a
lightweight Lightning wallet that you can run in kind of a low maintenance way
to receive mining payouts to Lightning, and not have to kind of manage your
own home infrastructure and separate keys, and all this kind of stuff, really
simplifying your ability to be paid out quickly and at a low cost from, for
the moment, OCEAN mining, but hopefully in the future, other mining pools also
over Lightning.  So, tell us more about it, Vincent.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Vincenzo Palazzo&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah.  So, Landfall started from this frustration where,
I work also for OCEAN for the Lightning payouts, so I had to do the support
and every time that I had to explain people how to do the setup of OCEAN, that
from an address, we connect the address to the offer, and then the user need
to sign, with the onchain private key, the message that OCEAN provide to him,
just to prove that the owner of the address want really to be paid on
Lightning.  So, it’s just a way of us to bind the offer with the onchain
address.  And if you go on the documentation, you have to switch at least
three wallets.  So, you have your Trezor, and then you need to move your key
to another wallet, and then sign the message with the Lightning wallet with
the offer created inside the Lightning wallet.  So, if you are lucky, you have
at least two wallets involved; if you are unlucky, you may have three wallets
involved.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brandon Black&lt;/strong&gt;: And depending on what wallet your key is in, you might have
a third wallet involved, right?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Vincenzo Palazzo&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah, because you usually don’t mine on the Lightning
wallet onchain address, you usually mine on, I don’t know, on a Trezor or, I
don’t know, onchain wallet, or something.  And then, after a while, you say,
“Okay, let’s try it out this Lightning stuff”.  And at this point, the OCEAN
payout is permissionless.  So, the only thing that matters to OCEAN is the
onchain address, so you cannot, I don’t know, move the proof of work that you
did till that point to another address.  So, the thing that we really need is
a better UX to do this signing message.  And this is not an OCEAN procedure,
it’s also Relai, a European exchange, required you to do a withdrawal on an
onchain address, and required you to sign this BIP322 message.  And if you go
around, you probably find one or two wallets that are able to do that.  And
when I collected this information, I say, “Okay, it’s so difficult to make
one”, and I started two years ago with a command line and said, “Okay, I can
hook up all the wallets, right?  You can use the hardware wallet interface,
you can connect all the wallets”, but at some point, everything became too
complicated.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;At the same time, I was following this Lexe project, that is a Lightning
wallet that is running on a TEE (Trusted Execution Environment), so you don’t
have the key on the phone, but basically the keys are inside this TEE.  And
while I was talking with the team in Viareggio or somewhere else, they said to
me that I could import the mnemonic.  I could create the wallet with a
mnemonic on the device and ask the Lexe server to create a wallet.  Now, I
think it’s the default.  Before, it was not the default operation, so I didn’t
have the private key to send a message.  And at that point, I just went to
Claude Design, I figured out a nice design for that.  And I created an app
that is able to do this step guidance, focused on the OCEAN setup, but no one
is stopping you to say, okay, now the message is another message that is
required by Relai, or some other platform.  And with four steps, I was able to
be up and running, and I had a Lightning node with a channel, and I created an
offer, and I was mining on OCEAN with a Bitaxe.  And then, you can go really
way crazy, you can buy in your Bitaxe, you can connect the, I don’t know, API
with a miner, you can go really in production with really big thing.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I released it not as a proof of concept, but as a showcase.  The proof of
concept is you should not run this.  The showcase is, “Hey, this is the way
how you should deploy this kind of stuff”.  And a couple of miners from OCEAN,
they saw my tweet and said, “Oh, this is cool.  I will test it”.  And they are
running now the software.  So, probably it’s not a showcase anymore, but
anyway, for now it’s a showcase.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brandon Black&lt;/strong&gt;: I was going to ask, what’s the future here?  Is this going
to be kind of long-term maintained stable software for people to use with
OCEAN?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Vincenzo Palazzo&lt;/strong&gt;: Well, if OCEAN will decide to pick it up as a project,
probably yes.  If there are a lot of users that are using the software, I will
decide at some point to do the maintenance of it, or just the packaging and
the release of the software.  And I feel that this is a needed project,
because there are some miners that are sometimes not able to set up a
Lightning offer, they’re just trying to figure out how to build with Grok AI
the app to be able to use it.  So, at the moment, there is no clear filter for
that outside of the showcase.  And this depends on if OCEAN decides to pick it
up as an internal project, or I will have enough users that are asking me to
maintain it.  So, yeah.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brandon Black&lt;/strong&gt;: Cool.  Definitely, I think, a needed project, because
you’re right, there are quite a few places in the world where people have the
challenge of linking an onchain address, for various reasons, to a Lightning
offer.  And Lightning is intentionally somewhat private.  And so, you have to
intentionally make that link, which is a good feature.  But sometimes you have
to make that link.  So, very cool.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Vincenzo Palazzo&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah.  And this is not for onchain payout, if you think
about the privacy that BOLT12 is giving you, right?  I’ll opine around this,
and then I will close in two seconds.  But one thing that a lot of people
think that OCEAN is doing Lightning payout for is for small miners, right, for
people that are not able to enter inside the threshold.  But if you think
about how much privacy you gain with BOLT12, you should use Lightning also if
you care about privacy, if you are one of these miners that is receiving the
payout in a wallet, and then you use Bitcoin as a miner, because then, at this
point, you are saying to everyone, “Hey, I mined on this address, and now
these are my payouts with the other UTXO”.  So, essentially, if you are a
miner that uses Bitcoin as a payment and not to sell to pay the bills, but if
you use Bitcoin as a payment, you should use Lightning, and for this privacy
guarantee that we put inside BOLT12.  And with BOLT11, you still leak some
information, but with BOLT12, you can really be underground and no one knows
you.  And if you think about this use case, exchange withdrawal will be
really, really nice with BOLT12, and then you need to link the onchain address
or the account with some BOLT12 offer.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So, you made a great point that sometimes, Lightning is used in a broken way,
say, for small payouts; now, Lightning is used for privacy, if you care about
it.  But yeah.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brandon Black&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah, I think there was the joke some months ago, Super
Testnet overplayed it a little bit, but he was talking about how Lightning is
the greatest privacy coin ever made.  And there’s some truth to that actually,
that because of the level of traffic that Lightning attracts and because of
the privacy of individual payments within the LN, in many cases, your best way
to use money privately is the Lightning Network, not one of the other coins
and not Bitcoin onchain.  So, it’s awesome to see privacy being pushed forward
here as well.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Vincenzo Palazzo&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah, even more if you are telling the onchain address
to everyone, right?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brandon Black&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah, for sure.  Awesome.  Any questions, Gustavo,
otherwise, we’ll get on to rbitcoin?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Gustavo Flores Echaiz&lt;/strong&gt;: No, really cool stuff.  Thank you.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p id="rbitcoin-0-8-0-released-transcript"&gt;&lt;em&gt;rbitcoin 0.8.0 released&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brandon Black&lt;/strong&gt;: All right.  Our last software release, also
agentically-engineered, of course, because that’s the theme of the year, let’s
say, is mine, rbitcoin.  So, a couple of weeks ago, I released rbitcoin 0.8.0.
This is now somewhat out of date, as you might expect in a fast moving,
agentically-engineered project.  But in summary, rbitcoin is a Bitcoin full
node from the ground up in Rust using rust-bitcoin.  Notably, it intentionally
does not use any of Bitcoin Core’s consensus logic internally.  It is
validated against Bitcoin Core’s consensus logic using a lot of automation,
but it is a from-scratch consensus implementation based on rust-bitcoin.  The
project overall, I built it for myself because I run a Bitcoin node that I use
to back my wallets, and I wanted something to exist that made that easier.
So, I didn’t have to run Bitcoin Core and Electrs or Esplora, or any of the
other kind of sidecar indexers.  So, I built this.  And I think since this
newsletter was written actually, it has somewhat become important, I would
say.  Because in building it, I came up with a variant of the Esplora API that
allows for stable views of wallets.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I didn’t realize when I built that, that it was a universal pain point of
everyone building wallets based on Esplora and Electrum.  I was just like,
“This is the way it should be for me when I’m building my wallet on this”.
And it turned out that everyone had problems with Esplora and Electrum
providing an unstable view when viewing wallet contents.  So, rbitcoin has a
variant of those APIs that make stable wallet sync possible.  And people seem
to really like that about it.  So, I hope that rbitcoin maybe is a guidepost
for how Esplora-based wallets can be better in the future.  And yeah, it’s
also a modern Bitcoin node.  But it turns out that being a Bitcoin node is a
secondary feature to most people who are very interested in it.  It’s
important to me.  I wanted one thing to run, but you can also run rbitcoin, on
master at least, against your Bitcoin Core node and use it primarily as a
wallet service against your Bitcoin Core node.  So, that’s rbitcoin.  Any
questions, guys?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Gustavo Flores Echaiz&lt;/strong&gt;: Super-cool stuff.  Thank you for sharing.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Vincenzo Palazzo&lt;/strong&gt;: Can you explain really briefly what the pain point of
Esplora and Electrum Server that you fixed?  What is the use case that you’re
going to fix?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brandon Black&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah.  So, the problem with syncing a wallet against the
Esplora is if you make two queries, let’s say you query the balance and then
the UTXOs, you have no way of knowing if you got those from the same block.
You might get, especially if there was a reorg in that time, you might get the
balance from a block on chain A, but then the UTXOs from the block on chain B,
and there’s no way to tell that you got that.  So, you kind of just have to
keep querying until you’re pretty sure you got a stable answer.  So, rbitcoin
does two things.  One, in the headers of an Esplora response, it always puts
the blockhash you got the response from.  So, you can at least tell for sure
whether you got a stable view or not.  But then, it also has an extra query
parameter you can pass, asof.  And you can say, “I want my next query to be
asof this blockhash”.  And it’ll either give you an error, “That blockhash is
no longer on the best tip”, or it’ll give you the stable view at that
blockhash in your next response.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So, either way you use it, whether you just query kind of naively and then
look at the headers, or you ask in your next query for a specific stable view
to keep going with your future queries, the result is that you can now be
confident you didn’t miss a shift in the UTXO set because of a reorg in
between your queries.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Vincenzo Palazzo&lt;/strong&gt;: Okay.  Makes sense.  Thanks.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brandon Black&lt;/strong&gt;: Obviously, it’s a low-probability thing, but because
Esplora provides no way to know for sure, wallets are always like, “Well, I
sure hope I got a stable view and I’m not lying to my user”.  And especially
in Lightning, what if you missed someone getting a force-close in the chain,
and then it’s not in the different view.  It matters, and so you have to work
around it.  And with rbitcoin, it’s kind of provided for you that you can tell
for sure whether you got a stable view or not.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Vincenzo Palazzo&lt;/strong&gt;: Okay, makes sense.  Thanks.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brandon Black&lt;/strong&gt;: Cool.  Well, that’s it for the Changes to services and
client software.  So, back over to you, Gustavo, for the Releases, release
candidates, and whatnot.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p id="eclair-0-14-4-transcript"&gt;&lt;em&gt;Eclair 0.14.4 and 0.14.5&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Gustavo Flores Echaiz&lt;/strong&gt;: Awesome.  Thanks so much, Brandon, that helps a
lot.  So, we’re now going to go through the Releases and release candidates.
So, the first item, both new releases from Eclair that came up one after the
other, versions 0.14.4 and 0.14.5.  So, the first one fixes several issues we
covered in Newsletter #427.  I think most of the Notable code changes we
covered in #427 were around Eclair, multiple issues related to HTLC (Hash Time
Locked Contract) settlement, splicing, on-the-fly funding, many potential fund
theft cases where you would fail an incoming HTLC but an outgoing HTLC would
still be claimable by an upstream peer.  So, all of those fixes are now
included in this first release, and listeners can refer back to Newsletter
#427 and the episode that came with it if you want further details on all
those and everything that was included.  Also, that same version includes a
fix we covered in Newsletter #423, which basically Eclair now rejects API
requests containing an Origin header to prevent cross-site request forgery.
It basically means a browser-based frontend can now no longer call Eclair
directly and it needs its own backend instead to call Eclair.  So, that fix is
also included in the first version.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Then, the second version that came quite a few days later, version 0.14.5,
this one includes some fixes we’re going to describe in the section below,
specifically around trampoline routing and taproot splicing vulnerabilities.
Also, in Newsletter #427, we covered specifically a bug around the HMAC
construction and validation.  That is also included in this second release.
Users are recommended to upgrade since these are security releases, so if you
run an Eclair node, use it as part of your infrastructure, please take notice
of that.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p id="bdk-chain-0-23-4-transcript"&gt;&lt;em&gt;BDK chain 0.23.4&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The next release is BDK chain 0.23.4.  So, previously, BDK used to make
releases under the BDK name.  Now, it has basically split the BDK repo into
wallet and chain releases, chain being the main one.  So, we’re now covering
this maintenance release, and interestingly so it has multiple fixes around
its connection with Electrum.  So, not exactly the same thing you discussed
with Esplora, although we do have a BDK item talking about Esplora below.  But
this release includes multiple fixes when using an Electrum server to connect
to a Bitcoin node around txid verification, confirmation detection for
transactions with an OP_RETURN as a first output, and also confirmation
tracking after reorgs.  That’s something we covered last week, where if a
transaction got reorged, BDK might not notice that it would get reconfirmed in
a new block.  A cache of the BDK system might still think it’s linked to the
block that was reorged.  And that’s for BDK.  It also has some other fixes
related to Bitcoin Core RPC synchronization after reorgs.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p id="lnd-v0-21-5-beta-rc1-transcript"&gt;&lt;em&gt;LND v0.21.5-beta.rc1 and v0.20.6-beta.rc1&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Finally, we cover two RCs, LND v0.21.5 and v0.20.6.  Both are still in the RC
level, so I just verified on the releases in LND, and no official release has
come out yet.  So, users that would like to test these RCs are invited to do
so.  They both include some fixes we covered in Newsletter #418, a small one
related to how update_fee is handled in LND to match BOLT12, BOLT2’s
replaceable state model, and thus preventing redundant uncommitted fee updates
from growing the update log.  So, it’s mostly about handling the size of the
update log, along with fixes for commitment fee rates, excessive memory
allocation, and SQL database deadlocks.  The v21 maintenance release also
includes auxiliary HTLC signature validation that we covered in the past
newsletter.  So, that was around the fact that LND sometimes could produce
some HTLCs without the auxiliary signing signatures, which meant that a
receiver of that HTLC, if the channel was later force-closed, the missing
signatures could prevent the affected underlying assets, for example, the
Taproot Assets, from being resolved onchain.  The fix is obvious: LND now
verifies that all auxiliary signatures are present before signing, so that is
also included in this RC.  Any comments, questions about the releases?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brandon Black&lt;/strong&gt;: Taproot Assets is still LND only, right?  There’s not a
cross-implementation of that?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Gustavo Flores Echaiz&lt;/strong&gt;: That’s correct.  I just got an email that actually
a new version of Eclair just released, 0.14.6.  So, while we’re online, if
you’re listening and you run Eclair, maybe worth looking into that too.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brandon Black&lt;/strong&gt;: Every day is zero day.  Update your software.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Gustavo Flores Echaiz&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah, every day, it’s the new way.  We jump into
the Notable code and documentation changes section.  This week, once again, we
have multiple Lightning security items; we have some from the BTCPay Server
repo, as well from BDK; and finally, we have two BOLT specification changes,
which I don’t know if, Brandon, if you had time to look at the last item, but
that one seems a bit over my head.  So, if you can take a quick look at it
before I get there, that’d be good.  Finally, we get to the section.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p id="eclair-3409-transcript"&gt;&lt;em&gt;Eclair #3409&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So, we start with two Eclair items. #3409, this one is about fixing a
vulnerability that allows a malicious payer to steal funds from a node
forwarding trampoline payments.  So, the problem here is that if pathfinding
failed when Eclair is forwarding trampoline payments, Eclair would retry with
relaxed limits on route length and expiry, but that would allow a payer to
provide routing hints or blinded paths with excessive expiry deltas.  And as
we know, you really got to be careful to never have a CLTV
(CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY) expiry delta that an outgoing HTLC expires before an
incoming HTLC, because that could lead to a loss of funds for the routing
node.  But this is exactly what happened.  When pathfinding failed, Eclair
would retry, and those relaxed limits would allow a payer to provide routing
hints or blinded paths with excessive expiry deltas.  The problem is then that
the payer could then reclaim the incoming HTLC, because it had an excessive
expiry delta, after it expired.  But the receiver could still claim the
outgoing HTLC, so it’s really important for the outgoing HTLC CLTV to expire
before the incoming HTLC, which was the main issue of this item.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So, the fix is clear, Eclair now only relaxes the route length limit, it
doesn’t allow a payer to provide routing hints or blinded paths with excessive
expiry deltas; that is never relaxed.  That’s the first item.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p id="eclair-3411-transcript"&gt;&lt;em&gt;Eclair #3411&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The second one, another vulnerability in Eclair, #3411.  This one is about a
vulnerability that could allow a malicious channel peer to steal funds by
making Eclair sign an invalid splice transaction.  So, this is specifically
when you’re splicing a simple taproot channel, a peer could provide the amount
and script of an input’s previous output instead of the full transaction.  So,
Eclair was previously trusting these values without verifying them.  So, if a
peer was providing, yes, a valid UTXO, but was maybe providing a different
amount or a different script for that UTXO for the splice-in of this
transaction, Eclair was simply trusting.  It was not going to its Bitcoin
backend and actually verifying that the claimed outputs, the amounts and the
script match.  So, Eclair would sign these transactions, but because taproot
signatures commit to the actual amounts and script of the spent inputs, these
signatures would be invalid.  So, the splice-in transaction could never
confirm on the Bitcoin blockchain.  However, Eclair would still treat this
invalid splice as ongoing and valid and at its latest channel funding state.
So, then, if the peer would publish previously signed commitment transaction
that spent the previous funding output, Eclair would not be able to react,
because Eclair was simply thinking the new splice transaction that would never
confirm onchain was the latest funding state, which meant that the peer could
then claim an outgoing HTLC after Eclair’s corresponding incoming HTLC had
timed out.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So, once again, this is the classic fund theft scenario, or vulnerability
scenario in Lightning, is that the incoming HTLC gets refunded and the user
can still claim the outgoing HTLC.  So, you are refunding to the downstream
peer while the upstream peer can still claim the HTLC and thus the routing
node, Eclair in this case, loses money.  So, now Eclair will obviously verify
that the claimed outputs from a peer for a splice-in transaction actually
correspond to a valid Bitcoin transaction, and it will verify that against its
own Bitcoin backend.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p id="ldk-5126-transcript"&gt;&lt;em&gt;LDK #5126&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So, now we move on to LDK.  LDK fixes a bug where BOLT12 payments using
one-hop blinded paths could be rejected because their HTLC expiry was too
short.  So, this was an edge case where, because in a blinded path, if there’s
only one hop, then the introduction node is also the receiver.  So, LDK would
overlook that fact and consequently, payments only met the receiver’s minimum
requirement, when LDK’s random CLTV offset was large enough.  So, in some
scenarios, LDK would provide a random CLTV that was large enough; in other
scenarios, it wouldn’t.  So, sometimes it would work, sometimes it would fail.
This was causing intermittent payment failures when testing against CLN,
because CLN had a minimum requirement of the HTLC expiry that LDK was simply
not meeting.  So, now the fix is also clear, which is LDK now includes the
advertised delta when constructing the route and checking its maximum
permitted total CLTV delta.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p id="lnd-10919-transcript"&gt;&lt;em&gt;LND #10919&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The next item is from the LND repo, #10919.  This is actually not a bug fix,
but an actual new feature.  So, in Newsletter #377, we covered channel jamming
mitigation, simulation, results and updates.  But in part, we have covered how
what was previously called HTLC endorsement, which was a reputation system
proposed for LN to mitigate channel jamming attacks, was renamed to, or was
reinvented, as HTLC accountability.  And in Newsletter #377, like I said, we
covered a lot of the channel-jamming research.  And in Newsletter #387, we
covered how Eclair and LND both started the implementation of HTLC
accountability, and that is based on a specific PR in the BOLTs repository,
#1280, which is still open.  So, we still haven’t covered how this was merged
in the BOLTs repo, because it hasn’t.  But Eclair and LND both took initial
steps towards implementing it.  And now we get to this LND item, #10919, which
implements at least the local reputation system that is defined in the HTLC
accountability scheme in the BOLTs repo.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So, the system scores outgoing channels based on past forwarding activity and
the node’s advertised fees, penalizing accountable HTLCs that take too long to
resolve.  So, the LND node is constantly monitoring outgoing channels when
forwarding HTLCs, how fast do these HTLCs resolve; do they eventually fail or
always succeed?  And it basically tracks how much revenue it’s supposed to
make versus actually how much revenue it’s making.  If, for example, it’s
always forwarding via a channel to a peer that is always failing the HTLCs, so
it’s never actually working, but it is supposed to make quite some revenue
from that channel and that peer, then that penalizes that peer.  That’s a sort
of simple explanation of how that system works.  So, the system is enabled by
default and it logs all this information, but it doesn’t yet affect forwarding
decisions, okay?  That is very important to be precise.  Same thing for the
Eclair implementation that we covered in Newsletter #387.  This is simply
monitoring, collecting data, but it’s not taking any forwarding decisions yet;
that could come in further phases.  However, in LND’s implementation,
reputation resets on restart, so this is not persisted on disk and storage.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The next two items are from the BTCPay Server repo.  Maybe I’m going to take a
little stop here.  Brandon, Vincent, anything you guys want to add now that
we’ve sort of covered the Lightning section?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brandon Black&lt;/strong&gt;: Man, I don’t know.  This is showing the complexity of the
Lightning protocol and the kind of difficulty of maintaining security in this
kind of multi-implementation routed network, where you have many different
permutations of channel peers all working together, and there can be kind of
nuances, like the CLTV expiry delta, where one implementation thinks that’s
not an important parameter but the other does.  And it’s actually quite
difficult to get every single nuance of that specified in the BOLTs so that
everyone can implement it in the same way.  Yeah, it’s tough stuff.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Gustavo Flores Echaiz&lt;/strong&gt;: Right.  And I think also, now that we don’t just
have one type of channels, but we also now have simple taproot channels, and
we also have zero-fee commitment channels, BOLT12 payments, splicing as well.
The amount of different types of channels and also the negotiations behind all
these protocols have sort of raised the complexity of the system.  So, I think
that’s what we’re seeing a lot over the past few weeks, but thankfully we’ve
got really good teams working on those different implementations, making the
required fixes and shipping the new security releases.  Great.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p id="btcpay-server-7679-transcript"&gt;&lt;em&gt;BTCPay Server #7679&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Now let’s jump into the BTCPay Server section.  So, we’ve got #7679, which is
a bug that could lead to duplicate Lightning payouts.  So, it’s not like
BTCPay Server was making duplicate Lightning payouts, but the problem was that
if a payout was initiated and a lookup returned no results, BTCPay Server
would cancel the payout and discard its payment hash.  But as we know,
Lightning payments sometimes can take longer than a few seconds to resolve.
And BTCPay Server was simply considering that a payment lookup that returned
no results, or specifically a null response, was the same as a payment that
had failed.  And this meant that an operator could interpret the canceled
payout as, “I need to make the payout again”.  However, the payout could still
have completed.  And that’s the risk here.  It’s not that BTCPay Server made
two payouts, it’s that an operator could interpret that the first payout had
failed and thus make the second payout.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So, the fix is also quite simple.  BTCPay Server doesn’t interpret no results
or no response as if the payment had failed.  It now retains those payouts in
progress and it retains their payment hashes as well for subsequent checks and
doesn’t consider them as failed directly.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p id="btcpay-server-7684-transcript"&gt;&lt;em&gt;BTCPay Server #7684&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The next item, #7684, this is actually a very important security vulnerability
in BTCPay Server.  This is a privilege-escalation vulnerability in the
Greenfield API key authorization.  So, there’s two bugs here.  The first one
is that an API key that was restricted to a particular store could exercise
server-wide or account-wide permissions despite its limited scope.  So, it’s
not clear to me yet if it happened in all cases or under all users, but
definitely there’s a risk for privilege escalation in that sense.  The second
one is also very, very potentially risky, which is that a key authorized to
create API keys for other users could grant permissions broader than its own.
So, this is a classic API key-authorization vulnerability that we’ve seen in
other systems, where by being able to create API keys, you could create API
keys with larger permissions than your own, which doesn’t make sense, of
course.  So, now the fix is for BTCPay Server to enforce permission scopes
when authorizing requests so that a key that is restricted to a particular
store could not exercise server-wide or account-wide permissions.  And also,
an API key that can create other API keys obviously shouldn’t be able to grant
permissions they do not possess.  Of course, if you have an unrestricted key,
it retains its intended capabilities.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p id="bdk-2325-transcript"&gt;&lt;em&gt;BDK #2325 and #2360&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The next item combines two different PRs from the BDK repository, #2325 and
#2360.  So, this is about fixing two bugs that could cause the wallet to
report successful synchronization without retrieving the requested transaction
data.  And I don’t know, Brandon, if this is related to your Esplora work, but
maybe I’ll go through the item and maybe you can tell me if you’ve seen this
issue before yourself as well.  So, the first one is that BDK will simply
ignore all error responses when fetching a transaction, specifically with
Electrum.  And it meant that if the request timed out, BDK would interpret it
as no transactions to scan.  So, for example, that could cause a spent output
to remain classified as unspent, even though it had been spent, because BDK
would simply interpret a timeout response from Electrum as if there was
nothing to record.  So, now the fix is for BDK to ignore, yes, Electrum
protocol errors, but propagate other failures, such as timeouts or connection
failures.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The second PR fixes specifically the sync and full_scan methods for the
Electrum and Esplora clients respectively, previously setting batch_size to
zero when using an Electrum backend, or parallel_requests to zero when using
an Esplora backend.  That could make the connection silently skip requested
scans or transaction fetches while reporting success.  So, the fix is to treat
a zero as one for these parameters, so you never get an empty response that
looks successful, but that is obviously just an empty response.  Brandon,
anything to comment here?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brandon Black&lt;/strong&gt;: The thing I would say is that I’m interested in why they
chose to set zero as one versus treating it as an error to make a call with
zero, because very small batch sizes with Electrum can exacerbate the issue we
talked about that rbitcoin fixes, where you’re making many requests to sync
the same wallet, and the view of the blockchain underneath can change over
those many requests, so you don’t get a consistent view of the wallet’s actual
contents.  So, I’m not saying it’s the wrong choice, it’s just I’m curious why
they chose to make zero equal one instead of making zero an error.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Gustavo Flores Echaiz&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah, to be honest, I wouldn’t have the specific
answer for it.  But yeah, that’s a very good question.  Yeah, I do see,
however, in the file’s change, that it does say a batch_size of zero is
treated as one, but there’s no comment on it that explains why.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p id="bolts-1357-transcript"&gt;&lt;em&gt;BOLTs #1357&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brandon Black&lt;/strong&gt;: And I can talk about the next two because we actually
talked about BOLTs #1357, well, the underlying issue that led to it, at
TABConf when I was there.  So, this was an interesting situation where the
BOLT specification had flexibility that was unnecessary, but it was there
because people thought it might be useful, which was it allowed for invoices
to have multiple payment hashes.  And I don’t know exactly why that was there,
I don’t know what the thought was.  But the problem with that is that the
invoice is paid when any of those payment hashes has been received.  But an
attacker, if they can manipulate your software into using one of the payment
hashes in one case and the other in another case, which is what happened to
the LNP2PBot, they could trick you into thinking an invoice was not paid and
pay it again with one of the other payment hashes to achieve a double payout.
And that was exploited.  They, of course, made the fix before the BOLTs change
here, which was just to always use the first one in both of their pieces of
software.  But now there’s an official BOLTs update to say that it should be
rejected if there’s more than one payment hash, because the most likely
reason, since no one’s found a real use for multiple payment hashes, is that
it’s an attack if someone has multiple payment hashes in there.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;It is likely that that exploit was found by an AI looking for ways to exploit
Lightning and it saw this opportunity where there were two pieces of software
that parsed the multiple payment hashes, and chose different ones as an
exploitable opportunity.  So, that’s now closed both in the live software and
in the BOLT specification.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Gustavo Flores Echaiz&lt;/strong&gt;: Right.  And if I might just add here that actually,
it did say that the writer of the Lightning invoice must include exactly one p
field.  But on the reader, it left some ambiguity when it said ‘should’ use
the first p field as the payment hash, right, and not ‘must’ use or must fail
the payment unless exactly one p field is present.  So, those are the phrases
that are added now with this item.  But yeah, that ambiguity allowed this
vulnerability to be exploited.  And I think the LNP2PBot case was the
specifically flagrant one, I don’t know if you had time to look into that
case.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brandon Black&lt;/strong&gt;: I mean I talked about it with a guy at TABConf, and yeah,
the specific thing was that they had two different pieces of software that
both parsed it, and they parsed it and picked a different payment hash.  And
it just had to do with the frontend versus the backend parsing within the same
software stack.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Gustavo Flores Echaiz&lt;/strong&gt;: Right.  Unfortunate.  Please carry on.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p id="bolts-1352-transcript"&gt;&lt;em&gt;BOLTs #1352&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brandon Black&lt;/strong&gt;: Right, the last item is BOLTs #1352.  So, this one is a
weird situation and I think demonstrates the challenges in both having a
specification for software and having the software be the specification.  So,
in this case, I read through the PR as you were talking earlier, and what
happened here is that there are two implementations out there, maybe even
more, but at least two were referenced here, of the simple taproot channels.
And the software in both agreed, but neither piece of software actually did
what the spec said, because the spec was wrong.  And it was wrong in not
critical, dangerous ways, but in kind of subtle, insufficiently specified
ways.  And so, someone pointed a clanker at the implementations and at the
spec and said, “What’s the differences?” basically, and came up with, I think
it’s 13 or something differences between the implementations and the spec,
where again, it would be basically impossible to implement the spec as
written, because it would violate other BIPs.  But it’s still important to
have the spec match what the actual software has to do to implement these
simple taproot channels correctly.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So, that’s what this PR fixes.  It goes back and goes bit by bit through the
spec.  And what the prompter had the clanker do is take every bit of the spec
and implement it again and make sure that once it was re-implemented from the
spec precisely, it also matched exactly what the two real implementations were
doing.  So, it’s clearly now possible to go from spec to implementation and
have it match what others are already doing and match the other BIPs.  And so,
there were several things in here.  Some of the more interesting ones were,
for example, that the generation of MuSig nonces was not fully specified.  And
so, there was the potential for an implementer to create an insecure MuSig
nonce due to the loose specification.  And then, another one was that you
could get unsignable transactions, or potentially insecure transactions, it
was unclear to me from a brief reading which was possible, because of the use
of SIGHASH_SINGLE in the commitment signatures.  SIGHASH_SINGLE, you have to
be very careful that your transactions are constructed with the SIGHASH_SINGLE
input on the same place as the SIGHASH_SINGLE or corresponding output.  And
that wasn’t fully specified in the BOLT before.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Anyway, so that’s kind of that.  Again, the software was already correct in
this case.  The BOLTs were just not matching the software.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Gustavo Flores Echaiz&lt;/strong&gt;: That’s awesome.  Thank you so much, Brandon, for
covering that.  And thank you for co-hosting with me this newsletter and
everyone, including you, Vincent, for being present.  We thank listeners as
well and we’ll see you all next week.  Thank you.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Brandon Black&lt;/strong&gt;: Thanks so much, Gustavo.  See you soon.&lt;/p&gt;</content>
    <author>
      <name>Bitcoin Optech</name>
    </author>
    <summary type="html">Gustavo Flores Echaiz and Brandon Black are joined by Adam Gibson, Vincenzo Palazzo, and João Dias to discuss Newsletter #428.</summary>
    <media:thumbnail xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://bitcoinops.org/img/logos/optech-notext.png"/>
  </entry>
  <entry xml:lang="en">
    <title type="html">Bitcoin Optech Newsletter #427 Recap Podcast</title>
    <link href="https://bitcoinops.org/en/podcast/2026/10/20/" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="Bitcoin Optech Newsletter #427 Recap Podcast"/>
    <published>2026-10-20T00:00:00+00:00</published>
    <updated>2026-10-20T00:00:00+00:00</updated>
    <id>https://bitcoinops.org/en/podcast/2026/10/2026-10-20-recap</id>
    <content type="html" xml:base="https://bitcoinops.org/en/podcast/2026/10/20/">&lt;p&gt;Mark “Murch” Erhardt, Gustavo Flores Echaiz, and Mike Schmidt are joined by
Erick Cestari and Adam Gibson to discuss &lt;a href="/en/newsletters/2026/10/16/"&gt;Newsletter #427&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;

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&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;The Bitcoin Optech Podcast and transcription content is licensed Creative Commons &lt;a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0/legalcode" target="_blank"&gt;CC BY-SA 2.0&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

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  &lt;h2 id="news"&gt; News
    
  &lt;/h2&gt;
  
    &lt;ul&gt;
      
      
      &lt;li id="disclosure-of-two-dos-vulnerabilities-fixed-in-eclair-v0-14-1" class="anchor-list"&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
          &lt;a href="#disclosure-of-two-dos-vulnerabilities-fixed-in-eclair-v0-14-1" class="anchor-list-link"&gt;●&lt;/a&gt;
          Disclosure of two DoS vulnerabilities fixed in Eclair v0.14.1
          (&lt;a href="javascript:void(0)" title="Play this segment of the podcast" onclick="seek('0:53')" class="seek"&gt;0:53&lt;/a&gt;&lt;noscript&gt;0:53&lt;/noscript&gt;)
&lt;a href="/en/newsletters/2026/10/16/#disclosure-of-two-dos-vulnerabilities-fixed-in-eclair-v0-14-1"&gt;
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&lt;/a&gt;

    &lt;a href="#disclosure-of-two-dos-vulnerabilities-fixed-in-eclair-v0-14-1-transcript"&gt;
        &lt;i class="fa fa-file-text-o" title="Read this segment of the transcription"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
    &lt;/a&gt;


        &lt;/p&gt;
      &lt;/li&gt;
      
      
      &lt;li id="offchain-contracts-in-lightning-channels" class="anchor-list"&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
          &lt;a href="#offchain-contracts-in-lightning-channels" class="anchor-list-link"&gt;●&lt;/a&gt;
          Offchain contracts in Lightning channels
          (&lt;a href="javascript:void(0)" title="Play this segment of the podcast" onclick="seek('12:57')" class="seek"&gt;12:57&lt;/a&gt;&lt;noscript&gt;12:57&lt;/noscript&gt;)
&lt;a href="/en/newsletters/2026/10/16/#offchain-contracts-in-lightning-channels"&gt;
    &lt;i class="fa fa-link" title="Link to related content"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
&lt;/a&gt;

    &lt;a href="#offchain-contracts-in-lightning-channels-transcript"&gt;
        &lt;i class="fa fa-file-text-o" title="Read this segment of the transcription"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
    &lt;/a&gt;


        &lt;/p&gt;
      &lt;/li&gt;
      
    &lt;/ul&gt;
  

  &lt;h2 id="releases-and-release-candidates"&gt; Releases and release candidates
    
  &lt;/h2&gt;
  
    &lt;ul&gt;
      
      
      &lt;li id="bitcoin-core-32-0rc4" class="anchor-list"&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
          &lt;a href="#bitcoin-core-32-0rc4" class="anchor-list-link"&gt;●&lt;/a&gt;
          Bitcoin Core 32.0rc4
          (&lt;a href="javascript:void(0)" title="Play this segment of the podcast" onclick="seek('43:15')" class="seek"&gt;43:15&lt;/a&gt;&lt;noscript&gt;43:15&lt;/noscript&gt;)
&lt;a href="/en/newsletters/2026/10/16/#bitcoin-core-32-0rc4"&gt;
    &lt;i class="fa fa-link" title="Link to related content"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
&lt;/a&gt;

    &lt;a href="#bitcoin-core-32-0rc4-transcript"&gt;
        &lt;i class="fa fa-file-text-o" title="Read this segment of the transcription"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
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        &lt;/p&gt;
      &lt;/li&gt;
      
    &lt;/ul&gt;
  

  &lt;h2 id="notable-code-and-documentation-changes"&gt; Notable code and documentation changes
    
  &lt;/h2&gt;
  
    &lt;ul&gt;
      
      
      &lt;li id="eclair-3396" class="anchor-list"&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
          &lt;a href="#eclair-3396" class="anchor-list-link"&gt;●&lt;/a&gt;
          Eclair #3396
          (&lt;a href="javascript:void(0)" title="Play this segment of the podcast" onclick="seek('49:25')" class="seek"&gt;49:25&lt;/a&gt;&lt;noscript&gt;49:25&lt;/noscript&gt;)
&lt;a href="/en/newsletters/2026/10/16/#eclair-3396"&gt;
    &lt;i class="fa fa-link" title="Link to related content"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
&lt;/a&gt;

    &lt;a href="#eclair-3396-transcript"&gt;
        &lt;i class="fa fa-file-text-o" title="Read this segment of the transcription"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
    &lt;/a&gt;


        &lt;/p&gt;
      &lt;/li&gt;
      
      
      &lt;li id="eclair-3399" class="anchor-list"&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
          &lt;a href="#eclair-3399" class="anchor-list-link"&gt;●&lt;/a&gt;
          Eclair #3399
          (&lt;a href="javascript:void(0)" title="Play this segment of the podcast" onclick="seek('53:23')" class="seek"&gt;53:23&lt;/a&gt;&lt;noscript&gt;53:23&lt;/noscript&gt;)
&lt;a href="/en/newsletters/2026/10/16/#eclair-3399"&gt;
    &lt;i class="fa fa-link" title="Link to related content"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
&lt;/a&gt;

    &lt;a href="#eclair-3399-transcript"&gt;
        &lt;i class="fa fa-file-text-o" title="Read this segment of the transcription"&gt;&lt;/i&gt;
    &lt;/a&gt;


        &lt;/p&gt;
      &lt;/li&gt;
      
      
      &lt;li id="eclair-3395" class="anchor-list"&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
          &lt;a href="#eclair-3395" class="anchor-list-link"&gt;●&lt;/a&gt;
          Eclair #3395
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&lt;h2 id="transcription"&gt;Transcription&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Welcome, everyone, to Bitcoin Optech Newsletter #427 recap.
Today, we’re going to be talking about two DoS bugs in older versions of
Eclair; we have the LN-GAP discussion, which is a way to run multi-round
contracts.  The example is like a chess game inside a Lightning channel.
We’re going to talk about Bitcoin Core RC4 for 32.0, and then we have our
Notable code segment with a batch of Eclair fixes, among other things.  This
week, Murch, Gustavo, and I are joined by a couple of special guests.  We’ll
have them introduce themselves.  Erick?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Erick Cestari&lt;/strong&gt;: Hi, my name is Erick, and I’m a Vinteum grantee, and I’ve
been working on Bitcoin security, especially on LN.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Adam?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Adam Gibson&lt;/strong&gt;: Hi, I’m waxwing, I do various privacy and crypto research
projects.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p id="disclosure-of-two-dos-vulnerabilities-fixed-in-eclair-v0-14-1-transcript"&gt;&lt;em&gt;Disclosure of two DoS vulnerabilities fixed in Eclair v0.14.1&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Thank you both for joining us.  We’re going to tackle each
of your items first, as they are in the News section this week, first one
titled, “Disclosure of two DoS vulnerabilities fixed in Eclair v0.14.1”.
Erick’s back.  I feel like when Erick’s back, it’s like the old Matt Morehouse
is back.  Erick, you were on back in #421.  You joined us for the Core
Lightning (CLN) ping flood bug, I think it was.  This time, we have Eclair.
Maybe just to frame up the discussion a bit, when you have two Lightning nodes
and they open a channel between them, they go through a little handshake, and
the first message uses a temporary ID for the channel until the real one
exists.  And there’s two bugs in that handshake that let an attacker with no
channel and no money at risk actually eat memory until an Eclair node falls
over.  So, Erick, you found one of them, Matt Morehouse found the other one.
So, this is like a joint disclosure, and you’re representing sort of both of
them here.  Both were fixed in Eclair 0.14.1, that was back in July.  We
talked about that release in #416.  So, obviously, encourage folks to upgrade.
But, Erick, maybe you can give us a rundown of the two different bugs.  You
can start with whichever you’d like.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Erick Cestari&lt;/strong&gt;: Sure.  Yeah, both are related to memory usage when running
the Eclair node.  And they are related to the pending open_channel rate
limiter that Eclair has to limit peers to open too much channels, and left
them pending without funding the transaction and let the channel be open and
not just stay pending.  So, the first one was found by Matt Morehouse using
his fuzzer, which is smite.  Basically, it was found by sending multiple
open_channel and detecting that it accepts the same temporary_channel_ID
because of a race condition.  So, when Eclair adds the pending channel to his
rate limiter, he would first check it and then later, asynchronous would put
it on the map.  So, there is like a race between checking and putting it on
the map.  So, if you send two or more open_channel it could get both on the
rate limiter.  So, you could do it and leak a heap object on the process.  In
doing it, Matt Morehouse measured it, and it could leak 1 MB of memory per
second until the nodes crash.  Yeah, so the impact of this one is the DoS.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The second one was found using some sort of AI scanning, just using an LLM to
find it, and it was found by me and the AI.  But it’s also related to the
PendingChannelsRateLimiter.  When you are opening a channel, you need to
exchange some message.  So, first, the funder sends the open_channel, then the
fundee sends the accept_channel, the funder sends funding_created, and finally
the fundee sends the funding_signed message.  So, to know which channel we are
talking about, first the funder sends a temporary_channel_ID, which is 32
random bytes that the funder chooses.  And then, after the fundee sends the
accept_channel and the funder sends the funding_created, it gets the
FinalChannelId, which is basically the txid plus the index, the outpoint of
the funding transaction.  So, the issue in this one was related to how Eclair
adds the temporary_channel_ID and FinalChannelId on his rate limiter, which
you can say it’s basically an array.  So, it would first check if this array
already contains the temporary_channel_ID.  Then, when it gets the
FinalChannelId, it would remove all the objects in the array by filter and
filtering by the temporary_channel_ID.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So, the issue is basically that you can send a temporary_channel_ID value as
the last pending channel you have with Eclair.  So, basically, you would first
send a random temporary_channel_ID, get the channel_ID, and then you send
another open_channel, setting the temporary_channel_ID as the previous
channel_ID.  And by doing that, when Eclair tries to filter and remove the
temporary_channel_ID on the array, it would actually remove the FinalChannelId
from this array.  And by doing that, it would leak memory.  It would also
write those actors on disk.  So, when it gets restarted, it would crash
immediately, because it would load from disk to memory and it would be like a
persistent crash and crashing over and over.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: So, for that last one, it sounds like at least Eclair thinks
that array never actually gets above, like, two pending channels, but like the
real number of pending channels is actually growing unlimited behind the
scenes; is that right?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Erick Cestari&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah, exactly.  And the fix for this, for the second one, I
forgot to say the first, but for the second one, is basically using the
temporary_channel_ID and checking this array for both channel_ID,
FinalChannelId and temporary_channel_ID.  So, we check if that value is
already used for a channel_ID.  And for the first one, let me just recap, it’s
a race condition when adding the temporary_channel_ID to this rate limiter.
So, the fix is basically doing it atomically in a synchronous way instead of
doing it async.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: So, you mentioned the first one was found using smite;
that’s the fuzzing engine that Matt Morehouse created, similar to the one for
Bitcoin.  And that’s a fuzzing engine testing lightning implementations, and
it hit this state, and Matt Morehouse was able to figure out what caused that
state.  And then, second, you used LLM scanning tools to find it.  What did
you use?  I’m just curious.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Erick Cestari&lt;/strong&gt;: I have used the Claude Opus 5.5, and I’ve built my own
scanning.  But if you search on the internet, you can easily find how it was
built.  It’s based on a Cloudflare blog post, which is called Build Your Own
Harness.  Basically, the idea is to have some sort of a first agent that’s a
recon agent that scans the codebase.  And it will get the trust boundaries of
the code, the entry points, and invariants that cannot be broken.  And then,
the hunters are basically the ones that found the bugs.  And the hunters
receive small tasks and well-defined tasks to do.  And those tasks are given
by the first recon agent.  And hunters can also create other tasks for other
hunters to do it.  So, it’s kind of some sort of, like, the hunter will read
the code, get deep in, and find something suspicious, and let the other spy on
you, and create a new task for other hunters to finish and evaluate if there
is a vulnerability in that code or not.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So, about the smite one, we have an oracle, so building the smites, we can put
some oracles to check those invariants and see if the implementations are
respecting the BOLTs specification. And one oracle exactly that a node cannot
accept two open_channel that contain the same temporary_channel_ID.  So, it
detects it and probably Morehouse got deep in and found that could be used to
do a DoS attack.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Both of these were fixed back in July, as I mentioned, in
0.14.1.  So, folks should upgrade if they haven’t already.  I think we have
some more coming, it seems like from the notable code segment.  Maybe, are you
aware if this has been exploited in the wild, or was this just sort of fixed
before anybody could actually take advantage of it?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Erick Cestari&lt;/strong&gt;: No, I don’t think so.  And usually, Eclair, they update
their own node, they patch it right away.  So, I don’t think anyone has used
it or exploited that.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Adam Gibson&lt;/strong&gt;: May I ask a general question?  It’s not really about the
bugs, but about Eclair.  Is it something that is recommended to be used
generally, or is it only businesses that use Eclair?  I don’t have any sense
of that.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Erick Cestari&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah, I believe I cannot talk for them, but I have the
feeling that they use it for them, but they also provide the code if anyone
wants to use it, but I don’t see much users using Eclair code.  Yeah.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Adam Gibson&lt;/strong&gt;: So, it’s principally just the company themselves, you think,
that use it?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Erick Cestari&lt;/strong&gt;: I mean, it’s open source, people could use it, but right
now, definitely they are the biggest one running Eclair.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mark Erhardt&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah, I think it’s a very especially geared towards an LSP
business.  So, they have a lot of things that they need themselves.  I think
there might be a few other instances, but it’s a very low count, probably I
would say under 10 maybe.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Adam Gibson&lt;/strong&gt;: Got it.  Thanks.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Murch, Gustavo, anything else?  Or Erick, anything else
before we wrap up this item?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Erick Cestari&lt;/strong&gt;: No, thanks so much.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: All right, Erick.  Thanks for your work on this and
responsibly disclosing, and joining us today to talk about it.  We appreciate
your time.  Cheers.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p id="offchain-contracts-in-lightning-channels-transcript"&gt;&lt;em&gt;Offchain contracts in Lightning channels&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Second news item from the Newsletter, “Offchain contracts in Lightning
channels”.  This is LN-GAP.  I’m calling it LN-GAP, I don’t know.  Adam?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Adam Gibson&lt;/strong&gt;: Sure, yeah.  I mean, it’s one of these somewhat comical
attempts to make something sound like an easy to pronounce word, right,
governed by arbitrary programs.  But yeah, it’s LN-GAP, yeah.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Well, welcome back to the show.  You were on in #422, I
believe it was, to talk about Babilonia.  And that was your proposal for
coinjoins that were disguised as sort of these covert onchain bets, so that a
chain analysis company couldn’t tell that you were seeking privacy explicitly.
So, that was a cool project.  This one’s a little bit different.  I will defer
to you, waxwing, on introducing this one so I don’t butcher it.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Adam Gibson&lt;/strong&gt;: Okay.  So, yeah, I was thinking this morning about how do I
explain this?  I think you maybe take one concrete example, which is the chess
game.  By the way, the repository, which is at AdamISZ/ln-gap on GitHub, has
Demos that you can literally play a game of chess and play a game of blackjack
on regtest if you want.  But yeah, maybe to introduce it with a concrete
example, and then it sort of expands out from that.  So, let’s say you’re
playing a game of chess.  Now, obviously, you can play a game of chess and bet
on it if you want, but that’s got nothing to do with Bitcoin.  But the idea
would be that, let’s suppose that we could decide fairly or trustlessly the
outcome of the game and assign the winnings to the winning party using Bitcoin
Script.  Now, that’s already a can of worms, right, because what I think most
listeners will be well aware of is that there are severe limitations in the
kinds of rules that you can encode in Bitcoin Script.  Some people will be
familiar with the idea of little script and big script, and big script is
basically hashes and signatures and evaluating them as equal or not equal to
something, whereas little script is where you can actually do arithmetic, but
you can only do very limited arithmetic and it’s only on 32-bit values.  So,
yeah, very limited.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So, if I say something like, “Oh, we can decide whether a move you’re playing
in a chess game is valid in Bitcoin Script”, that might make you think, “Oh,
that sounds hard”.  And yes, it is hard, but at the same time, it is possible.
So, part of the thing here is to get some intuition that fairly complicated
games or, let’s say, contractual relationships with complicated rules can be
decided in Bitcoin Script using a few tricks.  So, one of the tricks is the
idea of verifying one predicate to decide some much larger piece of logic.
So, something like, okay, somebody’s saying to me that their move in chess is
to move the bishop from c1 to g5, one square to some other square.  And there
might be six or seven or 20 different reasons why that move is legal or
illegal.  In fact, when you write them all out, it ends up being like 10 to 15
distinct rules that you have to check to decide if a specific chess move is
legal or illegal.  And the idea is that the person who is trying to claim that
the move is illegal can do so very concisely by showing one specific rule that
is broken with one specific fact.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So, for example, if I’m saying I’m moving the bishop from c1 to g5, then maybe
there’s a pawn on e3 which blocks that path.  So, the person who wants to say,
“Your move is illegal”, can do so very concisely by presenting one specific
piece of evidence, such as a pawn, which is in the path from the beginning
square to the end square of the bishop’s move.  And this sort of dovetails
very nicely with taproot as well, because the nice thing about taproot is that
you can embed tens, hundreds, even thousands of different predicates, that is
to say rules that evaluate something to true or false, in individual tap
leaves, taproot leaves.  And so, that means that in that example, there might
be, as I claimed, 10, 15 different rules that you can check in chess to say
that move is illegal, but they can all just be separate taproot leaves.  And
if the game is more complicated and it has 100 different such legality rules,
then they can just be tap leaves and nobody cares.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So, that’s the first thing, is proving that some claim isn’t valid by
presenting one small piece of evidence.  If some massive statement that you’re
making is false, then logically it follows that one piece of it is false, that
kind of thinking.  The other nice trick, this is well understood by people
who’ve been looking at Bitcoin Script tricks over the last many years, the
other trick is to use things like Lamport or Winternitz One Time Signatures
(WOTS).  And why they’re important is that we don’t have things like CSFS
(CHECKSIGFROMSTACK).  If we want to debate between two counterparties whether
a certain state has certain properties, we kind of have to carry the state
from one transaction to another.  And the only way we can do that is because
without covenants, without being able to constrain, we need to carry state
from one transaction to the other by signing them.  And then, because a party
has signed a particular state, they can’t then sign another state.  So, we can
both, as the counterparty, use their signature, and also we can create
conditions that prevent them from equivocating and signing another state later
or in a separate branch of a tree, or something like that.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So, those two tricks together give you ways that it is at least possible, and
you can either believe me or not, it is at least possible, with the limits of
Bitcoin, such as a limited stack size.  You can’t execute some utterly massive
program because you can only ever put 1,000 different items on the stack by
consensus.  And yeah, there are also limits in size, although they tend to be
a little bit less unforgiving because of the size limit of, what is it now?
Well, again, it also depends on standardness, right?  So, 100 kB or 400 KvB
(kilo-vbytes), correct me if I’m wrong, Murch, is your standardness limit for
your transaction size itself.  Is that correct?  I think it’s correct.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mark Erhardt&lt;/strong&gt;: 400,000, yes.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Adam Gibson&lt;/strong&gt;: Yes, thank you.  So, that tends to be less of a restriction
than the stack limit for these kinds of things, where you’re executing very
complicated logic and you’re limited in how you can do arithmetic.  So, if you
want to do something like divide a number, you don’t just divide a number.
You can’t use OP_DIV, it doesn’t exist or it’s not valid.  So, you have to
mess around using additions and subtractions and moving things around.  So, it
turns out that’s a bit of a restriction.  So, what was I saying?  So, I was
saying that, yeah, you could kind of just take it as a claim and you can trust
me, or not and look at the code, but it is possible to decide, move by move,
whether the opponent’s move is valid given the current state, which as I said,
has to be sort of moved from one transaction to the other using WOTS, or
similar.  But then, think about this question.  Okay, let’s suppose we can do
that, and let’s suppose the transactions are not too ridiculously big, but
they will be quite big at certain points, do we really want to play chess like
that?  I mean, the answer is obviously no, right?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mark Erhardt&lt;/strong&gt;: I mean, it sounds very, very expensive!&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Adam Gibson&lt;/strong&gt;: It sounds expensive and it sounds slow, yeah.  I mean, maybe
you’re a fairly slow chess-mover like some of us are, but in any case, it was
still expensive.  So, then you start thinking about this idea.  And this idea,
I think, goes back to when the Ethereum people were looking at ideas of state
channels.  So, they looked at payment channels, as had been invented in
Lightning, and they said, “Well, that’s cool.  But in Ethereum, we have state,
we want to do complex contracts.  So, can we do the same thing as a payment
channel, but with evaluating steps of a contract?”  Seems like a sound idea.
And one idea that came out of that was what they called ForceMove, so as one
word, ForceMove.  The idea was very simple, really.  It was like operate
offchain optimistically.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So, Alice and Bob are in a contract or a game.  Alice makes a move, Bob makes
a move, Alice makes a move and so on.  And they sort of update state just very
similarly to how you do in Lightning; you update state as you make payments.
And the idea was that if one party stalls, so after move three in a chess
game, let’s say, Alice has made a move, Bob realizes he’s lost his queen or
something, and he’s thinking, “Well, damn, I’m definitely going to lose this
game, so I’m not going to play anymore”, which if you’ve ever seen children
playing chess, I’m sure you’re familiar with this.  This is a very common
thing, that people just don’t want to make a move, because they know they’d
rather go and do something else.  So, that presents a problem if you’re trying
to make a trustless scenario.  And in ForceMove, the idea was very simple.  It
was, well, if the other guy doesn’t move before a timeout, then you lift the
game onto the chain.  So, you then start playing the remaining moves of the
game on the blockchain.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So, this would seem like a step forward.  But as we’ve just observed, we don’t
want to play chess on the Bitcoin blockchain.  It’s going to cost money, it’s
going to take time.  If the game is 30 to 50 moves long, we’re talking about
hours and hours of waiting.  So, that’s why I thought to myself, well, could
you go a step further and try to sort of somehow create an architecture where
the resolution to a person stalling and refusing to move doesn’t necessarily
have to go on the blockchain?  And that was basically the idea behind LN-GAP,
the main idea.  So, how could that be possible?  So, it’s in some sense an
insoluble problem, because how could you prove to the blockchain that somebody
stalled?  It requires the use of a clock, right?  And the only way you could
sort of resolve it using Bitcoin’s clock is to go back to what we already
said, which is to force the game onto the blockchain where you can check, you
know, a timeout using a CSV (CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY) or CLTV
(CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY) clause.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So, this is the basic idea.  Since our only problem is one of recognizing that
silence has occurred for too long, let’s say, let’s have a trusted third party
resolve only that question.  So, in the paper, I call it a venue.  And the
idea is that you post your moves to the venue.  Now, obviously, the venue
could just be one trusted third party and that wouldn’t be great, but you can
distribute this amongst a group of entities, which the parties to the contract
could even just randomly choose them or agree on the set of entities.  It
could be 5, 10, 15, it could even be 100 different entities, all of which have
this power to attest that a move has taken place.  It’s somewhat limited in
some ways but it has a pretty nice properties.  First of all, the two parties
in the contract, Alice and Bob, don’t have to actually tell the venue what
their moves mean.  So, this is a bit of an echo of the client-side validation
concept, that the meaning of the steps are not relevant to the adjudicating
party, because all the adjudicating party is doing is saying that Alice signed
a move before deadline one, and then for move two, Bob must sign his move
before deadline two, and so on and so forth as you go down the list of moves.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mark Erhardt&lt;/strong&gt;: So, wait a minute.  Does this venue come into play for the
entire game and it just makes sure that time is passing, or is this only
happening once Bob the three-year old stops playing after losing his game?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Adam Gibson&lt;/strong&gt;: Unfortunately, no, it’s the entire game, because what it’s
doing is it’s saying each party made the relevant move before the pre-agreed
deadline.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mark Erhardt&lt;/strong&gt;: So, Alice and Bob agree on a venue before starting the game?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Adam Gibson&lt;/strong&gt;: Yes.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mark Erhardt&lt;/strong&gt;: Okay, I see.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Adam Gibson&lt;/strong&gt;: So, there is quite a lot of setup.  They have to agree on the
venue and that would usually involve agreeing on a set of parties that
constitute that venue; they would then have to presign a transaction tree,
hanging off a contract output within their Lightning channel for every move.
So, this is actually maybe another big limitation with the design, in that you
can’t have an unlimited number of moves.  It has to decide in advance there’s
going to be move 1 to 100 or 1 to 200, or whatever it is.  Why does it have to
do that?  Well, because they represent the conditions of the entire contract,
and if you don’t agree all of them, then a person who doesn’t want to continue
can stall.  Making sense so far?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mark Erhardt&lt;/strong&gt;: Right, so basically we’re using a chess game just as a
stand-in for any possible contract.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Adam Gibson&lt;/strong&gt;: Any possible two-party contract.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mark Erhardt&lt;/strong&gt;: Yes, important.  They agree on a venue, which is sort of an
arbitrator, but it only attests to the timing of actions in the contract.  And
you need to know how many moves at most a game will take in order to be able
to commit to the sequence of timings that each party has to fulfill.  Can you
make it dependent on the previous timing?  Let’s say we actually played pretty
quickly in the beginning and I do a move, you do a move, we have the first ten
moves within a minute.  Would now Bob be able to stall?  Or, sorry, we’re
playing, so would you be able to stall for 109 minutes, because we had
committed that each move has to be done within ten minutes?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Adam Gibson&lt;/strong&gt;: Good question.  In the current implementation, yes.  So,
that’s kind of a bit crappy, but it’s still following the rules of a contract,
right, which is that there is a deadline.  Stalling isn’t possible, but I’m
not sure if using CSV, I can’t remember now if it’s actually easy or possible
or really difficult to rearrange it so that the clock starts ticking from the
previous.  Is that possible at all, though, because all of this is happening
offchain?  I’d have to look into it again.  At the moment, the basic principle
is followed, which is that there is a deadline for each move, but that
deadline is not variable.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mark Erhardt&lt;/strong&gt;: Right, okay.  So, let’s say we do a minute because we can
play more quickly, but we would set basically a timeline of up to 200 minutes
for the game.  And at any point now, the other player can grief you up to
number-of-moves minutes, but there’s a deadline they cannot stall
indefinitely.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Adam Gibson&lt;/strong&gt;: Exactly, yeah.  So, what else?  I did send a link.  Okay,
I’ll just describe it.  If you go into the repository, so it’s ln-gap under
AdamISZ on GitHub, and then if you go into docs, you will find, I think, one
particular diagram is the most useful to sort of grok what’s going on, which
is in that docs subdirectory, there’s a file called presigned-graph.md.  And
if you look at that graph, assuming it actually displays correctly, because
apparently it doesn’t for some people, but if you look at that graph, it will
show you how the contract output sort of hangs off the channel in the same way
as the to-local and to-remote outputs hang off.  And I think it’s interesting
to look at that to understand the logic of the game, because the general idea
is that the contract output holds the funds that are under dispute.  So, maybe
it’s a bet and there’s, like, $200 in there, whatever, and it’s going to
decide who gets that money.  And it could decide that there’s a draw and both
sides get what they started with, or it could decide that white wins or black
wins and that person gets all the money.  Now, how it does that is that
there’s basically a process of claim and then sort of counterclaim, but it’s a
little complicated.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So, the initial claim would be if anybody wants to do this, because they’re
saying, “Well, you know what, Bob, he hasn’t posted his move and the
deadline’s passed, and I can see on the venue there wasn’t any move”.  And in
fact, there’s a mechanism whereby venue members will set what they call a
flag, and they will actually publish saying, “Bob didn’t actually post before
the deadline”, and it will become a matter of a threshold agreement of
deciding, “Oh, there’s enough flags saying, ‘No, he didn’t post it’”.  So, if
I’m Alice in that situation, I post onto the chain.  Well, it’s like a
force-close effectively.  I’m force-closing and I’m publishing a claim that
says, “Bob didn’t publish his move”.  And the logic is subtle because if I do
that for, let’s say, move 12, I say, “He didn’t post move 12 and he was due.
He should have done so before this deadline”, one way Bob can counter me is he
can say, “Well, you didn’t post move 11”.  And that’s actually really
important, because if you don’t include that logical condition, then Alice
could just, at the start of the game, say, “He didn’t post move 12”.  Well, he
wasn’t due to post move 12.  So, there’s one little level of, like, recursion
there, which doesn’t go into infinite recursion, but if Alice says Bob didn’t
post move 12, Bob can counter by saying, “I wasn’t due to post move 12,
because you didn’t post move 11”, and that would end it and Alice would lose.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;But of course, assuming that she didn’t do anything stupid like that, she’s
saying, “No, he didn’t post move 12 and he was due to”, then Bob’s rebuttal to
that claim is to say, “No, actually, here is move 12 and here is a signature
from one of the venue members that says, I did actually post it”.  Now, think
about this; Bob could be cheating here.  If he’s colluding with one of the
venue members, he could have maybe not had the move posted deliberately,
sneakily, didn’t post it and didn’t get a signature on it from one of the
venue members.  Then Alice says, “Oh, you didn’t post your move”.  He could
rebut and say, “Oh, look, I have got a signature from a venue member”, because
the venue member’s colluding and didn’t post.  You see, the thing about
signatures is they’re not timed, you don’t know if a signature’s been
published or not anywhere.  So, he could cheat like that.  So, that’s why we
need to have what we call these flags.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So, what we do is we have individual points, as in curve points, from each of
the venue members, that they can broadcast the secret for, such that you can
count up with an OP_CHECKSIGADD counting mechanism how many of them said,
“This move did not occur before the deadline”.  And that has to be a matter of
consensus over the venue.  It’s not an objective fact, right?  So, you’ll see
some sort of philosophical commentary about this in the paper, because that is
the fundamental trust assumption that you have to create.  And my argument was
that with a combination of positive, you can actually lock fees for publishing
these attestations.  Although it’s a bit of a stretch, there are scenarios in
which you can create bonds that could be slashed if they publish false
attestations, and there’s the fact that if some of your venue members are
public entities whose reputation depends on not making transparent lies, then
you can make that argument as to why they would not make false attestations
like this.  Go ahead.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mark Erhardt&lt;/strong&gt;: So, you got me thinking on why we would not just rely on an
arbitrator here.  So, if there’s collusion, it breaks.  Obviously, the
arbitrator also wants to be able to prove that they behave correctly.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Adam Gibson&lt;/strong&gt;: What do you mean by an arbitrator is distinct from what I’m
describing?  I don’t quite get it.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mark Erhardt&lt;/strong&gt;: Right.  So, you have basically a timestamping service?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Adam Gibson&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah, kind of, yeah.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mark Erhardt&lt;/strong&gt;: And if they secretly provide a timestamp that they didn’t
publish, you need to be able to catch that and the only mechanism to do so is
reputation, right?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Adam Gibson&lt;/strong&gt;: Well, concretely, you catch it by other people, if they
secretly sign something and then only reveal it instead of publishing it in
the venue, then you catch it by the other members having attested, “No this
didn’t happen, this was not published”.  So, it’s essentially a threshold.
It’s a majority statement of what was and what was not published before a
deadline.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mark Erhardt&lt;/strong&gt;: Okay.  So, venue is really also a multiparty construct and
it must have multiple signers?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Adam Gibson&lt;/strong&gt;: No, I mean, you can have just one, but then you’re just
relying on one party.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mark Erhardt&lt;/strong&gt;: Sure, okay.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Adam Gibson&lt;/strong&gt;: What I’m trying to say is it is an arbitrator, it’s just a
question of what it arbitrates.  What it could arbitrate is the entire
contract logic, right?  You could literally think of it as in comparison with
putting money into, let’s say, a sidechain controlled by a multisig
federation.  You might put the money into a sidechain so that you can do
things on the sidechain that you wouldn’t be able to do otherwise.  The
problem with that, and I make this comparison in the paper, the big negative
with that is that that means that that entity controls all the funds of
everyone, right?  Whereas here, you’re taking the two-party contract logic off
of control of anyone else.  That doesn’t mean that you’re not ceding control
of the money, because you are, 100%.  If there is collusion, the money and the
contract can be stolen unfairly by a counterparty, because they’ve managed to
convince all the venue to be on their side.  So, 100%.  That’s why I think
it’s interesting but it’s not a perfect solution in that regard, but it does
mean that the venue is not controlling all the funds.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;What I think is a nice illustration of where this might matter is in the
paper, I gave an example, a silly example, I call it the Iranian Service
Provider example.  But I pointed out the idea that if two Iranian people, like
a service provider and a client, wanted to interact and use such a venue, the
first nice point is that because the moves that they’re posting don’t contain
information that the venue can necessarily read, the venue might not know that
they’re Iranian and that they’re violating sanctions, or whatever.  So, if the
venue are American public companies, and then after, let’s say, three weeks of
helping these Iranian people do their business, they decide, “Oh no, we’ve
just found out these guys are Iranian.  We don’t want to offer them service
anymore”, what they cannot do is freeze those two Iranian people’s funds
because they never controlled them in the first place.  What they can do is
stop cooperating.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mark Erhardt&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah, that’s an important distinction.  So, the funds remain
controlled by the two participants of the contract.  The venue only acts as an
oracle and it only attests to the timestamps on the statements made by the two
contract members.  And the statements are used to resolve the contract.  So,
having the timestamp simply attests to the presence or non-presence of these
pieces of information that are used to resolve the result of the contract.
This does remind me a little bit of the oracles in the discreet log contract
(DLC).&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Adam Gibson&lt;/strong&gt;: I’m just laughing because I was about to say exactly the same
thing, and it’s in the paper as well.  Ultimately, this is really just the DLC
oracle or the federation or the multiparty DLC oracle concept, but it’s just
trying to boil it down to the smallest possible atom, which is the only thing
it attests is the existence before a time.  Instead of, let’s say, attesting
the price of oil was such and such on this date, it’s just attesting that one
fact.  But apart from that, structurally, it’s absolutely the same basic
thing.  But in a way, all I’m saying is, “Oh, look, this thing that we already
have, this kind of DLC oracle design, can maybe do some interesting things
that you don’t realize, not just things like games.  You can do things like
chess and card games, or what have you, but you could also have things like a
file storage service, like Filecoin type thing, with the nice property that if
the counterparty in the contract stops storing your file, and you can prove
that he’s stalled, he’s no longer sending the merkle paths or some random
chunk of bytes in my file, which means he isn’t storing it anymore, I can take
all the money as a punishment.  The other implementations of that, Filecoin,
Siacoin, and some other ideas, they didn’t have that property.  They just had
the property that if he stopped storing your file, you would stop paying him.
But in this case, you can actually get an insurance payout.  This is just an
example.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: How do the members get paid, if at all, the members of the
venue?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Adam Gibson&lt;/strong&gt;: That’s another really cool little detail that I didn’t
mention.  I had this idea, what I called ECOTS.  So, instead of Winternitz or
Lamport one-time signatures, you could use elliptic curve one-time signatures.
And actually, again, it’s very similar to DLC.  So, the concept of DLC is that
there’s some fixed nonce, which means that the final result of the signature
is also fixed, it’s just that you don’t know it yet.  So, you could kind of
leverage that into making an atomic Lightning payment every time somebody
attests.  So, imagine there are 50 members of this venue.  That’s generous,
I’ve only got five in my examples.  But let’s say there are 50.  You send your
moves out, your chess game moves.  Every time one of them decides to attest
it, then in so doing, I can’t remember how it works now, but in so doing,
there will be a Lightning payment that they will be able to receive by
publishing the move onto the venue.  And I thought that was a really nice
feature, because trying to create this kind of structure, well, it’s a lot of
extra cost, right, having all these venue members, etc.  There kind of needs
to be a fee, a revenue stream that would incentivize that.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Anything else you’d like to say on this item, waxwing, and
then we’ll maybe have you tease some of your future work?  Murch, any
questions as well?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Adam Gibson&lt;/strong&gt;: Okay, no, just that’s already probably way too much.  But
it’s very hard to explain.  But I think it’s kind of a fun, somewhat limited
construction.  I’ve kind of taken the idea and run with it in a slightly
different direction in my next thing, which is to sort of remove the venue,
but for a specific application.  The thing I didn’t mention, which I probably
should have, about LN-GAP, is if I’m claiming it’s for arbitrary programs,
that’s kind of bogus, because as was just described, Bitcoin has limited stack
size and a limited amount of space so you can’t do any arbitrary computation
on it.  That’s just not true, but I did describe in the LN-GAP paper that if
the computation you were doing was the evaluation of zero-knowledge proof
verifier, then you could be effectively proving the correctness of any
arbitrary program within this limited paradigm with the venues and there’s a
certain trust and there’s a collusion threat, and so on.  I still think it’s
very interesting, but it has a limitation.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So, what I’ve been working on now is taking that same idea of verifying
zero-knowledge proof within a two-party contract so that you could create
effectively a kind of L2.  And without going into details, you don’t actually
need a venue to do that.  And I’ll just stop there because it’s too much.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Stay tuned, perhaps next week.  Waxwing, thanks for joining
us.  We appreciate your time and your work on this.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Adam Gibson&lt;/strong&gt;: Thank you.  Thank you very much.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: Okay, that wraps up our news segment.  We can jump to
Releases and release candidates.  We’re seeing this one a few times with
different RCs, but I’ll turn it over to Gustavo to walk us through what might
have changed.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p id="bitcoin-core-32-0rc4-transcript"&gt;&lt;em&gt;Bitcoin Core 32.0rc4&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Gustavo Flores Echaiz&lt;/strong&gt;: Thank you.  Yes, this is the fourth RC of Bitcoin
Core.  The testing guide was updated with this new RC last week.  And now, I
don’t think I’ve seen any changes on what was included, just things were fixed
that remain.  So, listeners are invited to keep testing Bitcoin Core.  This RC
has a few new RPCs.  One of the major changes is the rewrite of the HTTP
server, which has removed the external libevent dependency.  But mainly in
there, the estimatesmartfee combined estimator, which now includes a mempool
feerate estimator, alongside the conservative block-based estimator and a few
new RPCs and updated RPCs.  So, nothing else to say, but go test it out.
Except, Murch, please jump in.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mark Erhardt&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah, I think there’s two more interesting things.  There
are new schemes, how we store the txindex and the txospenderindex.  One of
them is backwards-compatible, the other one is not.  But if you want to use
those indexes, you can delete the existing one once you’ve upgraded in order
to rebuild it and get about half of the space saved for those indexes.  For
the txindex, it’s not downgrade-compatible.  So, if you want to go back to the
old version, you’d have to rebuild it with the old version again.  This can
happen, of course, from the blockchain.  It just takes a few hours to build.
But yeah, some people came up with some smarter ways of storing those indexes.
And that way, they take only about half the space.  That’s kind of cool in an
age where we’re running into our hard-drive limits maybe for some nodes.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The other one that I had in mind is, which one was it?  Never mind.  There was
something else.  Yeah, the mempool feerate estimation.  Oh yeah, the
connections.  We increased the number of connections a node makes by default
from 125 to 200.  But only half of those are able to support transaction
relay.  So, roughly the number of transaction relaying connections would stay
the same.  And what we really increased is the number of blocks-only
connections we accept.  The idea is blocks-only connections have very little
traffic.  Optimally, you only once announce every roughly ten minutes that you
have a new block, and the other party says, “I have it too”.  And then,
besides that header every ten minutes, you don’t really send anything.  But in
case you are being eclipsed, having a blocks-only connection that will
announce a new block to you makes you more robust against eclipse attacks.
So, having more blocks-only connections is very cheap and makes us more
robust.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Gustavo Flores Echaiz&lt;/strong&gt;: Thank you, Murch.  Yes, waxwing?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Adam Gibson&lt;/strong&gt;: Sorry, may I ask a brief question about that?  I always
wondered, even from the early days, why the numbers are what they are; 120
seemed quite high to me.  I totally agree.  Having more blocks only makes
sense.  But why are the numbers what they are?  Is there any science behind
that, or is it just what we think, what we feel?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mark Erhardt&lt;/strong&gt;: Well, I don’t know how they got initially picked, but I
guess that the amount of traffic that nodes had was monitored somewhat
closely, and it was found to be all right for most people.  You can obviously
set different limits, so your node can have more or fewer connections.  And
also, because for the most part, we announce that we have new transactions,
but we don’t actually send all the transactions on all the connections,
because each node only receives every transaction once, we hopefully don’t
actually need all the bandwidth to – what am I trying to say here?  There is
a diminishing cost for more peers, because the brunt of the data is sending
transactions, but you only actually have to receive each transaction once.
And so, you probably only have to actually send most transactions to a few
peers, because they’ll also get it from other peers.  So, it might be less
data than one would intuitively think that is necessary to maintain a peer
connection.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Adam Gibson&lt;/strong&gt;: Yeah, thanks.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Gustavo Flores Echaiz&lt;/strong&gt;: Thank you for the question, waxwing, and for the
extra details, Murch.  Yes, if listeners want to learn more about the topics
Murch mentioned, they are found in the release note drafts in the P2P and
network changes.  And for the indexes, you can find in the section about
low-level changes.  It talks about both the txindex update and the
txospenderindex update.  That’s it for the Release and release candidates.
Now, we jump on to the Notable code and documentation changes.  This week, the
main repo we look at is Eclair, which has announced about eight different PRs
covering multiple fixes.  These are packaged in four different items, so we’re
going to go one by one.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p id="eclair-3396-transcript"&gt;&lt;em&gt;Eclair #3396, #3397, and #3400&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The first one, which combines three different PRs #3396, #3397, and #3400, are
different ways a malicious channel peer could prevent Eclair from enforcing
HTLCs (Hash Time Locked Contracts) onchain during splicing.  So, the first one
is one where Eclair would sign a splice transaction that could not get
published because, for example, the peer would have chosen a very distant
absolute locktime, it would have added inputs with relative timelocks, or it
would also provide non-standard witnesses that could get blocked by relay
policy, or additional changes such as exceeding the standard transaction
weight limits.  So, when Eclair would try to publish this transaction, it
wouldn’t be able to do so.  And the commitment transaction based on this
splice transaction would simply never be able to be broadcasted, because the
transaction would never be able to get confirmed.  And so, now the fix is to
add checks on these cases.  Eclair will simply not sign a splice transaction
that cannot be published onchain because it has these different
characteristics.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The second case is one where Eclair is trying to publish a commitment or a
penalty transaction, but at the same time, the peer has published a
conflicting unconfirmed transaction that basically reuses a same input part of
a splicing transaction.  So, the peer proposes a splicing, includes his own
input, but at the same time publishes a conflicting transaction when Eclair is
trying to publish the commitment transaction.  So, what would happen is the
peer could then RBF his own conflicting transaction and publish one that
doesn’t conflict with the splice or with the commitment transactions, and
Eclair would have just had to retry publishing the commitment transaction, but
Eclair would fail to do so.  So, the fix is for Eclair to keep watching.  If
the transaction that was conflicting doesn’t get confirmed and another one
gets confirmed, Eclair simply has to keep retrying the commitment or penalty
transactions until they can be broadcasted and confirmed on-chain.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The third one is one where Eclair and the peer both agree on a splice, then
they both agree on an RBF replacement.  But before they agree, or at some
point, Eclair tries to force-close the splice transaction based on the initial
splice, not on the RBF replacement.  So, what happens if the RBF replacement
gets confirmed instead of the initial attempt?  Then, Eclair would have failed
to publish another commitment transaction that force-closes the RBF
replacement of the splice, and that would have left funds locked and HTLCs
unenforced.  So, now the fix is for Eclair to recognize that the funding
transaction has changed, that it’s actually the RBF replacement one that got
confirmed, and for Eclair to react to that by broadcasting a commitment
transaction that spends the splice output of the replacement transaction.  And
only then, Eclair can ensure that the funds don’t remain locked and the HTLCs
get enforced.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So, those are three scenarios where Eclair would fail to enforce HTLCs onchain
during splicing, but now all the fixes have been applied.  And I also
referenced Newsletter #423, because we had similarly covered issues related to
splicing and Eclair.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p id="eclair-3399-transcript"&gt;&lt;em&gt;Eclair #3399 and #3394&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The next item, these two PRs, #3399 and #3394.  These are two ways Eclair
could pay a downstream peer without collecting the corresponding incoming HTLC
during on-the-fly funding.  So, on-the-fly funding is a method that Eclair
uses mostly for mobile clients that don’t yet have Lightning channels but want
to receive funds via Lightning.  Eclair forwards an HTLC at the same time it
sets up a new channel for the peer.  So, it’s provision of a channel in real
time, also called on-the-fly funding.  So, here the issue is that, for
example, the Eclair receives a payment that expires, and then the sender sends
a new payment that reuses the same payment hash.  So, then, once that second
payment gets routed, if the downstream peer claims the original outgoing HTLC
onchain for the first payment, Eclair basically has the preimage and it can
apply that preimage to claim either the first payment or the second one,
because remember, they both share the same payment hash.  And here the issue
is that Eclair would fulfill the new payment, even though it was supposed to
fulfill the old payment.  And if the amounts differ, then Eclair is basically
handing out to a downstream peer an HTLC of a higher amount, but claiming from
an upstream peer an HTLC of a lower amount.  So, that’s how you can see how
Eclair can lose funds, because it uses the preimage on the wrong payment.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So, now the fix is for Eclair to always make sure that it fulfils the HTLC
that applies to the one that the downstream peer fulfilled.  Basically, you
don’t just look at the payment hash, but also at the amount and other
characteristics of the HTLC, so you don’t get confused by fulfilling a
lower-amount HTLC and losing money.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The second PR is one where Eclair makes the mistake of forwarding an HTLC, not
on the on-the-fly funding splice but on another channel it already has with
the peer.  So, yes, Eclair splices a channel with the peer, offers on-the-fly
funding for that channel, but forwards the HTLC in another channel.  So, then,
this requires for the receiver not to fulfill the HTLC.  And then, when Eclair
realizes that the downstream peer never fulfilled the HTLC, never claimed
funds, so Eclair will force-close the on-the-fly funding channel.  And by
doing that, it will simply check if there were any HTLCs on that force-close
channel that required failing upstream, and it sees no HTLCs in that channel
because the HTLC was routed via another channel, so it doesn’t fail any HTLCs;
and thus, the outgoing HTLC remains claimable, right?  So, it has forwarded an
HTLC, it has failed downstream an HTLC on another channel, and it can lose
money again on one side, because the downstream peer is claiming it and Eclair
is failing it for the incoming peer, so both claim it.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So, now the fix is for Eclair to always forward the HTLC on the correct
channel, so later it doesn’t get confused which channel to look at.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p id="eclair-3395-transcript"&gt;&lt;em&gt;Eclair #3395&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The next item, this one is a pretty simple one.  Here, a malicious sender,
constructs a malformed payment onion packet that has a valid HMAC.  So, when
Eclair receives the packet, it has a valid HMAC.  However, the malicious
sender is claiming that the payload length is larger than it actually is.  So,
when Eclair tries to decode the payload, it simply catches an uncaught
exception and crashes, because it’s trying to decode something larger than
what it actually is.  So, then, the problem is that the relayer resumes
without failing the HTLC.  So, the last hop, the upstream peer, doesn’t get
back his money.  Even if Eclair cannot forward the HTLC, because the length of
the packet is different from what it says, it simply never fails back the
incoming HTLC.  So, a malicious sender basically makes the downstream peer,
the hop right before Eclair, have his money locked and basically be forced to
force-close the channel to be able to claim back the money on chain.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So, now the fix is simply for Eclair to check that the per-hop payload fits
within the packet.  If it doesn’t, it simply returns a failure message and it
simply fails back the HTLC, and every peer in the route can claim back their
money without force-closing the channel.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p id="eclair-3401-transcript"&gt;&lt;em&gt;Eclair #3401&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The last item from Eclair, #3401, this is one where Eclair is trying to
fulfill or fail an HTLC, but let’s say for this example, Eclair is fulfilling
an HTLC, it has the preimage, it asks the downstream peer, “Hey, here’s a
preimage”, but the downstream peer, for example, doesn’t respond.  And then,
Eclair has a duplicate instruction to once again fulfill the payment, but when
the duplicate instruction comes in, it gets rejected because Eclair detects
that it had already proposed a fulfillment, but the peer never replied with a
signature.  So, the fulfillment is not signed, but the second, the duplicate
instruction, makes Eclair schedule the deletion of the original stored
instruction.  So, Eclair wants to fulfill an HTLC, the peer doesn’t respond,
Eclair retries to do that, but the retry makes it delete the original
instruction.  So, now Eclair is simply unable to fulfill the HTLC, even though
it has the preimage.  But the problem here is that the downstream peer has
already collected the money from Eclair, right?  So, once again, a similar
scenario where Eclair gets double-spent, pays the upstream peer, but the
downstream peer can still fail back the HTLC onchain and claim back the money.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So, now Eclair always retains the original instruction.  Even though there’s a
duplicate instruction, it will never delete the original instruction to never
lose that state.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p id="ldk-5080-transcript"&gt;&lt;em&gt;LDK #5080&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The next two items are from the LDK repo.  So, the first one is one where it’s
not the node itself that’s at risk, it’s his peer that can get their money
locked.  So, this is specifically about when LDK restarts and wants to process
HTLCs, it would have excluded channels undergoing cooperative close.  However,
a channel that is undergoing a cooperative close can still have HTLCs that
require fulfillment or require being failed.  So, here, LDK would simply
ignore all HTLCs from cooperative-closed channels, which consequently, if at
the same time the downstream peer would fail an HTLC and LDK was supposed to
also fail the incoming HTLC, it would fail to do so if the channel was
undergoing cooperative close.  That means that the incoming channel peer would
have to wait until expiry to force-close the channel to reclaim their money.
So, now LDK simply makes sure to include channels undergoing shutdown or
undergoing a cooperative close when restoring the information needed to
resolve existing HTLCs.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So, I think that’s the last one that covers these HTLC scenarios.  So, I know
it can be a bit confusing, but now we’re going to get to ones that are a bit
easier to understand.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p id="ldk-5087-transcript"&gt;&lt;em&gt;LDK #5087&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The LDK #5087, this is an interesting potential privacy leak when sending an
onion message over a blinded path and when you use dummy hops.  So, in
Newsletter #370, we covered how LDK added support for dummy hops on blinded
paths, which enables receivers to add arbitrary hops that serve no routing
purpose but act as decoys.  This prevents a sender from guessing the position
of the receiver.  LDK is at position three, but with dummy hops, it can claim
that it’s at position six.  However, a sender could include message-content
TLV (Type-Length-Value) records that were targeted for the recipient, but he
would include it at a different position.  So, for example, let’s go again
with the three and five scenario.  The sender is position one; there’s a hop
in between the sender and the receiver; and LDK is the receiver at position
three, but it adds two dummy hops, right?  So, it seems that the receiver is
at position five, but it actually is at position three.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So, what the malicious sender does, it includes a message-content TLV record
at the third position, trying to guess that the receiver is at the third
position.  And the problem was that LDK was simply accepting it as if it was a
correct message.  So, then, the sender gets basically confirmation that LDK is
at position three, and position four and five are dummy and are not real,
because why else would a node at position three reply as if it was the
receiver?  So, now the fix is simple.  LDK simply rejects message-content
records at dummy hops.  So, even if it could interpret it because it is the
receiver, it will act as if it’s simply a node at level three, see that this
message-content record was not destined for position three but instead for
position five, and reject the message instead of actually accepting it.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p id="lnd-11068-transcript"&gt;&lt;em&gt;LND #11068&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The next one from the LND repository, this is #11068.  So, this one is about a
missing check for auxiliary HTLC signatures on experimental taproot overlay
channels used for Taproot Assets.  So, what does this mean?  It means that
taproot overlay channels are channels used for Taproot Assets, or other types
of assets, so you’re extending a simple taproot channel to be used for not
just Bitcoin routing but additional meta protocol assets.  So, in these
channels, it’s very important for a signer to not only sign the Bitcoin HTLCs
as in a regular Lightning channel, but also provide additional signature
entries for each non-dust HTLC alongside the usual Bitcoin signatures.  This
is what allows the underlying assets, the Taproot Assets, to be properly
signed and routed.  However, if LND is, for example, the one receiving the
signature from the peer, so previously, if the peer sent a commitment that had
the required Bitcoin signatures but didn’t have the auxiliary HTLC signatures,
LND would incorrectly accept it.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Now, the fix is for LND to verify that the auxiliary signatures are present.
And if they’re not, it will reject the commitment and force-close the channel.
But previously, it would accept it, which meant that if the channel was later
force-closed, the missing signatures could prevent the affected asset HTLCs
from being resolved onchain, because LND would simply not have the signatures
of the peer for the auxiliary assets.  So, now LND simply makes sure that the
signatures are present.  If not, it rejects the commitment and force-closes
the channel.  However, I want to note that this PR doesn’t include fixes for a
peer that is sending a commitment without the signatures.  It’s about the peer
verifying that the signatures are present, but not the check that prevents a
not properly signed commitment from being sent.  So, that’s probably work that
will follow up.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p id="rust-bitcoin-6956-transcript"&gt;&lt;em&gt;Rust Bitcoin #6956&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;And the last two items are from Rust Bitcoin and BDK.  The Rust Bitcoin item
#6956, this is a very interesting one because this is something that I hadn’t
understood before.  But technically, a witness script and scripthash can
differ under certain conditions.  For example, when a P2WSH script contains an
OP_CODESEPARATOR, signature hashing must exclude everything up to and
including the last separator.  So, it means that previously, when creating a
signature, this Rust Bitcoin would accept a witness script, and a witness
script is always the whole contents of the script where, like I said, a
signature hash under the P2WSH situation that contains an OP_CODESEPARATOR
differs from the witness script.  But previously, it would accept a witness
script, which in this specific scenario, would differ from the required data
for signature hashing, which means that it would produce an invalid signature.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So, now Rust Bitcoin introduces a new type, called ScriptCode, for the script
data used in legacy and segwit v0 signature hashing that differs from the full
script being signed.  And specifically, like I said, it’s for the case where
the OP_CODESEPARATOR is present.  So, the API now accepts ScriptCode.  You can
sign your specific transactions with this, specifically for legacy and segwit
v0 signature hashing.  But you as a caller must still identify the last
executed separator and shorten the script yourself.  Also, the PR also adds
P2wpkhScriptCode, which is another edge case which represents a fixed-size,
allocation-free representation of the standard script used to sign P2WPKH
inputs.  So, this is a very granular, detailed scenario for applications that
sign these specific types of transactions.  They would previously result in
invalid signatures, and now they will work even in the specific edge case
scenarios.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p id="bdk-2319-transcript"&gt;&lt;em&gt;BDK #2319&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Finally, the last item, BDK #2319.  So, this is a bug where an Electrum-backed
wallet, so if you’re using the BDK component for Electrum with an Electrum
Server, here, if you had a transaction that would confirm, but then it would
get re-org’d, so it would get unconfirmed, but it would get re-confirmed via
another block after the re-org, BDK would fail to track that change, because
BDK was placing the block’s header in its cache and was basically linking the
transaction to the first block that it was included in.  It would fail to
update the block header’s cache, so it would still be looking at the
transaction, see that the transaction was linked to this block, see that the
block got re-org’d and the transaction was unconfirmed, and still present the
transaction as unconfirmed, even though it had now been included in another
block.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So, now the fix is simply to refresh the header cache to catch that the
transaction was included now in a new block, to basically make the link
between the transaction and the new header block, and thus allow for a
one-block reorg, for a wallet that depends on BDK, to show to its user that
the transaction was now included in a new block after a reorg.  And that’s the
final item and completes the Newsletter.  Thank you.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Schmidt&lt;/strong&gt;: I was checking that last one.  That sounded like something
that an LLM scan would find.  Not totally sure if it did.  It did say that the
PR was generated with Claude Code, but that felt like an LLM scan one.  But
Gustavo, thanks for getting us through the Notable code segment, especially
those Eclair PRs, because there were like three and two and whatever, and
those different ones.  So, appreciate that.  We’ll see the release soon.
Yeah.  Murch, anything else before we wrap up?  All right.  Well, thanks to my
co-host, Murch and Gustavo.  We also want to thank waxwing for staying on with
us, and Erick for joining us earlier, and for you all for listening.  Cheers.&lt;/p&gt;</content>
    <author>
      <name>Bitcoin Optech</name>
    </author>
    <summary type="html">Mark “Murch” Erhardt, Gustavo Flores Echaiz, and Mike Schmidt are joined by Erick Cestari and Adam Gibson to discuss Newsletter #427.</summary>
    <media:thumbnail xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://bitcoinops.org/img/logos/optech-notext.png"/>
  </entry>
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